



CLIMATE CHANGE INACTION IN CANADA: POLITICAL SUBSYSTEMS AND POLICY 














A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL 




























Climate Change Inaction in Canada: Political Subsystems and Policy Outcomes in the Oil 
& Gas Industry, 1999-2019 
 
Abstract 
Despite increasing urgency of the climate crisis, Canada is unlikely to meet its 2030 greenhouse 
gas emissions reduction target under the Paris Agreement. The expansion of the country’s fossil 
fuel industry is one of the main causes for Canada’s emissions. Consequently, recent studies have 
adopted a policy network approach to outline the relationship between the federal government and 
the fossil fuel industry to explain the country’s inaction. However, the relationship between this 
network and actual policy outcomes remains unclear. Hence, this study determines the extent to 
which climate and energy policy change applied by the federal and Alberta provincial governments 
reflect the interests of the fossil fuel industry. The main findings point to the fossil fuel industry 
having had substantial political influence on climate and energy policy decisions over the last 
twenty years, although its influence has been increasingly contested over time. However, this 
network remains influential in Canadian politics. 
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“Become a general in the struggle for a humane planetary future. If this is asking more than you 
are competent to give now, find your level; get more experience and training, then assume all the 
responsibility that you can carry. Future generations on our planet may not know your name, but 
they will remember you and bless you as part of the magnificent vanguard who stepped into the 
breach at this very decisive time in human history and fought to secure a viable future for the 
children – the sons and daughters – of this beloved planet Earth. 
Be glorious.” 
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1. Introduction & Overview  
1.1. Problem Statement: Inaction in the Face of the Climate Crisis 
As the effects of the climate crisis continue to mount and the critical need to reduce global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions becomes ever more pressing, solutions proposed by nearly every 
country so far have failed to garner comprehensive support, along with increasing criticism 
regarding their effectiveness – or lack thereof. Indeed, the recent turn to a new decade seems to 
have also been accompanied by a noticeable change in tone found in climate change-related 
literature. For instance, Heatley, Read, & Foster (2019) argue that, while previous mainstream and 
greatly influential works1 on the subject contributed to increasing public concerns about the global 
climate crisis, they nonetheless contained a significant optimism that the situation could be averted 
without too much long-term damage – an optimism, they say, we no longer can afford.  
There is now compelling evidence indicating that global efforts to tackle the crisis are critically 
insufficient, and especially overshadowed by a ‘business-as-usual’ mentality dominating 
policymakers regarding the greatest challenge of our time (Broadbent, 2017; Clarke, 2018; 
Graham, 2019; Heatley et al., 2019; Jackson, 2017; Lancet Report, 2019; Lukacs, 2020; 
MacArthur et al., 2020; Newell, 2019; Satgar, 2018). For instance, the Paris Agreement – and the 
roughly 4,500 other multilateral and bilateral environmental agreements signed since 1990 
(Mitchell, 2017, 2018) have been heavily condemned for failing to provide effective solutions to 
such a global problem (Cass, 2015; Clarke, 2018; Heatley et al., 2019; Jackson, 2017; Pleyers, 
2010). Notably, critics argue that independently set targets, such as the ones set within the Paris 
Agreement, are unlikely to generate the needed results, given that polluting rates of GHG 
 
1 The authors notably refer to the Stern Review (2007), as well as the works of Naomi Klein (2014) and George 




emissions have, for the most part, not only failed to stabilize but continue to increase every year 
(Cooper et al., 2017; EIA, 2019; Hémous, 2016; Jackson et al., 2019; Jackson, 2017; Olivier, 
Shure, & Peters, 2017; Mildenberger & Stokes, 2019; Pirani, 2018; Satgar, 2018; UNEP, 2019). 
Moreover, “the Paris declarations may have helped create space for political, and even legal, 
action. But Paris also shone a harsh light on the failure of the process as a whole. The principal 
participants largely rejected strong regulation, and stuck stubbornly to the principle of reducing 
emissions by commodifying them (i.e. producing tradable rights to pollute)” (Pirani, 2018, p.164). 
In fact, recent measures now estimate global temperature increase to reach at least 3.5oC (IPCC 
report, 2018), making the Paris Agreement virtually useless2. In all, “the categorical truth is that 
things are now certainly going to get worse – much worse – whatever we do” (Heatley et al., 2019, 
p.3, emphasis in original).  
The current situation regarding the climate crisis is considered by many to be a consequence of the 
dominant capitalist logic, in which the imperative for constant production and accumulation has 
been heavily criticized for disregarding planetary boundaries and finite resources (Evans, 2008; 
Jackson, 2010; Rist, 2014; Pleyers, 2010). Moreover, attention has been particularly directed to 
the ‘growth imperative’, the relentless pursuit of profit and capital often associated as a 
fundamental characteristic of capitalism, which has been a dominating force in global economic 
policy (Buch-Hansen, 2018; Jackson, 2017; McNeill Douglas, 2019; Schmelzer, 2015). However, 
despite growing criticism and suggested alternatives for the transition from this economic model, 
there has been little to no transformative change at any substantial scale.  
 
2 In addition to the IPCC report, several groups tracking countries’ progress towards meeting their respective Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) reveal that only less than a dozen nations are actually on track to meet 




This negative depiction also characterizes Canada’s record on climate change adaptation and 
mitigation. While there is significant evidence showing that both Canada’s population and its 
economy are particularly vulnerable to the climate crisis, the federal government has generated 
highly insufficient corrective measures to reduce its ecological footprint. In fact, the country is 
among the group of nations that are unlikely to meet their sustainability targets set within the Paris 
Agreement – and among the worst of the G20 countries (Clarke, 2018; Climate Action Tracker, 
2019; Climate Transparency, 2019; Hoberg, 2016; Lum, 2018). In fact, the independent center 
Climate Action Tracker, which rates the efforts of multiple countries with respect to their 
commitments under the Paris Agreement, currently classifies Canada’s climate policies as 
‘insufficient’, contributing to a warming of 3oC, instead of the goal of maintaining global warming 
below 1.5-2oC (Climate Action Tracker, 2020a). This poor national profile, along with the 
inadequate performance of a great majority of other countries, represent the general ‘business-as-
usual’ approach witnessed across the globe, which generated strong activism within civil society 
groups, as well as in academic literature, where growing research is directed toward understanding 
why, despite decades’ worth of scientific evidence and warnings regarding climate change being 
caused by man-made actions, governments are so reluctant to respond adequately to this crisis 
(Carter, 2016; Compston, 2010; Heatley et al., 2019; Howlett & Joshi-Koop, 2010; Taft, 2017). 
1.2. Crises of Climate and Energy, and the Canadian Oil & Gas Industry  
Poor global efforts to tackle this crisis essentially reflect the sheer complexity of climate change, 
which has been qualified as a ‘super wicked problem’ (Levin et al., 2012). However, the main 
challenge in dealing with the climate crisis stems not from a lack of scientific knowledge, but, 




path-dependent reliance on ‘high carbon’ sources of energy, as well as creating new processes that 
would entrench and expand policies to generate the transition towards a decarbonized economy.  
For instance, of particular concern is the discrepancy between the planet’s ‘carbon budget’ – the 
maximum limit of cumulated carbon dioxide that can be in the atmosphere in order to prevent 
global warming above 1.5-2oC – and the potential for GHG emissions from the proven global fossil 
fuel reserves. The IPCC’s carbon budget estimates total cumulative emissions of between 420 and 
580 gigatons of carbon dioxide in order to have a fair chance in preventing dangerous levels of 
global warming (Rogelj et al., 2018). Meanwhile, the consumption of the entire current reserves 
of fossil fuels would equate to about 2,734 gigatons of carbon dioxide (Heede & Oreskes, 2016)3. 
Consequently, “energy firms, which dominate the lists of the world’s largest corporations, suffer 
from a deepening dependency. They depend upon counting as a financial asset a reserve of fossil 
fuels of which four-fifths must stay buried and uncounted in the ground if we are serious about 
keeping the planet habitable” (Mitchell, 2013, p.256). 
In other words, the climate crisis is essentially an energy crisis. The main sources of global 
emissions are all related to the use of fossil fuels, from their extraction and production to their 
consumption. In Canada, 52% of the country’s emissions originate from the fossil fuel industry4 
and transportation (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2020a). Consequently, the urgent 
need to reduce global emissions thereby implies a complete rethinking of the modern world’s 
relationship with energy; from the use of fossil fuels for electricity, heating, and transportation, to 
 
3 Multiple organizations have provided their own calculations of the carbon budget, which has led to varying figures 
– as well as regarding the extent of proven reserves of fossil fuels. Regardless, the notion of the important dichotomy 
between emissions limits and sustained consumption of fossil fuel, which can far exceed this limit, remains. See 
Carbon Tracker Initiative (2011, 2020), Rogelj et al. (2018), and McKibben (2012). 
4 Defined here as any corporation involved in the extraction, processing, and transport of oil, bitumen, gas, or coal 




the way in which cities are designed. Particularly in North America, nearly a century of cheap oil 
and significant economic growth resulted in city development in the form of sprawling suburbs 
and low-density urban areas with poor public transport infrastructures, further exacerbating the 
emergence of a car culture. Consequently, it is important to better understand the interrelation 
between these two crises, how issues related to fossil fuels and the ‘environment’ are one and the 
same.  
Interestingly, the introduction of the term ‘energy crisis’ occurred nearly at the same time in the 
1970s as the politicization of the ‘environment’, “a word that had previously meant milieu or 
surroundings, but had recently come to be used with the definite article, like the term ‘economy’ 
two decades earlier, to designate an object of widespread political concern” (Mitchell, 2013, 
p.175). Indeed, Mitchell’s extensive work on the effects of fossil fuels on political systems reveals 
the extent to which oil companies have played a consequential role, beginning in the 1970s, in 
framing the ‘environment’ issue within specific boundaries that best fit their interests: 
“…oil companies joined [efforts] to frame the environment as a new object of politics, 
and to define it and calibrate it in particular ways. Like the economy, the environment 
was not simply an aspect of external reality, against which the oil industry had to contend. 
It was a set of forces and calculations that rival groups attempted to mobilise.” (p.192) 
In the context of Canada, there is growing understanding that inaction regarding the climate crisis 
stems from political inaction, caused mainly by strong influence from business and industries 
(Boyd, 2003; Wood, Tanner, & Richardson, 2010) – particularly from oil and gas industry5 actors.  
 




The contribution of the fossil fuel industry onto the Canadian economy is puzzling. National 
estimates account its total output as only slightly more than 5% of the national gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 2019, and averaged 5.1% of GDP between 1997 and 20196 (Statistics Canada, 
2020c). However, a recent study by Stanford (2021) points to current statistics being calculated 
with 2012 oil prices – thus neglecting the significant fall of prices in 2014. As such, by adjusting 
for more recent prices, real GDP output is likely to be less than 3%. Moreover, the industry 
employs about 170,000 workers, which represents less than 1% of the country’s labour force 
(Stanford, 2021; Statistics Canada, 2020a), as shown in Table 1.1. Interestingly, the total labour 
force of the industry has declined significantly since 2014, by about 50,000 workers, despite a 
strong overall performance of the Canadian labour market7. 
Table 1.1: Economic Figures of Some Canadian Industries, 2019 
Industry 




Percentage of National 
Labour Force 
Service-based 70.8% N/A 80.6% 
Manufacturing 10.2% 68% 9.3% 
Agriculture 2.1% 1.0% 1.5% 
Fossil Fuel 5.3% 20.1% 0.9% 
Sources: Global Affairs Canada, 2019; Natural Resources Canada, 2020a; Statistics Canada, 2020a, 2020c; ISED 
Canada, 2020. 
However, these numbers do not reflect the full story. The fossil fuel industry wields a subtle 
influence across Canada’s economy, partly due to the country’s regional development. For 
instance, more than 80% of the industry is concentrated in the province of Alberta, which in turn 
fuels indirectly other industries supporting fossil fuel development (such as accommodation, 
transportation, food services, and many more.), as shown in Figure 1.1 below (Natural Resources 
 
6 These figures represent fossil fuel extraction only. With the addition of oil and gas transportation, in accordance with 
the definition of the fossil fuel industry introduced earlier, its share of national GDP increases to 6.7% in 2019, with 
an average of 6.1% between 1997 and 2019 (Statistics Canada, 2020c). 
7 Stanford points to the steady decline of the national unemployment rate since 2014, reaching 5.7% in 2019 – the 




Canada, 2020a). This creates deep connections between this single industry and the welfare of 
Alberta as a whole. By the same token, the entire province also feels the wrath of a bust of the 
fossil fuel industry, once the volatile oil prices fall dramatically (such as in 2014, and more recently 
following the global recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic). 
Figure 1.1: National Oil Production by Province & Territories, 2019 
Moreover, the fossil fuel industry has had significant growth over the last three decades, largely 
supported by a drastic increase in oil prices in the early 2000s, which attracted significant 
investment and development projects, particularly in Alberta’s oil sands (Natural Resources 
Canada, 2020a; Heyes, Leach, & Mason, 2018; Stringham, 2012). Indeed, crude oil production 
increased significantly over time, from 1.5 million barrels of oil per day (Mbpd) in 1990 to 4.7 
Mbpd in 2019, making Canada the fourth largest oil producer in the world (Canada Energy 
Regulator, 2020). Additionally, national production is still projected to reach more than 7.1 Mbpd 
by 2040 (Canada Energy Regulator, 2019)8. This increase in production was also combined with 
a significant rise in GHG emissions, from 106 megatons of carbon dioxide equivalent (Mt CO2 
 





eq) to 194 Mt CO2 eq in 2018 – an 82% increase (Canada Energy Regulator, 2017; Environment 
and Climate Change Canada, 2020a). Moreover, oil production in Alberta’s oil sands is one of the 
most carbon-intensive in the world (Jing, et al., 2020; Masnadi et al., 2018)9. 
Conversely, despite representing only a portion of Canada’s GDP and exports, the fossil fuel 
industry is shown to be enjoying a disproportionate degree of influence over political decisions on 
national and provincial climate and energy policy (Carroll & Huijzer, 2018; Clarke, 2018; Graham, 
Carroll & Chen, 2019; Neubauer, 2018; Stanford, 2019). For instance, oil & gas companies 
represent some of Canada’s largest political donors10 – and the three main donors in Alberta have 
been fossil fuel companies for a number of years11 (Brownlee, 2020). Moreover, Brownlee also 
points to a massive rise in lobbying expenditures by fossil fuel companies since the 1970s, with an 
even sharper increase following the 2000s. Notably, this influence has been notoriously used to 
challenge and delegitimize calls for governments to transition towards green and sustainable 
energy sources and decarbonized economies. In turn, this industry and its advocates have 
suggested alternative – but widely less effective – transition measures, such as GHG emission 
reduction targets based on emission intensity levels rather than absolute emissions (Saric, Carson, 
& Bachmann, 2017; Meadows & Crossman, 2016; Wood et al., 2010), geoengineering and carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) projects (Carton, 2020; Markusson et al., 2017), the phasing out of 
fossil fuels on a longer-term timeline than required by international scientific authorities (Carton, 
2020; Graham, 2019; Lee, 2017; Pineault, 2018), or the adoption of voluntary- or market-based 
 
9 Proponents of oil development in Canada point to technological innovation and the use of better industry practices 
that led to a reduction of the industry’s emission intensity by 30% between 2000 and 2018 (Kaplan & Milke, 2020). 
Despite these improvements, recent studies still denote Canada’s oil production and refining as one of the most 
polluting in the world (Jing et al., 2020; Masnadi et al., 2018). See also Markusoff (2019) for a discussion on the topic. 
10 While corporations and unions are prevented from directly contributing to political parties at the federal level, the 
situation differs widely between provinces. See Brownlee (2020). 




solutions, such as carbon markets – in which the scope and scale of the carbon prices have been 
largely insufficient to reduce absolute GHG emissions (Fluker, 2015; Levin et al., 2012). Overall, 
these measures essentially represent a form of “new climate denialism” (Carroll et al., 2018; Daub 
et al., 2020; Graham, 2019), a practice focused on shaping the narrative and language of climate 
policy in order to limit its effect on the fossil fuel industry (Blue et al., 2018)12, where “the climate 
crisis is acknowledged [by the fossil fuel industry] while effective climate action is forestalled in 
favour of increased fossil fuel production” (Carroll, Graham, & Yunker, 2018, p.61). 
1.3. Political Influence of the Canadian Fossil Fuel Industry 
While being the biggest source of GHG emissions in the country, the fossil fuel industry is largely 
viewed as one of the most prominent causes of inaction regarding the climate crisis and 
maintenance of the status quo from governmental institutions as well as business organizations 
(Adkin, 2016; Carter, 2018; Clarke, 2018). This industry’s extraordinary relationship with state 
institutions, and its extensive political influence, have been increasingly studied through a policy 
network (PN) approach, which suggests that policymaking processes are influenced by the formal 
and informal arrangements of actors within and outside the government, regrouped under a 
‘subsystem’ of actors, which uses a broad range of resources – such as lobbying, public relations 
and communications for framing specific issues, and the financing of specific think tanks and other 
CSOs to advance their views13 – to influence political decisions over specific policy issues and 
affect policy processes and outcomes (Compston, 2009a; Knoke, 2018; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; 
Thatcher, 1998). From a historical context, Mitchell (2013) points to the emergence of a 
‘hydrocarbon cartel’ in the late 1920s within major oil companies to engineer oil supply scarcity, 
 
12 Blue et al. actually refer to this practice as “ecological modernization”, but its characteristics are strongly similar to 
the other accounts of “new denialism” referenced here. 




control prices, and stifle competition from alternative sources of energy (at the time coal, but later 
nuclear and then renewables). In turn, these practices led to the development of broad and 
consolidated networks, enabling an extensive array of tools and resources to influence political 
issues, which proved particularly useful in the context of the climate crisis: 
“…oil companies developed much larger and more extended networks for the production 
of expertise, which became increasingly involved in making of the wider world a place 
where its products could thrive. […] The major oil companies could draw upon a wide 
array of resources in public relations, marketing, planning, energy research, international 
finance and government relations – all of which could be used to help define the nature 
of the crisis and promote a particular set of solutions.” (Mitchell, 2013, p.193) 
In Canada, studies using this approach have outlined an extensive network encompassing fossil 
fuel industry-related corporations and business associations, federal and provincial government 
officials, and decision-making individuals of civil society organizations and other institutions, 
consolidated together as a hegemonic group supplanting its own private interests over the 
‘common interest’ of the Canadian population (Carter, 2018; Carroll, 2020b; Neubauer, 2018; 
Pineault, 2018). In turn, the extent of this network has also been qualified as the Canadian 
“petrobloc”: “a decentralized yet interlocked constellation of state, civil society, and corporate 
actors jointly dedicated to tar sands expansion” (Neubauer, 2018, p.249). Overall, the oil and gas 
industry policy network is brought forward as a possible main cause of political inaction in Canada 
regarding the climate crisis. 
A vivid example of such a network in Canada is the creation of the Energy Policy Institute of 




with the conviction of Bruce Carson for fraud and influence peddling by the Supreme Court of 
Canada14. EPIC was established in 2009 to represent the main interests of the largest oil and gas 
companies in Canada, with the main purpose of developing “a strategy for Canada’s global energy 
leadership”15. More specifically, EPIC provided numerous recommendations for energy and 
environmental legislation reform and deregulation, which were ruled as having a direct influence 
on the 2012 omnibus bills C-38 and C-4516, which drastically reshaped the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act as well as virtually every other environmental protection legislation 
– largely for the benefit of the fossil fuel industry (Doelle, 2012; Gibson, 2012)17. As such, this 
series of events outline a clear need to study and better understand the extent of the oil and gas 
industry’s influence onto Canadian politics. Consequently, this project asks the following 
question: To what extent do the policy changes applied by the federal and Alberta provincial 
governments onto the country’s fossil fuel industry between 1999 and 2019 reflect the interests of 
the Canadian oil and gas industry policy network? 
1.4. Research Objectives and Thesis Structure 
Despite growing evidence of the existence of such a network, the extent to which policy outcomes 
– at a national or subnational level – are directly impacted by the oil and gas policy network’s 
influence remains unclear. Indeed, one of the main criticisms found in policy network theory is 
the lack of evidence between a network’s structure (or typology) and its causal impact onto policy 
 
14 Bruce Carson was a senior advisor to former Prime Minister Stephen Harper, executive director of the Canadian 
School of Energy and Environment, and also vice-chair of EPIC. He was convicted of three charges under the 
Lobbying Act by the Ontario Court of Justice. See R v. Carson, 2016, ONCJ 596. His case was then appealed to the 
Supreme Court, which rejected by a count of 8-1 his appeal. See R v. Carson, 2018, SCC 12. 
15 Justice Kehoe, in R v. Carson, 2016, ONCJ 596, para. 233. For a detailed explanation of EPIC and its effects on 
Canada’s climate and energy policy and legislation, see Taft (2017). 
16 See R v. Carson, 2016, ONCJ 596 and Taft (2017). 
17 The significant impact of these two bills have been covered extensively by previous studies, and will also be covered 




preferences, processes, and outcomes (Braunstein, 2015; Dowding, 1995, 2001; Heaney & 
Strickland, 2017; Howlett, 2002; Rhodes, 2009; Thatcher, 1998). Moreover, this criticism also 
applies to network studies in Canada, where the emphasis of research has been mostly directed 
towards providing evidence of the existence of the fossil fuel industry network and outlining its 
overall structure across various state, industry, and societal policy domains. Furthermore, there is 
limited empirical evidence outlining this network’s impact on climate and energy policy decisions 
– reviewed in detail in following chapters.  
As such, this study aims to consider the theoretical and practical implications of the relationship 
between the oil and gas PN and Canadian governments (more specifically, the federal government 
and the Alberta provincial government) in the efforts to address the climate crisis, more 
specifically through policy outcomes related to emissions reduction and fossil fuel industry 
regulation between 1999 and 2019. The main objectives are: 
• to critically examine the different factors believed to be causes of political inaction to 
address the climate crisis within Canadian governments; 
• to review the strengths and limitations of recent oil and gas policy network studies and 
their value as a tool to address the political inaction in the Canadian context;  
• to consider the extent to which oil and gas PN interests have been aligned with policy 
decisions of the Alberta provincial government and the federal government over time, and 
to determine the implications of such relationships in the efforts to address the climate 
crisis in the country. 
The thesis is structured as follows: the next chapter presents the research methodology used, along 




the fossil fuel policy network structure and policy outcomes described above, the study adopts a 
mixed-method approach, combining case studies of climate and energy policy of the federal and 
Alberta provincial governments with semi-structured interviews with key individuals related to 
these case studies.  
The third chapter provides a literature review situating policy networks within the Canadian 
political economy, which justifies the use of a PN approach for this study. Given the ‘wicked 
complexity’ of the climate crisis, this study adopts an analytic eclecticism approach, a pragmatist 
intellectual stance focused on widely-scoped problems, which arises from “efforts to specify how 
elements of different causal stories might coexist as part of a more complex argument [which] 
requires engaging and utilizing, not displacing, the well-organized research efforts undertaken by 
committed adherents of various traditions” (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010, p.415). As such, the literature 
review is structured to cover two broad – yet interrelated – themes: the evolution of the Canadian 
economy and its relatively recent dependence on fossil fuel; and other sources of pressure – such 
as trade agreements, Canada’s federalist structure, and the adoption of a neoliberal political 
doctrine since the 1980s – as exacerbating this dependence on fossil fuel for economic 
development. The main argument here is that, despite their critical importance, these concepts 
prove to be insufficient by themselves in fully explaining the political inaction of Canadian 
governments in tackling the climate crisis. However, as will be shown, the combination of 
Canada’s staples-based economy, its highly decentralized federalist structure, and the adoption of 
neoliberal ideology, generated a political environment highly favourable for the development of 
strong networks of non-state actors which then had the resources and opportunity to influence 
policy processes towards outcomes that were in their interests – at the expense of both the public 




Following this broader justification of the legitimacy and benefits of studying Canadian political 
dynamics through a policy network approach, the fourth chapter thus delves further into the PN 
literature, and critically reviews recent oil and gas network studies, where their limitations 
represent this study’s analytical gap. More precisely, the study focuses on the relationship between 
the oil and gas PN and its effect on policy outcomes. The fifth chapter presents the findings of the 
case studies, along with a thematic analysis from the primary data collected. The findings reveal 
that the Canadian fossil fuel policy network has had substantial influence over climate and energy 
policy outcomes over the last 20 years. However, the network’s influence appears to have been 
decreasing in recent years, mainly due to an increase in both diversity and number of actors 
involved in policy processes at the federal and provincial level (but to a lesser degree in Alberta), 
combined with reduced cohesion among oil and gas industry actors. The findings show that, 
despite this waning influence, this network remains highly influential within Canadian politics. 
Finally, the sixth chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings, 
followed by the acknowledgement of research limitations, and points to areas of further research, 
along with concluding remarks. 
1.5. Significance of Study 
Despite the increasing urgency of the climate crisis, the fact that the Canadian government has 
had, so far, a widely inadequate stance to minimize its carbon footprint and manage this crisis is 
ever more alarming. The extent of this dire situation represents the need for further research that 
may lead to better understand the main reasons limiting action by Canadian governments in 
tackling the climate crisis – the greatest crisis of our time. By examining the degree of importance 
of the oil and gas industry policy network within this issue, this study specifically aims to play a 




crisis. In addition, this study also contributes to the policy network literature, more specifically 
regarding understanding the causal mechanisms between network structure and policy outcomes, 
an area known to be understudied within this field (Braunstein, 2015; Howlett, 2002; Thatcher, 
1998). Lastly, this research fits within the contemporary ecological political economy (EPE), a 
subfield of the broader Canadian political economy, which provides a unique integrative 
framework linking environmental issues with power relations in the Canadian political economy 
context (Adkin, 2016a; Carter, 2020). Indeed, “EPE theorizes how our dominant petro-capitalist 
system forwards extraction that undermines the environment and heightens social inequities” 





2. Research Methodology 
This chapter delves into the methodology used for this research project. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the research adopts a policy network approach to study the political inaction of 
Canadian governments regarding the climate crisis. The first section defines the research question 
in light of the previous review of recent oil and gas network studies. Consequently, a mixed-
method approach is used, which is presented in the second section. The third section presents the 
data collection process. Finally, the fourth section outlines the research hypotheses that will guide 
the study. 
2.1. Research Question 
As the research will show, a number of recent studies have outlined the close relationship between 
fossil fuel industry and state actors as a main source of the political inaction regarding the climate 
crisis – using a policy network (PN) approach to better understand this dynamic. This approach is 
notably used by the Corporate Mapping Project (CMP), a SSHRC-funded research project 
focusing specifically on the network and ties between oil industry actors and other spheres of 
Canadian society. The CMP’s studies, along with some the works of the Canadian Center for 
Policy Alternatives, the Parkland Institute, and a few other researchers, review the country’s top 
fossil fuel industry companies and associations regarding their financial behaviour (Graham, 
2019), share ownership and ties with other financial institutions (Carroll and Huijzer, 2018; Rowe 
et al., 2019), interlocking directories with academic institutions and other civil society 
organizations (Carroll, 2020a; Carroll et al., 2018; Carroll, Graham, and Yunker, 2018; Gray and 
Carroll, 2018), as well as oil and gas industry lobbying practices (Cayley-Daoust and Girard, 2012; 




These studies point to growing evidence of the existence of an extensive policy network spanning 
across oil and gas companies and industry associations, financial institutions, national economic 
elites, civil society organizations, as well as some government officials and political parties. While 
these studies are highly useful in understanding the structure and extent of this network within 
Canadian politics, they still face several limitations regarding policy network analysis. However, 
despite this compelling evidence, there remain analytical gaps regarding the study of such 
networks.  
Briefly, there are three fundamental roles of a policy network analysis: to describe linkages among 
actors; to measure how networks change and adapt over time; and to study the causal mechanisms 
between network structures and policy outcomes (Thatcher, 1998)18. Consequently, it appears that 
most of the empirical evidence provided in the existing literature is related to the first role, whereas 
the remaining two are largely understudied19. Indeed, these studies provide valuable evidence of 
the relations between actors, as well as insights into the implications that an established policy 
network such as the oil and gas PN can have on Canadian politics. However, there remains a need 
to complement these contributions with further research directed towards understanding how the 
fossil fuel PN evolves over time, and the degree to which it is able to influence provincial and 
federal climate and energy policy decisions. This contribution would further support the use – and 
enhance the explanatory power – of a PN approach to study Canadian political inaction in the 
context of the climate crisis. More specifically, causal mechanisms20 between the existence and 
 
18 Further discussed in Chapter 4. 
19 Graham et al.’s (2017) study is the only one that looks at how the policy network changes and adapts over time, 
notably by using the same approach of Cayley-Daoust & Girard (2012) in order to compare their findings. Nonetheless, 
this role remains understudied. 
20 In accordance with the study’s eclectic analytical approach, it also adopts Sil & Katzenstein’s (2010, p.421) more 





structure of an oil and gas industry policy network and actual policy outcomes remain 
understudied. This element thus represents the focus of the study. This leads to the main research 
question: To what extent do the policy changes applied by the federal and Alberta provincial 
governments onto the country’s fossil fuel industry between 1999 and 2019 reflect the interests of 
the Canadian oil and gas industry policy network? 
2.2. Mixed-Method Approach 
This study adopts a mixed-method approach in order to investigate this question. The first part 
consists of case studies of climate and energy policy of both the federal and the Alberta provincial 
governments. The cases are conducted through a PN approach, in order to determine links between 
policy subsystem structure and climate and energy policy outcomes. These cases are then 
complemented with a series of semi-structured interviews of prominent individuals with extensive 
experience in Canadian environmental and oil & gas industry-related policymaking, and/or in 
policy network research within Canadian politics and society.  
This mixed-method approach rests on a base of pragmatism in social research, which combines 
the strengths of both methods in order to address their individual limitations. In other words, it 
“points to the importance of joining beliefs and actions in a process of inquiry that underlies any 
search for knowledge” (Morgan, 2014, p.1051). Moreover, Sil & Katzenstein (2010, p.418) 
emphasize its benefits in social research, in which “knowledge claims, however produced and 
defended, are always in need of reconsideration and reconstruction on the basis of engagement 
 
that may or may not recur across contexts and that may be, but often are not, directly observable”. Notably, this 
definition allows for “a more complex view of causality in which different types of mechanisms interact to generate 
outcomes of interests in different contexts” (p.421). Therefore, this study acknowledges the breadth of complexity of 
the problematic observed here and avoids making any claim in identifying a single causal link that may explain 




with the experiences of actors seeking to cope with real-world problems”. As such, the application 
of a pragmatist view is particularly useful in the context of policy research as a valuable tool to 
observe and understand the structural context of a liberal capitalist democracy, where resources 
and political power are unevenly distributed among actors (Evans, 2020).  
Particularly, interviewing experts on a specific policy domain is considered to be highly valuable 
in the policy network literature for better understanding a given network, notably due to its 
informal nature, which may be quite difficult to grasp for an outsider researcher. In turn, the 
combination of interviews with a PN approach “would create more detailed and nuanced 
information about personal and business relations and would enable analyses of multiplex 
networks” (Knoke, 2018, p.557). These two methods are further explained below. 
Case Studies: Howlett’s Model 
In order to research causality mechanisms between the oil and gas PN and policy outcomes related 
to environmental policy, the research adopts a model based on the work of Burnaby Mountain 
Professor Michael Howlett (2002). The premise of Howlett’s study is specifically directed towards 
the idea that policy networks affect policy processes and outcomes, and therefore would prove that 
policy network (also referred as subsystem) analysis is valuable beyond mere ‘heuristics’21. 
Mainly, Howlett demonstrates: 
“If subsystem structure affects policy outcomes then, at minimum, in inspecting specific 
policy sectors over some fairly long period of time, one would expect to find some 
correlation between changes in policy outcomes and changes in subsystem culture. 
 
21 Critics of PN studies often qualify this approach as ‘heuristics’, as they contend that it lacks analytical or explanatory 




[Thus,] conducting such a demonstration involves measuring policy change and 
subsystem change in specific sectors over at least a decade and comparing the record or 
pattern of changes in policy subsystems with the record of changes in policy outcomes.” 
(2002, p.241)  
Consequently, Howlett compiles the variations in both a policy subsystem’s configuration and 
related policy outcomes within four Canadian federal policy sectors over a ten-year period (from 
1990 to 2000) in order to determine a correlation between these two elements. The resulting model 
operationalizes policy change and subsystem configuration variations, which can then be used in 
a specific policy domain to determine whether a certain network has a direct impact on policy 
processes and outcomes. 
Application of the model requires the collection and comparison of two data sources: policy 
change and network structure variation. For policy change, Howlett adapts works of previous 
scholars22 to create a two-dimensional terminology based on the degree to which new actors and 
ideas can enter the policy sphere, resulting in four distinct types of policy change (see Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1: Operationalized Model of Policy Change 
 
Entrance of New Actors 
High Low 
Entrance of New 
Ideas 
High Changes in policy goals Changes in programme specifications 
Low Changes in policy instrument types Changes in instrument components 
Source: Adapted from Howlett, 2002 
Howlett’s model draws heavily from research on group effectiveness and diversity, in which 
decision-making groups tend to perform better in the long-term and adapt to crises through policy 
innovation when they are constituted by a more diverse set of individuals (Sil & Katzenstein, 
2010). For instance, Page (2007, p.10) states that “collections of people with diverse perspectives 
 




and heuristics outperform collections of people who rely on homogeneous perspectives and 
heuristics”. Thus, on one end of Howlett’s table, the entrance of new ideas would imply a 
paradigmatic shift of ideas within policy. If paired with the entrance of new actors, the result would 
lead to fast change in the abstract goals and intended ends directing overall policy decisions. If the 
entrance of new actors is limited, the paradigmatic shift would occur more gradually, thereby only 
affecting concrete programme specifications. At the other end, a lack of new ideas would only 
result in incremental policy change. If there is nonetheless an entrance of new actors, rapid change 
would affect abstract policy instrument types. Otherwise, the lack of both new ideas and actors 
would only generate slow, incremental change to concrete instrument components. 
For subsystem configurations, Howlett uses his previous work23 on policy subsystem 
configurations to create an operationalized, two-dimensional typology, based on the degree of 
symmetry and insulation of a subsystem (see Table 2.2). Symmetry refers to the degree of overlap 
between a policy subsystem and the entire discourse community (the population of any stakeholder 
with a certain involvement within a specific policy domain). This factor has a direct impact on the 
extent to which new actors can enter the network from the policy community. Indeed, Howlett 
(2002, p.249) explains that “subsystems which feature a relatively small interest network within a 
much larger discourse community will, all other things being equal, be more susceptible to new 
actors than will those featuring very little distance between the two component parts”. Secondly, 
insulation refers to the level of separation between a network and the community. This is a critical 
factor for measuring the extent to which new ideas are integrated from the community to the 
network24. Together, “these two dimensions of subsystem structure – the degree of insulation of 
 
23 Such as Howlett & Ramesh (1998). See Howlett (2002). 
24 Additionally, long-lasting network members are more likely to be more influential than newer actors, particularly 




the network from non-“interest-related” actors, and the extent of symmetry existing between 
communities and networks – proved to be significant inhibitors and facilitators of policy change” 
(Howlett, 2002, p.260). 
Table 2.2: Operationalized Model of Policy Subsystem Configurations 
 




Low Open subsystem Contested subsystem 
High Resistant subsystem Closed subsystem 
Source: Howlett, 2002 
A ‘closed’ subsystem is similar to the policy community network type found in early PN literature. 
This subsystem tends to be highly stable and cohesive, leading to very high insulation from new 
actors or ideas. Therefore, the existence of such a network would limit types of policy change to 
mere instrumental components. On the other end of the spectrum is an ‘open’ subsystem, in which 
exists significant space between the discourse community and the interest network, combined with 
low barriers between both. The lack of cohesion within this network can then lead to significant 
policy change, even of entire policy goals. Between these two extremes exist two other types of 
subsystems. The ‘resistant’ subsystem is characterized by minimal differences between the 
network and the discourse community, but where the boundary between both groups is easily 
penetrable. Under this configuration, “one would expect changes to be restricted largely to 
instrument components, but with some experimentation involving program specifications, as some 
new ideas about policy goals could penetrate across subsystem boundaries but would be dealt with 
largely existing actors” (p.250). Meanwhile, the ‘contested’ subsystem represents a type of 
network that is quite different from the discourse community, but where the barriers between the 
two groups are high. This type of network structure would limit the consideration of new policy 




configurations and their respective relationship with subsequent policy change are summarized in 
Table 2.3 below. 
Table 2.3: Policy Subsystem Configurations & Propensity for Types of Policy Changes 
 







(tends towards all forms of policy change) 
Contested subsystem 
(tends towards change only in policy 




(tends towards change in instrument 
components and programme specifications) 
Closed subsystem 
(tends towards change only in instrument 
components) 
Source: Adapted from Howlett, 2002 
Through this approach, Howlett provides significant evidence linking patterns of policy change 
and two specific (and observable) “structural characteristics of policy subsystems, both related to 
the manner in which discourse communities and interest networks interact within a subsystem” 
(p.260). Given this study’s focus on causal mechanisms between network change and policy 
outcomes, Howlett’s work represents one of the few studies directed toward network structures 
and policy outcomes that can be particularly useful in the context of this research (Braunstein, 
2015). Notably, the evidence provided “suggests that the presence of a specific kind of network in 
a given policy sector reveals a great deal about the propensity for it to experience intra or 
interparadigmatic types of policy change” (Howlett, 2002, p.260).  
Consequently, Howlett’s methodology shows the practicality of a typology approach to policy 
network analysis when combined with quantitative data. As mentioned earlier, the addition of 
semi-structured interviews to Howlett’s model further enriches the PN analysis. Indeed, 
conducting interviews with key individuals knowledgeable on climate and energy policy across 
the time period following the case study of provincial and federal subsystems allows for a refined 




process regarding the PN case studies in order to apply Howlett’s model, along with the interview 
conducted. 
2.3. Data Collection Process 
This study adopts a PNA approach through the application of Howlett’s (2002) framework of 
research on causal mechanisms between policy subsystem configuration and policy outcomes, 
followed by semi-structured interviews. The main part of the research consists of a case study of 
the effects of the oil and gas PN on specific related policy outcomes, conducted by measuring 
policy and network change within the fossil fuel industry sector between 1999 and 2019.  
This time period was selected for two reasons. First, adopting a multiyear time period of at least 
ten years is necessary in network analysis in order to have a proper depiction of the general network 
(Howlett, 2002). Indeed, “the danger in using short time periods is that hey might capture only 
infrequent changes and miss the overall patterns of stability characteristics of most periods of 
network behaviour” (Howlett & Maragna, 2006, p.437). Adopting a multi-decade time period 
limits the emphasis on short periods of punctuated equilibrium and transition, instead revealing 
enduring dynamics in policy development (Lemphers, 2020; Levin et al., 2012). Second, the 
selected 20-year period covers two major changes in governments both in Alberta and at the federal 
level. At the provincial level, the election of Rachel Notley and the New Democratic Party (NDP) 
in 2015 was a historical moment for Alberta, ending a 44-year rule of the Progressive 
Conservatives. This change was short-lived, however; the NDP lost the following election in 2019, 
to the newly-formed United Conservative Party (UCP), led by Jason Kenney. At the federal level, 
the Conservative Party, led by Stephen Harper, was elected in 2006 after 12 years under the Liberal 




to observe whether these political changes have affected policy network configurations, or if they 
remained intact. 
The research considers the importance of a meso-level analysis in order to avoid 
overgeneralization of a complex policy domain25. Therefore, only the changes in policy decisions 
and PNs within the context of the climate crisis policy domain (multi-issue) affecting the fossil 
fuel industry (specific issue) are observed, both for the Canadian federal and Alberta provincial 
governments. Changes in network configuration are measured by assessing subsystem 
membership at the beginning and end of the selected time period for the study. Subsystem members 
can be identified as actors who presented policy briefs to parliamentary committees – which are 
available within respective committee reports (Howlett, 2002; Knoke, 2018). Thus, committees 
relevant to fossil fuel industry development, GHG emissions policy, and environment protection 
in the context of fossil fuel activities were reviewed for the federal subsystem. However, such 
information is rather limited, as there is no specific committee for the fossil fuel industry or GHG 
emissions, and committees do not necessarily publish reports every year. Consequently, relevant 
reports published near the beginning and end of the studied period are considered. Table 2.4 
presents the different federal committees considered, along with their respective reports, and the 





25 As emphasized by Howlett, such overgeneralization is prevented by adopting a two-stage strategy “in which a large 




Table 2.4: Considered Federal Committees and Respective Reports 
Committee Published Work 
Policy 
Briefs 
Standing Committee on 
Environment and Sustainable 
Development (ENVI), House 
of Commons 
Report 1: Harmonization and Environmental Protection: An analysis 
of the harmonization initiative of the Canadian Council of Ministers 
of the Environment (1997) 
3 
Report 2: Kyoto and Beyond: Meeting the Climate Change 
Challenge (1997) 
0 
Report 4: Bill C-32 (1998)  
Clean Growth and Climate Change: How Canada Can Lead 
Internationally (2019) 
5 
Standing Committee on 
Natural Resources and 
Government Operations 
(NRGO), House of Commons 
The Kyoto Conference on Climate Change: Let`s Get the Ball 
Rolling (1997) 
15 
Standing Committee on 
Energy, the Environment, and 
Natural Resources (ENEV), 
Senate of Canada 
Fifth Report: To examine issues relating to energy (2000)  
Bill C-69, An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the 
Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection 
Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts (2019) 
201 
Study on the effects of transitioning to a low carbon economy (2019) 145 
Source: Senate of Canada; House of Commons of Canada. 
For the federal policy network, subsystem membership at the beginning of the period is based on 
the policy briefs submitted to the Standing Committee on Natural Resources and Government 
Operations (NRGO) of the House of Commons26 in the making of their “Kyoto Conference on 
Climate Change” report in November 1997, where 15 different actors submitted at least one policy 
brief. For the 2019 subsystem membership, data is extracted from the Standing Committee on 
Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources (ENEV) of the Senate of Canada27 in relation to 
the Committee’s report that led to Bill C-6928. Here, 201 policy briefs were submitted by 164 
different actors. As described in the previous section, policy subsystem configuration is measured 
through two distinct factors. First, insulation is determined by assessing the number of members 
within the subsystem who are present throughout the period. As per Howlett’s (2002) work, a high 
 
26 36th Parliament, 1st Session. 
27 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. 
28 An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation 
Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, SC 2019, c 28. It received royal ascent on the 




percentage of continuing members would indicate a high insulation level. Second, symmetry is 
represented by the percentage increase in the number of actors within the subsystem over time, in 
which a large positive increase would represent a low degree of symmetry.  
Data sources for the Alberta provincial subsystem are more difficult to gather. The Legislative 
Assembly of Alberta and the Government of Alberta provide very limited digital records of 
submitted policy briefs or witnesses to committees, royal commissions, or task forces that are 
publicly available. Therefore, the application of Howlett’s model is limited for the Alberta 
provincial subsystem. Alternatively, network membership structure can also be determined by 
looking at the inclusion and exclusion of non-state actors involved in policy decisions (Braunstein, 
2015)29. Notably, Braunstein’s work emphasizes the fact that some actors have a direct line of 
influence in policy processes, while “other actors merely voice their ideas and advocate policy 
positions in hope of influencing the policy-making process” (2015, p.53). Therefore, the analysis 
of the Alberta subsystem is based on the inclusion and exclusion of non-state actors in key 
institutional bodies (such as standing committees, task forces, and public consultation policy 
groups) to the province across the study’s time period. Finally, policy actors identified are then 
compared with the subsystem actors of the recent oil and gas policy network studies reviewed (in 
Chapter 4) in order to outline key reoccurring actors over time. 
Policy change is determined by reviewing the enactment, repeal, or amendment of provincial and 
federal legislation (acts), as well as relevant regulation subordinate to these acts, related to fossil 
fuel industry development, GHG emissions policy, and environment protection in the context of 
fossil fuel activities between 1999 and 2019. Consequently, the database of the Canadian Legal 
 
29 Braunstein’s (2015) work builds, in part, on Howlett’s (2002) study of causal mechanisms between PNs and policy 




Information Institute (CanLII) was used to review provincial and federal legislations. Table 2.5 
provides information regarding the main pieces of legislation reviewed, along with their respective 
amendments during the study’s time period.  
Table 2.5: Main Provincial & Federal Acts Reviewed 
Title of Act 
Amendments 
(1999-2019) 
- Province of Alberta Acts - 
Pipeline Act, RSA 1980, c P-8 and RSA 2000, c P-15 10 
Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, RSA 2000, c E-12 (EPEA) 19 
Oil & Gas Conservation Act, RSA 1980, c O-5 and RSA 2000, c O-6 14 
Oil Sands Conservation Act, RSA 2000, c O-7 7 
Climate Change and Emissions Management Act, SA 2003, c E-7.8 (CCEMA), formerly the 
Emissions Management and Climate Resilience Act, SA 2003, c E-7.8 (EMCRA) 
6 
Alberta Land Stewardship Act, SA 2009, c A-26.8 (ALSA) 2 
Carbon Capture and Storage Funding Act, SA 2009, c C-2.5 0 
Responsible Energy Development Act, SA 2012, c R-17.3 (REDA) 1 
Oil Sands Emissions Limit Act, SA 2016, c O-7.5 1 
Climate Leadership Act, SA 2016, c C-16.9 2 
Energy Efficiency Alberta Act, SA 2016, c E-9.7 0 
- Federal Acts - 
National Energy Board Act, RSC 1985, c N-7 (NEBA) 15 
Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act, RSC 1985, c O-7 14 
Canada Environmental Assessment Act, SC 1992, c 37 (CEAA) 6 
National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy Act, Sc 1993, c 31 3 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, SC 1999, c 33 (CEPA) 13 
Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, SC 2007, c 30 2 
Canada Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 52 (CEAA, 2012) 4 
Jobs and Economic Growth Act, SC 2010, c 12 5 
Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, SC 2012, c 19 6 
Pipeline Safety Act, SC 2015, c 21 0 
Canadian Energy Regulator Act, SC 2019, c 28, s 10 0 
Impact Assessment Act, SC 2019, c 28, s 1 0 
Source: Canadian Legal Information Institute (CanLII). 
However, it is important to note that not every amendment has had a significant impact on the type 
of policy change analyzed here30. A broad set of sources were compiled in order to interpret the 
substantial number of changes in legislation. Notably, The Alberta Law Review publishes on a 
mostly annual basis an extensive review of provincial and federal legislative changes that may 
 
30 Although several amendments may have had significant effects on the legislation studied here, they will not be 




affect the oil and gas industry in the form of an academic paper31. In total, there are 23 publications 
under this title that covered legislative changes related to this study’s research scope within the 
selected time period. The information found in these publications was also compared and 
combined with several other articles from the Alberta Law Review, as well as from other academic 
and law journals, such as the Canadian Bar Review, McGill Journal of Sustainable Development 
Law, Ottawa Law Review, Queen`s Law Journal, as well as specific articles from various Canadian 
academic journals. In addition, this study gathered official documents made publicly available by 
the federal government and the provincial government of Alberta, along with policy briefs and 
legislative reports from other relevant organizations, such as the Pembina Institute, the Alberta 
Environmental Law Centre (ELC), EcoJustice, and the Canadian Bar Association – Alberta 
Branch. The considerable amount of data compiled from these different sources was then analyzed 
in order to classify legislative changes according to Howlett’s policy change typology. The 
analysis of these two types of data are then combined in order to determine the type of network 
subsystem for both cases, and their evolution over time. The results of this process are presented 
in Chapter 5. 
Subsequently, ten semi-structured interviews were conducted for this study. The selection of key 
individuals as participants followed the argument that interviews meeting specific research factors 
(such as quality and depth of data gathered from participants) can ensure validity of the data 
collected even from a small sample size (Robson, 2002; Romney et al., 1986). The individuals 
interviewed were senior government officials, directors and executives of oil and gas companies 
and industry associations, policy analysts from ENGOs and think tanks, as well as environmental 
 
31 The articles are mostly titled “Recent Regulatory and Legislative Developments of Interest to Energy Lawyers”, 




lawyers and policy experts with multiple decades of involvement in Canadian environmental or 
energy legislation. Each interview lasted approximately an hour. The interviews were recorded32, 
transcribed, and then coded. The interviews are identified in this study using a randomized 
alphanumerical code, with the full list of participants in Appendix 4. In order to ensure 
confidentiality, every interviewee had control over the degree of their respective anonymity, as 
well as for the title used to represent them. They also each had the opportunity to review and 
modify direct interview quotes used for the study. 
The participant selection process started with the identification through the case studies conducted 
of key actors in the Canadian oil and gas industry or involved in provincial and federal politics in 
the context of climate and/or energy policy. Additional participants were then contacted following 
a snowball technique from the first round of interviews. Every interview followed a general 
framework, using broad questions, and then gradually specifying the inquiries, gravitating around 
the themes of political change in Alberta and the federal government over the past 20 years, the 
degree of influence of the fossil fuel industry on politics, impacts of various legislation or policy 
change, and views on political influence from non-state actors.  
2.4. Hypotheses 
Through the use of Howlett’s (2002) model, an inductive research approach is taken. Mainly, this 
research aims to observe the extent to which fossil fuel industry interests have been aligned with 
policy decisions of the Alberta provincial government over time, and the implication of such 
relationship in the efforts to address the climate crisis in the country. Thus, the following 
preliminary hypotheses will guide the initial research: 
 
32 As part of the consent agreement of the study’s ethics process, each participant had the choice to be recorded or not 




• H1: The oil and gas industry PN is a highly concentrated network, defined as a high 
insulation from the remaining discourse community and the main actors remaining 
relatively stable over time, thus limiting the introduction of new ideas or new actors within 
the network. The network would then be highly resistant to policy choices that contradict 
the network’s interest, and the allocation of power to actors outside of the network. 
• H2: Adopted policy would be restricted to incremental change (if any), affecting limited 
areas of the industry or network-related activities. Consequently, these features would 
characterize the subsystems as closed networks. 
The structure of the study is also an adaption to the reality of conducting research during a global 
pandemic. The worldwide spread of the COVID-19 virus in 2020 had significant consequences on 
research, particularly regarding the ability to undertake fieldwork and gather primary data, notably 
through in-person interviews. With the main part of research done through secondary sources of 
information, this project ensured that it reduced its vulnerability to the uncertainties related to the 
COVID-19 crisis and consequent measures of social distancing and quarantining imposed by 
public health authorities. Consequently, the interviews were done through online communication 
channels. Furthermore, this type of research also represented limited ethical risk.  
Prior to discussing the results of this research, it is useful to justify the value of a policy network 





3. Literature Review 
3.1. The Climate Crisis and Democratic Deficits in Canada 
The introduction depicted the greatly insufficient efforts by the Canadian federal government in 
reducing national GHG emissions. A particularly striking element of this situation, however, is the 
fact that the Canadian population is largely in favour of increased ecological regulation across the 
nation’s economy. There is considerable environmental activism in the country, established over 
multiple decades and in various forms; numerous reputed think tanks and research institutes are 
devoted to the climate crisis, as well as countless other civil society organizations which use 
different means in order to make governments more accountable to the issue. Additionally, recent 
years saw an important increase in social events, climate walks (or strikes), and other forms of 
civil disobedience to express the population’s growing concerns regarding the climate crisis and 
the political inertia surrounding it. Some groups have also resorted to legal actions, as shown by 
lawsuits filed against the federal government for its inaction towards climate change (Killoran, 
Feasby, & Huys, 2019; Lukacs, 2020; Peritz, 2018; Schmunk, 2019). Even across Alberta, the 
nation’s oil powerhouse, the public opinion has been largely against any further development of 
oil sands projects until environmental and infrastructure issues are addressed. Public opinion also 
favours increased environmental protection and regulation enforcing GHG emission reduction in 
the oil sands (Carter & Zalik, 2016).  
However, despite public opinion, scientific evidence, and extensive warnings from the global 
community about the climate crisis and the need to reduce fossil fuel extraction, for more than the 
last two decades, the federal and some provincial governments have instead directed even more 




2017; Graham, 2019; Harrison, 2015). Such discrepancy between public opinion and government 
policy has been described as an erosion of democratic institutions in Canada. For instance, a recent 
study on policy trends of environmental regulation within Canada’s oil-producing provinces33 
provided evidence that economic development through the growth of the fossil fuel industry has 
been overriding environmental regulation – accompanied with important democratic deficits 
(Carter et al., 2017). The study emphasizes that, across each province, “citizens face high barriers 
to participation in decisions regarding the oil and gas sector. Not only is public access to decision 
making in oil and gas activity frequently weak, but in various cases it has been actively 
undermined” (p.69). Moreover, the findings of the study place Alberta as one of the worst 
provinces in the country in terms of regulatory streamlining of environmental and fossil fuel 
industry legislation, as well as for democratic deficits. These findings also corroborate with the 
work of Adkin et al. (2017), who reviewed cases of various environmental regulations in Alberta, 
monitoring the province’s public engagement process in the development of the regulations, which 
showed significant democratic deficit. Notably, the review of the 2007 consultations for the 
‘Climate Change Strategy: Responsibility/Leadership/Action Plan’ led the study to state: 
“As in 2002, the public consultation process appeared to have little impact on the 
established trajectory of the province’s climate change strategy. […] Public and expert 
input that did not conform to government goals was generally ignored in 2007, and the 
formal influence of stakeholder processes was limited to narrow technical input and 
options analysis. Neither government nor industry wanted new policies that might slow 
the growth of the energy sector. Moreover, in the parallel informal meetings in which 
 




Ministry of Environment staff obtained feedback on policy options from select 
stakeholders, industrial emitters maintained a privileged influence on policymaking. 
Their influence outweighed that of democratic consultative processes involving the 
public, ENGOs, and non-industry experts.” (pp.308-309) 
Adkin et al. (2017) emphasize the extent to which democratic engagement has been restricted – 
but also can greatly vary. Moreover, their findings show that democratic deficits are at the highest 
with any policy linked to the regulation of the fossil fuel industry, thus directly impeding on the 
government’s ability to implement ecological regulation onto the largest polluting sector in the 
country. In all, a key point of this study was that “liberal capitalist democracies are systemically 
resistant to the thoroughgoing democratization of environmental governance” (p.317). 
The democratic deficits illustrated above further support the premise of this study, in which 
Canadian climate and energy policy decisions have failed, on numerous occasions, to reflect public 
interests – and particularly to tackle the climate crisis effectively. However, such deficits, and their 
relationship with further reliance on the fossil fuel industry for economic growth, could be 
explained by numerous factors. Among them, Canada’s relatively recent dependence on fossil 
fuels must first be placed within historical context – that the country’s political economy has 
gravitated, since its inception, around staples-based forms of development. In turn, Canada’s 
legacy of dependence on natural resources for economic growth is now represented by the current 
importance of oil and gas, notably in the province of Alberta. This has led some to describe Canada 
as a ‘petro-state’ in order to describe the seemingly erosion of democratic institutions across the 
country. However, the reality may be more complex than this argument would imply. The next 




3.2. Canada’s Dependence on Oil Through Staples Theory & Rentierism 
From a historical perspective, Canada’s political economy has been mostly built and reliant upon 
natural resources for its development. From its establishment as a European colony, the natural 
resources found on the Canadian territory were already shipped and sold to world markets 
(Hessing, Summerville, & Howlett, 2005; Pineault, 2014; Stanford, 2019). Although a deep 
modernization and industrialization in the mid-20th century transformed the country as one of the 
most advanced nations in the world, contemporary Canada remains largely a resource-based 
economy with a focus on trade. Thus, its economic structure has been the subject of extensive 
research since Confederation, with various approaches used to explain and define the nation’s 
history of dependence on various ‘staples’ resources. As Stanford (2019, p.80) argues, “fish, furs, 
timber, wheat, minerals, and now petroleum were the industries that led the way through these 
successive chapters of Canadian economic history”. Indeed, Canada’s dependence on natural 
resources has fluctuated a lot over time. This historical context is best understood through staples 
theory, which was developed specifically to explain the importance of resource industries for 
Canada’s economic development – in turn greatly shaping its political economy (Grinspun & 
Mills, 2015; Shrivastava & Stefanick, 2015; Pineault, 2018).  
Early staples theory literature corresponds to the works of Harold Innis (1894-1952) and W.A. 
Mackintosh (1895-1970)34, who studied the impact of the then dominant resource industries of 
19th and early 20th century – mainly fur trade, fish, and wheat – to depict the Canadian economy 
as dominated by its primary sector. According to them, this focus on the export of barely processed 
goods greatly restricted the development of value-adding processes or the diversification of the 
 




economy (Grinspun & Mills, 2015; Hessing, Summerville, & Howlett, 2005, Stanford, 2014, 
2019). However, Innis and Mackintosh warned that too much emphasis on the primary sector 
makes Canada both highly dependent on other larger economies, such as the British Empire or the 
United States35, and particularly vulnerable to the high fluctuations of commodity markets, prone 
to ‘boom and bust’ cycles (Cameron, 2014; Clarke, 2018). Additionally, dependence on staples 
exports was also argued to have deeper effects on the Canadian society than merely its economy, 
in fact shaping economic, social, and political institutions at national and subnational levels 
(Grinspun & Mills, 2015; Shrivastava, 2015a). This is also emphasized by Grant (2014), where 
the “nature of the production function […] under which the staple commodity is produced [has] 
broader implications not only for the economy as a whole, but political and social institutions as 
well” (p.22). 
Political economist Mel Watkins (1932-2020) would later greatly enrich these initial arguments, 
notably through the introduction of the ‘staples trap’ (Watkins, 1963). Mainly, the initial 
comparative advantage from an abundance of one or more natural resources leads to an 
overreliance on their exports and the concentration of capital, labour, and other resources towards 
these industries, which then act as barriers to economic diversification (Hessing et al., 2005; Mills 
& Tufts, 2019). In turn, the staples trap has been frequently used to describe the structure of 
Canada’s economy, particularly to denounce periods of slow economic growth or limiting further 
sophistication of industries (Cameron, 2014; Drache, 2014). However, Canada also represents a 
case of exiting the staples trap. The country successfully managed, during the second half of the 
20th century, to deeply modernize its economy and transcend to one of the richest countries in the 
 
35 Canada’s staples economy has been described as a form of ‘core-periphery’ arrangement, in which Canada is 





world before the 2000s (Drache, 2014; Stanford, 2014, 2019). Interestingly, several scholars point 
to the existence of a strong welfare state and high capacity to implement policies and regulations 
orienting industries in a certain direction as the most optimal way to exit the staples trap (Grinspun 
& Mills 2015; Hessing et al., 2005; Pineault, 2018; Rotstein, 2014; Stanford, 2019).  
However, emerging from a staples trap does not entail that an economy is forever exempt from 
falling into one again. Multiple factors may cause a state to revert back into staples dependence. 
Correspondingly, several scholars argue that the staples trap is still of relevance today (Gunton, 
2014; Rotstein, 2014). Indeed, this modernization trend began to invert drastically around the turn 
of the 21st century. This situation is studied extensively in the works of Stanford (2019), where his 
analysis of Canada’s economic development leads him to qualify the period between 2000 and 
2014 as one where the country has essentially ‘structurally undeveloped’36. Indeed, Stanford 
describes a sharp decline in the level of diversification of the economy, accompanied by a 
significant deterioration in business innovation and Canadian manufacturing, particularly in high-
technological sectors – meanwhile accompanied by a drastic increase in the share of exports of 
staple goods, as shown in Figure 3.1. Consequently, “there is no doubt […] that the renewed 
reliance on extraction and export of unprocessed staples [particularly petroleum] to other, more 
technologically advanced economics over the last fifteen years represents a qualitative step 
backwards in Canada’s economic development” (Stanford, 2019, p.87). 
 
36 One metric of this ‘undevelopment’ is the economic complexity index, ranking countries based on an aggregation 
of production, technology, and exports and imports. The Atlas of economic complexity, measured by the Center for 
International Development of Harvard University, shows that Canada has gone from having the 16 th most complex 
economy in the early 1990s to 39th in 2018, with an all-time low of 41st between 2011 and 2015 (CID, 2018). 
Alternatively, MIT’s Observatory of Economic Complexity also describes an important decrease in Canada’s 




Even though the causes for this ‘undevelopment’ are multi-dimensional, the evidence presented 
by Stanford largely attributes this critical transformation of Canada’s political economy to the 
profound development and expansion of the fossil fuel industry – which follows the objective of 
former Prime Minister Stephen Harper to make Canada an ‘energy superpower’37. According to 
Stanford, “the evidence is strong that the relative and absolute erosion of manufacturing during 
this period [2002-2014] (as well as other non-resource export industries) was clearly exacerbated 
by the over-appreciation of the Canadian currency, which in turn was clearly driven by [petroleum 
industry] developments” (2019, p.95). These findings corroborate with other studies pointing to 
the recent significant increase of Canadian oil production – particularly gravitating around the 
Athabasca oil sands in Alberta – as points of significant economic and environmental concern for 
the country – especially amidst a climate crisis mainly caused by the consumption of non-
 
37 Prime Minister Stephen Harper, “Address by the Prime Minister at the Canada-UK Chamber of Commerce” 
(delivered at the Canada-UK Chamber of Commerce on July 14th, 2006). The mention of the term ‘superpower’ is 
interpreted here more as a publicity stunt. By definition, a superpower would imply a state with greater power and 
influence (over global energy supply, in this case) than the majority of other states – quite an improbable feat for 
Canada to achieve. However, this statement nonetheless encapsulates Harper’s vision of national energy policy. 
Figure 3.1: Composition of Canada’s Exports 




renewable sources of energy (Altvater, 2009; Carroll, 2020a; Pirani, 2018). Stanford (2014) 
explains that:  
“The key features of the staples trap first identified by Watkins are all visible in Canada 
today: A cozy compact between government and the staples-exporting industry […]. 
Enormous, publicly-subsidized investments in export-oriented infrastructure. Pressure to 
extract and export the staple in ever-large volumes to amortize development and 
infrastructure costs faster. A cumulative reinforcement of the dominance of the staples 
as seemingly the only path to economic progress – even as the risks of staples reliance 
become increasingly obvious.” (pp.66-67) 
It appears that Canada has indeed fallen into a staples trap. There is substantial evidence pointing 
to the increasing oil production in Alberta since the 2000s as having considerable consequences 
onto the province’s economy – as well as to the national economy as a whole. The oil boom led to 
foreign takeovers, the overvaluation of the Canadian dollar – thus damaging other Canadian 
industries and exports in a Dutch Disease-like manner38 – and crises of significant scale within the 
Canadian automotive and manufacturing sectors (Clement, 2019; Mills & Sweeney, 2013; 
Stanford, 2019). This is further explained by Stanford (referenced in Clement, 2019, p.37): 
“By the turn of the 21st century, raw and barely processed resources account for well 
under half of Canada’s total merchandise exports – the lowest in our history. Early in the 
 
38 The ‘Dutch Disease’ refers to the effects of a primary sector boom onto other economic sectors (Magud & Sosa, 
2010). Notably, the development of a natural resource (or many) “would tend to squeeze out other traditional export 
industries (manufacturing, for example) […] partly through ‘external’ economic adjustments if inflows of financial 
capital and growing resource exports increase the exchange rate and make it harder for traditional exports to compete” 
(MacFadyen & Watkins, 2014, p.416). Research by the International Monetary Fund in oil-exporting countries 
demonstrates that increase in oil production tends to generate negative impacts on other economic sectors, particularly 




new century, however, the logic of staples dependence reasserted itself. Inflated global 
commodity prices (especially for oil, some minerals, and agriculture) sparked major 
inflows of capital into expanded staples production in Canada.” 
There has been opposition to this view. Particularly, research on such decline of the manufacturing 
industry39 has shown that the increases in commodity prices are not the main (or only) causes for 
the inflation of the Canadian dollar that has affected the Canadian manufacturing sector in the late 
2000s (Cross, 2013; MacFadyen & Watkins, 2014; Naim & Tombe, 2013). Indeed, Canada’s 
modern economic structure and its interrelation to the highly complex and globalized oil industry 
represent an economic situation that is distinctly different from the conventional staples trap first 
imagined by Watkins (Clement, 2019; Harrison, 2015; Mills & Sweeney, 2013; Shrivastava & 
Stefanick, 2015). Notably, the position of Canada, as one of the wealthiest and most industrialized 
nations (even after a period of ‘undevelopment’), along with its high level of urbanization and 
developed service sector, among other factors, are quite antithetical to Innis’ staples theory from 
a century ago – which depicted staples-based Canada more within a colonial perspective, with very 
low economic diversification, essentially fulfilling its ‘peripheral’ role for the dominant (‘core’) 
states like the British Empire or the United States (Mills & Sweeney, 2013). Furthermore, while 
current oil production fits within the initial precepts of staples theory, it also goes beyond it, 
notably with measured democratic deficits – particularly in Alberta – from dependence on resource 
rents and the creation of a patronage system (Harrison, 2015). Consequently, other scholars have 
recently introduced the concept of ‘carbon trap’ (Haley, 2014)40 to depict the combination of 
 
39 There was substantial debate over whether Canada has been suffering from the Dutch Disease, which shares several 
similarities with the staples trap, notably following comments from former Leader of the Opposition Thomas Mulcair 
in 2012. Mulcair pointed to the loss of manufacturing jobs caused by an inflated dollar from increasing oil production 
in Alberta – which generated strong opposition. See Naim & Tombe (2013). 




ecological and economic issues surrounding the reliance on fossil fuel, where the “rapid and 
intensive development of the tar sands industry during a global context of an energy paradigm shift 
based on the normalization of unconventional forms of fossil fuels have locked Canada into a 
staples/carbon trap” (Pineault, 2018, p.137). As such, the increased reliance on fossil fuel 
essentially acts as a critical barrier restricting Canada’s ability to transition into a low-carbon 
economy (Haley, 2014). 
Consequently, the current oil dependence – and the staples trap it generates – can be seen has 
having moved Canada to a form of ‘neostaples’ state, which represents the strong changes of the 
Canadian political economy since the 20th century, while nonetheless maintaining the relevance of 
staples theory (Drache, 2014; Mills & Tufts, 2019; Mills & Sweeney, 2013; Shrivastava & 
Stefanick, 2015; Shrivastava, 2015a). These political economic changes represent a sharp contrast 
between previous staples traps and its contemporary form. Indeed, “today’s resource curse is more 
complex, multi-stranded and transnational than in Innis’ day. It is rooted in more than commercial 
dependency on the US market. It has led to a variety of rigidities with crippling consequences for 
an economy burdened by debt and a shrinking industrial core” (Drache, 2014, p.4).  
Alongside the carbon trap, the emergence of Canada as one of the largest producers of oil in the 
world – with allegedly the third greatest oil reserves (MacArthur et al., 2020; Mildenberger & 
Stokes, 2019) – also led to the use of rentier theory (or ‘rentierism’) to describe the country’s 
growing dependence on the extraction and export of fossil fuel (Adkin, 2016; Carter, 2018; Carter 
& Zalik, 2016; Clarke, 2018). A rentier state is typically heavily dependent on mineral or natural 
resources, where its economic power arises from rents – financial payments given to the state for 
the use of its territory and the natural resources embedded within it (Carter & Zalik, 2016; Gray, 




diversification of its economy, relying instead on exports of its natural resources, which further 
exacerbates the state’s dependence on natural resource extraction – resulting in the ‘resource 
curse’, also known as the ‘Dutch Disease’ – quite similar to the staples trap previously described 
(Carter & Zalik, 2016; Clarke, 2018; Mildenberger & Stokes, 2019; Ross, 2001). Most 
importantly, from the substantive revenues gained through resource rents, a rentier state becomes 
significantly less dependent on tax revenues from its citizens41, leading to diminishing pressure 
and incentives for a state to be accountable, democratically speaking, to its citizens. As such, Gray 
(2011, p.1) argues that “since the state receives this external income [from rents] and distributes it 
to society, it is relieved of having to impose taxation, which in turn means that it does not have to 
offer concessions to society such as democratic bargain or a development strategy”. Rentier theory 
was initially applied to oil-producing countries in the Middle East, which accumulated substantial 
wealth largely by rents created by fossil fuel extraction, thus leading to the term of ‘petro-state’; a 
usually derogatory term defining a state whose revenues are dependent on oil rents instead of taxes, 
resulting in weak political and economic institutions, and where state power and wealth are highly 
concentrated within a small, elite group (Gray, 2011, 2018; Karl, 2007; Shrivastava, 2015a). In 
this respect, some studies claim that, through the critical dependence on oil in the province of 
Alberta (and also due to the federal government’s stance regarding ecological regulation), the 
concept of petro-state encapsulates Canada as whole (Cayley-Daoust & Girard, 2012; Clarke, 
2018; Taft, 2017). 
However, the application of Karl’s (1997, 2007) ‘petrostate thesis’, which was initially applied 
onto oil-prolific countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, seems unfit to define a country with 
 





such different political institutions as Canada than its Middle Eastern counterparts. In that respect, 
there are two main arguments for the characterization of Canada as a petro-state worth exploring: 
that returns from the fossil fuel industry represent a prominent share of a state’s GDP, exports, and 
government revenues; and this economic overreliance on oil then leads to democratic deficits. 
Using these two components provides more clarity, but Canada’s situation remains intriguing. On 
one hand, Canada’s oil revenues and exports represent only a fraction of the country’s GDP, and 
are significantly lower than the typical figures found in other petro-states (Neubauer, 2018)42. 
Additionally, Neubauer points to Canada’s multiparty democratic system, ‘vibrant’ civil society, 
and independent media as completely antagonistic to Karl’s analysis of petro-states, which are 
traditionally seen as antidemocratic, with a tendency towards authoritarian regimes (Ross, 2001). 
Based on these figures, Canada seems quite unlikely to be a petro-state. 
On the other hand, while petro-states are usually studied at a national level, it may be more useful 
to apply rentier theory in the Canadian context at a subnational level. Although Canada has 
undergone a significant economic diversification that does not seem typical for a petro-state, it has 
done so in an uneven, ‘regional’ way – especially since Alberta represents more than three quarters 
of the country’s oil and gas industry (Carter & Zalik, 2016). Moreover, between 1999 and 2019, 
fossil fuel represented, on average, 67% of Alberta’s exports, 24% of its GDP, and 23% of 
government revenues (see Figure 3.2)43. 
 
42 Oil represented, on average, approximately 7% of Canada’s GDP between 2011 and 2017, as opposed to Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar with 50% and 55%, respectively, in 2016. In terms of oil exports, while Canadian figures are slightly 
more significant, with oil constituting more than 15% of national exports, it is still far from Saudi Arabia, representing 
85% of its total exports. See Neubauer (2018). 
43 As shown in the graph above, the figures have remained relatively stable over time – aside from government 
revenues, which were heavily impacted following the decrease in oil prices in 2014 – with each figures’ median very 
close to the average (67.5%, 23.4%, and 23.1%, respectively). However, prior to 2014, fossil fuel represented an 




Figure 3.2: Economic Figures of Alberta 
Sources: Government of Alberta, 2020, 2021c; Statistics Canada, 2020b.             . 
Consequently, these figures would, technically, meet the minimal requirements for a country to be 
qualified as a petro-state44 – or, in this case, a ‘petro-province’ (Adkin, 2016; Carter, 2016; 
Shrivastava, 2015b). Secondly, given the province’s economic dependence on the oil and gas 
industry, studies report a form of deference from the Alberta government towards the industry, 
and a deterioration of its democratic political system as a trade-off to decreased reliance and 
accountability to Alberta citizens (Adkin, 2016b; Adkin et al., 2017; Carter et al., 2017, Harrison, 
2015). Consequently, the lack of representation of citizen interest in politics, especially in the 
context of the climate crisis, would fit with Karl’s (1997) ‘oil-based social contract’45, associated 
 
44 Where oil-based revenues and exports typically represent at least 50% of total exports, 25% of GDP, and 25% of 
government revenues. See Gray (2011, 2018) and Neubauer (2018). 
45 In more economic terms, the surplus of capital generated from oil rents generally leads to a democratic deficit as 
trade-off. See Carter & Zalik (2016). Given the state’s dependence on revenues from oil extraction, the state often 
becomes ‘hostile’ to ecological criticisms, as it undermines its source of capital and power, which creates a form of 
rival relationship between state and civil society actors. A representation of this dynamic is the current Alberta 
provincial government’s Public Inquiry on Anti-Energy Campaigns, which investigates the main organizations in 
Alberta opposing fossil fuel industry development projects. As of February 2021, the Inquiry has not yet released its 
final report, and is quite a controversial subject in Alberta. There has been multiple critics questioning its use of public 
funds, as well as the dissemination of climate change literature with limited credibility, to which some critics have 




to rentierism: market interests become paramount to government institutions, and private 
developers often prioritized over the state’s citizens interests. Thus, based on these arguments, 
Alberta would qualify as a petro-province. 
However, the claimed causal relationship between oil rents and democratic deficits strongly 
depicted in rentier state literature has also been challenged (Mitchell, 2013). Notably, Mitchell’s 
(2013) historical analysis of the production of fossil fuels outlines a greater complexity than this 
causality would imply; “not every country dependent on oil revenues fails to develop more 
democratic forms of government” (p.201). Similarly, Shrivastava & Stefanick’s (2015) work on 
democracy issues in Alberta following the enormous rise of the oil industry as a significant portion 
of the province’s revenues also challenges the argument that increased oil dependence leads to 
decreasing democracy or authoritarian regimes46. Rather, it seems that it is the tremendous wealth 
acquired within a relatively short period of time that puts significant tension on a democratic 
system by greatly damaging the fundamental principle of economic and political equality in a 
liberal democracy47. Therefore, democratic issues would emerge due to inadequate or ineffective 
economic and political institutions linked to the rent gains from oil, and not necessarily from oil 
extraction per se. As Shrivastava puts it, “ultimately, it is not the commodity of oil itself that is the 
culprit, but the exacerbation of the tension between the individualistic and collectivist assumptions 
underlying liberal democracy, an amplification brought on by the great wealth generated in a short 
span of time in a neoliberal context” (2015a, p.35).  
 
46 Proponents of oil development argue that the massive returns from such revenues can provide the required capital 
for a state to further develop its economy, invest in technological innovation, and transition to sustainable energy 
sources – with the case of Norway as a frequent example. See Carter (2016) and Shrivastava & Stefanick (2015). 
47 Here, Shrivastava & Stefanick define liberal democracy as “a system of governance characterized by civil liberties, 
more than one political party competing for election, separation of power, the rule of law, and a representative 




In turn, Gray’s (2011) conception of ‘late rentierism’ seems more adequate in this matter. Although 
the initial tenets of rentierism are largely accepted in the literature, Gray points to an apparent 
sophistication of oil-based political economies following the oil crises of the 1970s and several 
other factors, such as globalization and technological innovation, that made them inherently more 
complex political economies, much different than classical rentier states (Gray, 2011, 2018). 
Through this approach, rentierism is “restructured and honed from its initial and overly optimistic 
goal of being an explanation for state structures, into the more realistic of rentierism explaining a 
political dynamic and strategy used by states in oil-rich political economies” (Gray, 2018, p.30, 
emphasis in original). This perspective therefore shifts the debate away from whether Alberta or 
Canada is actually a ‘petro-state’, and instead towards a more constructive analysis of Canadian 
political dynamics and their similarities with the rentier thesis. 
Consequently, Shrivastava (2015b) points to evidence of developmental liberalism as a “missing 
piece in the oil and democracy literature” (p.392), where it is not necessarily the increase of oil 
production and its associated wealth that lead to critical democratic deficits in Alberta and Canada. 
Rather, it is the governance processes, policies, and institutions – especially under a neoliberal 
political ideology – that came with oil industry development that have been critical factors to the 
democratic issue in the country, notably due to increasing economic, political, and social 
inequalities at provincial and federal levels. Particularly, Shrivastava (2015b, p.393) explains that 
“while the causal links between oil dependence and democratic malaise typically are not direct, it 
is well established in the oil and democracy literature […] that significantly large oil extraction 
generates great wealth for some but also creates particular political and economic conditions that 
inhibit democracy for most of the population in an oil-exporting economy”. Thus, this argument 




effect on Canada’s political economy since its gradual adoption in the 1980s – which is discussed 
in the following section.  
In all, the literature reviewed here – from staples theory to rentierism – leads to a few concluding 
points regarding Canadian political economy, and the specific consequences of excessive focus on 
oil production. First, Canada’s relationship with natural resource extraction has resurfaced as a 
main part of the economy, and the country may in fact be repeating the same economic mistakes 
as in the past – albeit quite possibly on a greater scale. For instance, Drache (2014) recounts the 
extensive transnational railway projects of the 19th century, influenced by a period of particularly 
high wheat prices, so that Canadian agriculture could benefit even more from these lucrative crops. 
However, at the turn to the 20th century, prices dropped, and the large railway infrastructure 
quickly became problematic, resulting in the federal government having to bail out all three 
transcontinental lines. In comparison, the numerous oil pipeline projects in recent times, 
proliferating during the ‘booming’, upside of the cycle, seem no different; such infrastructure may 
quickly become extremely expensive and economically untenable once the cycle busts (while also 
omitting the ecological consequences associated with such projects). This has become more 
important during this year, particularly due to the COVID-19 pandemic, where oil prices have 
reached some of the lowest points in history. The extremely high volatility of global oil markets 
in contemporary times only further exposes such projects in short and medium terms. 
Second, rentierism can be useful to emphasize the extent of Alberta’s dependence on oil and the 
growing social and environmental concerns raised over the province’s economic structure and 
reliance on the fossil fuel industry – although the link between oil rents and democratic deficits 
has been challengeds. In turn, regardless of whether Alberta can truly be characterized as a ‘petro-




neoliberal ideology across Canada is “prompting a country [Canada] that is statistically not a petro-
state to behave like one in terms of its disregard for the basic tenets of liberal democracy and for 
sustainable economic and environmental objectives” (Shrivastava, 2015b, p.399). Consequently, 
it appears that rentier state theory is insufficient on its own to fully explain a state’s political 
structure, mainly since the argument that oil rents necessarily leads to democratic deficits (or tends 
towards totalitarianism) has been challenged. Mitchell (2013) brilliantly exposes this 
misconception. Notably, he explains that “the transformation of oil into large and unaccountable 
government incomes is not a cause of the problem of democracy and oil, but the outcome of 
particular ways of engineering political relations out of flows of energy” (p.5).  Notably, this 
approach fails to fully characterize the political inaction regarding the climate crisis. Similarly, 
Adkin (2016) emphasizes that “petro-politics alone cannot explain the forms of disciplining of 
dissent that we have witnessed in Alberta since the early 1990s, and that have characterized 
neoliberal regimes (including non-oil-producing states) elsewhere” (p.19).  
The combination of the various theories discussed in this section further outlines the need to better 
understand the multiple roles of social, political, and economic institutions in the country regarding 
oil industry development and political inaction regarding the climate crisis. Indeed, “by explaining 
development performance solely in terms of the size and nature of the resource wealth, the oil and 
democracy literature often does not adequately account for the role of internal and external social, 
political, and economic environments in shaping development outcomes in resource-abundant 
countries” (Shrivastava & Stefanick, 2015, p.12). As such, staples theory explains the long history 
of natural resource dependence in Canada, having played a strong role in the development of 
political and economic institutions favoring a certain form of national development strategy. In 




as a third and causal link between the vast amount of wealth accumulated through oil production 
and democratic deficits. For instance, Hessing et al. (2005) explain that “in understanding the 
‘development of underdevelopment’ in Canada, it is often argued, the structural relations of 
capitalism must be examined to illustrate the ways in which transnational corporations perpetuate 
a flow of capital from corporate headquarters to branch plants, from the centre to the periphery” 
(p.39). Consequently, after situating the recent increase of the Canadian oil and gas industry within 
a historical context, it is now important to turn towards other factors that would also explain the 
democratic deficits witnesses in the context of political inaction regarding the climate crisis. Thus, 
the next section reviews such other factors – both within and outside of Canadian governmental 
structures – that influence Canada’s climate and energy policy choices. 
3.3. Effects of Multilevel Pressures on Oil Dependence in Canada 
From the previous section, which described the increasing importance of oil and gas within 
Canadian economies, it is worth wondering whether the federal government actually has the 
political power deemed required to implement and enforce impactful climate policy onto the fossil 
fuel industry (as well as on provinces) in the first place. For instance, compelled with the apparent 
‘laggard’ attitude of both the United States and Canada regarding the climate crisis, Craft & 
Howlett (2013, p.2) ask whether these governments “have the capacity to design and implement 
the complex policy initiatives required for climate change adaptation”. Efforts to answer this 
question point to multilevel (macro, meso, and micro) factors that can impact a state’s degree of 
political power. In other words, there is a combination of transnational, national (domestic)48, and 
 




subnational (or domain-specific) factors that determine power distribution and interaction type 
between actors, thereby affecting policy processes and outcomes (Adam & Kriesi, 2019). 
Given this approach, the Canadian federal government appears to be stuck in a two-front conflict 
between international- and domestic-level pressures (Hessing et al., 2005; Howlett & Joshi-Koop, 
2010). At the international level, Canada’s high trade dependence makes the country particularly 
exposed to global and transnational pressures. Fridell (2020) points to the considerable number of 
multilateral, bilateral, and regional trade agreements that Canada has signed since the Canada-U.S. 
Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) in 1989, which significantly transformed the country’s trade 
policy. Notably, different components of these trade agreements are seen as a loss of state 
sovereignty over transnational or foreign corporations49. These agreements thereby limit the 
federal government’s capacity to take on environmental initiatives that are not aligned with its 
largest-trading countries. For instance, the significance of the United States as importer of 
Canadian goods (and notably oil) has led several Canadian Prime Ministers, especially former PM 
Stephen Harper, to align environmental regulation with American policy – which has also been far 
from satisfactory in recent years50 (Climate Action Tracker, 2020b; Craft & Howlett, 2013; Wood 
et al., 2010).  
 
49 A notorious example is NAFTA’s Chapter 11 on foreign investment rights, which enabled foreign investors to 
challenge government policy and seek compensation for loss of potential profits. Nearly half of the claims filed under 
Chapter 11 are targeting Canadian policy, and have notably effected efforts of Canadian governments to introduce 
health or environmental regulations (ban of certain harmful chemicals, moratorium of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) 
in Quebec, and multiple others). See Fridell (2020). More critically, Nobel prize economist Joseph E. Stiglitz described 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 as “a provision designed to discourage environmental regulations by making the imposition of 
such regulations costly to the government’s budget” (2013, p.177). 
50 The idea that Canada would follow U.S. climate policy would be quite disastrous for the environment. The Climate 
Action Tracker currently classifies the United States’ climate policies as ‘critically insufficient’, which would lead to 




At the national level, important pressures can be regrouped under two interrelated concepts: 
parliamentary and administrative structures (Adam & Kriesi, 2019). The parliamentary structure 
represents the political configuration of the state (intra-state sources of pressure), while the 
administrative structure delves into the type of relationship between state and market actors (extra-
state sources of pressure) that can influence policy capacity. Together, these two concepts 
determine formal and informal institutions that play a critical role in the policy process, choice, 
and capacity of the state. 
Canada’s parliamentary arrangement can be understood through Lijphart’s (2012) extensive work 
on democratic structures. Through a comparative analysis of 36 democratic states, he provides a 
two-dimensional framework, each structured into five fundamental principles of varying scales, to 
classify the different democratic arrangements. First, the federal-unitary dimension represents the 
level of division of power within the state across different institutions. Correspondingly, numerous 
studies have pointed to domestic parliamentary pressures in Canada to emerge largely from the 
country’s federalist structure (Carter, 2016; Lemphers, 2020; MacLean, 2018; Mildenberger & 
Stokes, 2019; Montpetit, 2002), where the Canadian Constitution highly restricts federal 
regulatory capacity over provincial affairs and development. As such, “an adequate understanding 
of policy designs in […] Canada is impossible without a systematic account of the impact of federal 
arrangements” (Montpetit, 2002, p.2). Particularly, environmental considerations and natural 
resource ownership have been some of the most highly contended issues between provincial and 
federal governments, and “remain the subject of divided authority and complex jurisdictional 
debate” (Hessing et al., 2005, p.98). Therefore, these factors are of particular importance in 




Federalism implies the creation of at least two levels of government where both levels are 
sovereign in their respective jurisdictions – in this case federal and provincial (Hessing et al., 2005; 
Lijphart, 2012). The effectiveness of a federation relies on the guaranteed and protected division 
of power between central and regional governments51. Consequently, Canada’s constitutional 
arrangement under the Constitution Act of 1982 resulted in the formation of one of the most 
decentralized federations in the world (Atkinson et al., 2013; Doern & Gattinger, 2003; Healy, 
VanNijnatten, & Lopez-Vallejo, 2014; Lijphart, 2012; Smith, 2010). Of particular interest is that 
provincial governments have control over the natural resources within their respective 
jurisdictions, while the federal government oversees federal lands, fisheries, shipping and 
navigation, and interprovincial and international trade (Hessing et al., 2005; Howlett & Joshi-
Koop, 2010; MacArthur et al., 2020; Mildenberger & Stokes, 2019). 
In the context of oil production, Canada’s federalist structure provides near-exclusive autonomy 
to the provinces over their own energy policy (Mildenberger & Stokes, 2019). As such, there has 
been a drastic increase in fossil fuel production in Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and Labrador, 
and particularly Alberta, in recent years (Carter, 2018). In turn, these recent increases resulted in 
the fossil fuel industry becoming the biggest emitter of carbon emissions in the country, slightly 
ahead of the transportation sector (Carter, 2016; Environment and Climate Change Canada, 
2020a). Thus, despite the federal government’s international commitment to reduce total GHG 
emissions, the current trajectory of several provinces makes it quite unlikely that Canada will meet 
it meet its INDCs under the Paris Agreement (Carroll & Daub, 2018; MacArthur et al., 2020). 
 
51 Lijphart also acknowledges that strong bicameralism, a rigid constitution, and an efficient judicial review are other 




Consequently, Canada’s federal system, particularly its highly decentralized structure, then seems 
to be impeding climate and energy policy that would be aligned with emissions reduction 
imperatives. On one hand, the high dependence on trade limits the federal government’s 
willingness to adopt adequate environmental measures to mitigate the effects of climate change, 
notably if its trading partners (notably the U.S.) do not do so themselves. On the other hand, even 
if Ottawa were to put climate change mitigation as foremost priority, it would nonetheless face 
very limited authority over the exploitation of natural resources, particularly fossil fuel, across 
provinces and territories (MacArthur et al., 2020). Consequently, Mildenberger & Stokes (2019, 
p.5) contend that, “while the Canadian federal government has exclusive authority to negotiate 
international agreements – including international climate agreements – its capacity to implement 
these agreements is constrained by the provinces’ willingness to comply with Ottawa’s priorities”. 
A recent example of this is the current legal challenges by a number of provinces opposing the 
federal government’s carbon tax under the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act52. These 
elements outline the complexity of the climate issue and its impact on provincial development due 
to the interrelation and contention of provincial and federal policymaking. As such, it also calls 
for further research of climate policy capacity at the subnational level (i.e., provincial and domain-
specific), which is seen as quite understudied given its level of importance (Atkinson et al., 2013; 
Graham et al., 2019; Rayner, McNutt, & Wellstead, 2013; Williams & McNutt, 2013). 
For instance, through their work on policy capacity within the Canadian forestry sector, Rayner et 
al. (2013) emphasize that the extent to which provincial-level policymaking is critical within 
 




regulatory capacity analysis is contingent on the level of decentralization of a specific industry 
domain. They write that: 
“In an extremely decentralized subsystem such as forestry, the picture is radically 
incomplete without a consideration of provincial policy capacities. […] In addition, in a 
development that mirrors the situation in the United States, since the federal government 
has been reluctant to take action on the climate change file, provinces and even 
municipalities have moved into climate change policy in the absence of federal 
leadership” (2013, p.77).  
The same goes for the fossil fuel industry, which is highly decentralized, while also varying greatly 
across provinces. Indeed, Montpetit (2002) explains that, “as studies of federations indicate, the 
political costs that federal policy-makers must bear for targeting an industry as polluting tend to 
be higher than the political gains associated with environmental protection, a responsibility often 
easy to leave with subnational governments” (p.12). Based on these arguments, Canada’s federalist 
structure seems to be a major factor causing climate policy inaction. 
However, there have been numerous instances in recent years in which the federal government has 
intervened in fossil fuel industry development – most often in its favour. Notably, this has often 
been surrounding oil sands and pipeline projects, and through international trade and export 
agreements, despite the fact that the responsibility over natural resource exploitation is 
constitutionally delegated to provincial governments (Neubauer, 2018; Stoddart, Smith, & 
Graham, 2018). In these cases, the federal government meddling in provincial energy affairs did 
not seem so problematic. As such, it seems that the federalism aspect of climate policy 




governments to avoid taking ownership of the climate crisis (Carter, 2018; Harrison, 1996; Hessing 
et al., 2005; Mildenberger & Stokes, 2019; Montpetit, 2002). Indeed, “both provincial and federal 
governments use the Constitution’s ambiguity to justify their reluctance to act, when the reality is 
that environmental authority overlaps” (Boyd, 2003, p.263). Interestingly, federal inaction in terms 
of environmental policy and fossil fuel industry regulation is observed across both major federal 
political parties (Carter et al., 2017; Lukacs, 2020; Wood et al., 2010). While the Conservative 
government of Stephen Harper (in office between 2006-2015) has been idiosyncratic in terms of 
removal of environmental regulation and strong support of the fossil fuel industry, the 
transformation of Canada into an increasingly oil-dependent country “can be traced to free trade 
agreements adopted by both Conservative and Liberal governments since the late 1980s, as well 
as long-standing efforts by previous Liberal governments to decentralize environmental policy to 
the provinces and offer fiscal incentives for fossil fuel development” (Carter et al., 2017, p.63). 
Thus, this leads to the observation that “the primary obstacle to national leadership on the 
environment is a lack of political will on the part of successive federal governments rather than 
constitutionally imposed jurisdictional constraints” (Wood et al., 2010, p.1017).  In all, while 
Canada’s federal arrangement is an important aspect to consider in the case of implementing 
stringent, nationwide climate policy, it is also not enough to explain the entire issue of climate 
inaction within Canadian governments. Notably, it fails to consider other factors limiting the 
willingness of federal and provincial governments to take necessary action regarding this crisis. 
The executive-parties dimension, Lijphart’s second component, may help fill these gaps. This 
dimension defines political power concentration, notably the configuration of executive power, 




parliamentary system53, also known as a ‘majoritarian model’, implies that political power is 
controlled by the majority, or, most often than not, a plurality of parties, which can make this 
political system rather competitive and adversarial (Lijphart, 2012). As such, majoritarian 
democracies are associated with the presence of a strong plurality of independent interest groups 
gravitating around political institutions, as opposed to a model with greater consensus, which is 
more likely to be coordinated in a corporatist system aimed at compromise and concertation. 
Consequently, studies on Canada’s parliamentary structure have shown that such pluralism of 
interest groups has had significant effects on Canadian politics (Atkinsom et al., 2013). Indeed, 
“the proliferation of interest groups could be partially explained as a consequence of the diffusion 
of power within the executive and the administrative branches; that a tendency toward bureaucratic 
pluralism has led agencies to develop extra-governmental support at the interest group level” 
(Pross, 1985, p.264). Moreover, other scholars have pointed to a further increase in interest group 
influence within Canadian politics since the adoption of a neoliberal ideology in the 1980s and 
1990s, which had significant effects on the political dynamics in Canada’s parliament (Atkinson 
& Thomas, 1993; Smith, 2005). For instance, Smith (2005) points to the increased organization of 
business associations and use of collective action as new political strategy – notably with the 
creation of the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI) in the late 1970s and its growing 
influence in Canadian politics by the end of the 1980s – as a focal point which deeply changed 
political dynamics within Canadian governments: 
“Canadian business has consistently pushed for every measure that has de-democratized 
the Canadian political system, from its opposition to election financing laws to buying 
 
53 A Westminster system means that both the legislative and executive branches of government are merged into one 




and fueling the services of professional lobbying firms. […] Collective actors, such as 
business groups, have directly contributed to the restructuring of political institutions, 
thus reducing and recasting the access of other collective actors to the state and 
undermining the legitimacy of collective action.” (Smith, 2005, pp.185-186) 
Furthermore, oil industry-based pressure onto Canada’s political system has been dramatically 
increased through the adoption of neoliberal reforms, which represents a main source of the 
democratic deficits discussed earlier. Indeed, numerous studies on the level of political influence 
wielded by the Canadian fossil fuel industry emphasize the consequences of the gradual adoption 
of a neoliberal approach54 to economic development across provincial and federal governments 
since the 1980s. Accordingly, neoliberalism is considered as a central component of the current 
political inaction regarding climate change adaptation or regulation of the Canadian fossil fuel 
industry (Clarke, 2018; Shrivastava & Stefanick, 2015). 
Neoliberal governance emerged as the opposition to populist democracy and Keynesian economic 
measures during the 1930s, such as the New Deal in the United States (Evans, 2020; Mitchell, 
2013). Its emergence as a dominant economic ideology is largely attributed to the influential work 
of European intellectuals, notably Friedrich Hayek, as well as American economist Milton 
Friedman55. Particularly, “neoliberalism proposed an alternative ordering of knowledge, expertise 
 
54 Defined here as a “political ideology or a discourse of governance that informs the economic separation of 
democratic spheres and considers the economy as a nonpolitical self-regulatory space of individual enterprise immune 
to the intervention of the state” (Shrivastava, 2015b, p.393). See also Evans (2020). 
55 It is worth mentioning the extensive works edited under Mirowksi & Plehwe (2015), which have uncovered the 
degree of influence wielded by anti-New Deal businessman Harold L. Luhnow and the Volker Group on the Chicago 
School of Liberal Economics and the Free Market Society, founded by Hayek, during the 1930s and 1940s. This 
corporate control stemming from the financing of Hayek’s projects eventually morphed the neoliberal thought 
collective away from the initial tenets of the ‘new liberalism’ under Hayek, into a definition where “political 
“freedom” became increasingly conflated with economic freedom for the capitalist” (Steiner, 2015, p.194), rather than 




and political technology – the political apparatus that it named ‘the market’” (Mitchell, 2013, 
p.141). It enforces specific preferences over governmental structures and economic development. 
Particularly, it is most known for the privatization and financialization of public services, a laissez-
faire approach to governance, massive market deregulation and its prioritization over social goods, 
the removal of trade barriers, and monetarism (Adkin, 2016b; Clarke, 2018; Buch-Hansen, 2018; 
Evans, 2020; Gutstein, 2018; Harvey, 2005; Schmelzer, 2015; Shrivastava, 2015a; Wong, 2020). 
Moreover, Pirani’s (2018) historiography of the global oil industry describes the wave of 
deregulation and liberalization of oil markets in the 1990s under a neoliberal approach as one of 
the main factors of the subsequent oil boom. However, these new “energy policies were aimed not 
at conserving or shifting away from fossil fuels, but at liberalising and expanding markets” (p.141). 
Similarly, Mitchell outlines the relationship between neoliberalism and fossil fuel production, in 
which the rise of an oil-fueled modern world in the middle of the 20th century has led to a few 
families accumulating vast amounts of wealth, which has then been directed towards the 
advancement of the neoliberal doctrine, notably through the creation and financial support of right-
wing think tanks56. The relationship between neoliberal ideology, conspicuous oil wealth, and their 
effects on political structures, are brilliantly explained by Mitchell (2013, p.197): 
“The success in increasing oil prices undermined the Keynesian management of the 
economy, easing the way for the development of market-based devices promoted as an 
alternative to an ‘excess’ of democracy and the ‘failures’ of democratic government. A 
long struggle unfolded through the 1970s and beyond, to today, in which oil companies 
 
56 For instance, the Mellon family heavily funded the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, and 
many more, while the Koch brothers supported the Cato Institute and the American Libertarian Party. See Mitchell 




continually use their political connections to defeat legislation aimed at restricting their 
influence or at managing natural resources. The market-based solutions offered tools and 
arguments for derailing alternative efforts at regulation.” 
Neoliberalism reached Canadian politics gradually under different Prime Ministers; Brian 
Mulroney (1984-1993), Jean Chrétien (1993-2003), and Paul Martin (2003-2006). Across this time 
period, a significant reshaping of public services unfolded, leading to the rollback and decline of 
the national welfare state57. However, the implementation of neoliberal concepts was drastically 
increased under Stephen Harper (2006-2015), and in Alberta under the Progressive Conservative 
Party, particularly under Ralph Klein (1993-2006)58 (Adkin, 2016b; Harrison, 2015; Shrivastava 
& Stefanick, 2015; Wood et al., 2010). During this period of Conservative governments, 
significant deregulation ensued within Canadian industries, with a focus on primary sector 
activities, decentralization and privatization of public services or their transfer to non-profit and 
volunteer-types of organizations, which had significant consequences notably onto resource 
management and economic policy focus (Gutstein, 2018; Shrivastava, 2015b; Stefanick, 2015b). 
In Alberta, Premier Klein’s neoliberal approach gravitated around precepts of ‘results-based 
management’, aimed at the streamlining of public functions in order to reduce provincial debt and 
 
57 Prominent examples of the shrinkage of the welfare state are the dissolution of the Crown Corporation Petro-Canada 
and the elimination of the National Energy Program (NEP) under Mulroney. These two entities, initially implemented 
under PM Pierre Elliot Trudeau (1968-1979), represented Canada’s national energy strategy. They have not been 
replaced by any similar form of national strategy since. See Gutstein (2018) and Stefanick (2015a). 
58 It is worth mentioning here that Ralph Klein held office for only a small portion of the Progressive Conservative’s 
rule. Interestingly, Alberta politics are quite unique in Canada, where political parties have held power for unusually-
extensive ruling periods; Liberals (1905-1921), United Farmers of Alberta (1921-1935), Social Credit (1935-1971), 
Progressive Conservative (1971-2015), New Democratic Party – the exception to the rule – (2015-2019), and now 
United Conservative (2019-present). Additionally, Klein is not to be made solely responsible for the provincial 
building policy strategy that led to the transformation of Alberta into a seemingly petro-state. It was rather done 
through a gradual transformation of the province across social, political, economic, and cultural issues over the course 
of several decades. However, Klein’s neoliberal approach exacerbated these issues further, which played a key role in 




make the government as a whole ‘more efficient’ (Graefe, 2018; Harrison, 2015; Stefanick, 2015b; 
Wood et al., 2010). 
Where ‘efficiency gains’ are achieved through neoliberal reforms, it is often done at the expense 
of democratic accountability, as advanced by Susan Strange in her influential work, The Retreat 
of the State (1996). The general transition to market-based economies and the subsequent rise of 
private and transnational corporations led to a shift of authority from the state to non-state actors 
over economic and social decisions. Consequently, “the net result of the diffusion of authority […] 
from the state to other states and to non-state authorities adds up to a democratic deficit” (Strange, 
1996, p.197), especially since non-state actors are not democratically governed. This is also 
emphasized by Stefanick (2015b, p.367), where “governance without some measure of democratic 
accountability will result in a public policy process that becomes captive to dominant coalitions of 
nonstate actors”. Accordingly, the entrenchment of neoliberal ideology and reforms across 
Canadian governments are important factors in causing an erosion of Canada’s democratic system, 
while contributing to increasing – and extensive – socioeconomic inequalities felt across the 
country (Graefe, 2018; Shrivastava, 2015a). Notably, this integration of market values within the 
Canadian political system has had important consequences: 
“Canada is experiencing an unprecedented wave of market values, and ideals from the 
private sector successfully penetrating the state. The separation of powers (between 
different governmental agencies like the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary) in 
a liberal democracy is supposed to protect the governing elite and their institutions from 
societal encroachment, and vice-versa, in the interest of both state and society. Yet the 




are to be protected blurs the boundaries with respect to the exercise of political power.” 
(Shrivastava, 2015a, pp.40-41) 
Recall earlier that the guarantee for an efficient and successful federal-style of government rests 
on the fundamental division of power – and its protection – between different jurisdictions and 
branches of governments, which are elected and represent the population. In the current situation, 
the transfer of legislative and political power onto market-based actors following the wave of 
neoliberal reforms in Canada thus comes directly in opposition to the nation’s conception of its 
democratic system, and in turn has damaged it significantly.  
Particularly in Alberta, the intensity of the deregulation and privatization of the state through 
neoliberal measures have been described as the ‘hollowing-out of the state’ and the 
‘corporatization’ of the provincial government through the alignment of the public sector with 
corporate values and ideas (Carter et al., 2017; Graefe, 2018; Harrison, 2015; Stefanick, 2015a; 
Stefanick, 2015b; Strange, 1996; Williams & McNutt, 2013; Wood et al., 2010). Through it all, 
these reforms: 
 “…exacerbated problems of accountability in the public service through the out-
sourcing of public services, taking them out of the jurisdiction of legislative oversight. 
Government spending cuts resulted in the downsizing of the government’s intellectual 
capital that has traditionally produced fulsome public debate about policy direction. 
Without this, governments ceded control of the definition of the public interest to private 
sector interests.” (Stefanick, 2015b, p.384)  
In turn, this economic approach has been described as completely incompatible with the type of 




greatly diminishes state autonomy and policy capacity, while further empowering transnational 
corporations engrained with, for the great majority of them, deeply individualistic and short-term 
interests. 
Thus, it is here that the consequences of the neoliberal political ideology and the highly 
decentralized structure of Canada’s federation combine and exacerbate themselves. Given the 
highly decentralized structure of the Canadian federal system, the ‘hollowing-out’ of the state 
appears to further worsen. The decreasing power of an already fragmented set of political 
institutions further empowers non-state actors, leading to great difficulty in developing and 
implementing policies with long-term perspectives to existing problems (Howlett & Wellstead, 
2012).  
However, despite of all this, the adoption of a neoliberal ideology within Canadian political 
institutions cannot fully represent the trend toward the erosion of Canadian public institutions. 
Other underlying forces have had far-reaching effects onto political and economics forces. As 
such, it would be inaccurate “to put undue causal influence on neoliberalism, as opposed to the 
influence of more general characteristics of capitalism, or of the long-run institutionalization of 
capitalism” (Graefe & Hudson, 2018, p.312), which greatly affected Canadian policies. 
Particularly, the deep reliance of capitalist forms of development on hydrocarbons as energy 
sources that emerged in the 20th century and led to the concept of ‘fossil capitalism’ (Carter, 2020; 
Carter et al., 2017; Drache, 2014; Shrivastava & Stefanick, 2015; Stefanick, 2015b).  
Initially described by Altvater (2009), ‘fossil capitalism’ classifies carbon-based energy 
production as a foundational component of capitalist accumulation and expansionism following 




today (Carroll, 2020a; Guerrerro, 2018). As Altvater (2009, p.39) contends, “at the center of the 
analysis of capitalism’s relation to nature is its inherent and unavoidable dependence on fossil fuels 
and particularly on oil”. This is similar to the ‘missing link’ within rentier state theory discussed 
earlier. Fossil capitalism explains that the heavy reliance on fossil fuel extraction and exports also 
led governmental institutions and corporations to begin developing systemic processes and barriers 
protecting their interests and maintaining the conditions to continue – or even increase – their 
accumulation of fossil capital (Carroll, 2020b; Graham, 2019). In other words, carbon capital 
becomes invested into political and civil society actors, leading to important effects: despite the 
fact that the fossil fuel sector represents a relatively small portion of the state’s economy and 
revenues, it nonetheless enjoys disproportionate influence onto provincial and federal 
governments, in turn making it one of the most powerful industries in politics at the provincial, 
national – and even international – levels. This is explained by Gliedt & Larson (2018), where “in 
contrast to sustainability transition in many European countries where socio-technical solutions 
could be created and implemented independent of political differences, politics in North America 
are arguably the biggest bottlenecks to sustainability transitions and has served to lock in the 
existing regime subsystems for decades” (p.221), notably the fossil fuel industry.  
Based on this, fossil capitalism outlines two important contributions. First, it connects the 
unsuccessful global efforts to tackle the climate crisis with the dominant capitalist worldview. 
Second, it further explains the deep reliance of capitalism onto fossil fuel for economic growth. 
This arrangement thus outlines the level of threat that an energy and economic transition towards 
non-fossil fuels induces on the global oil industry. This threat is then a major incentive for the 
industry to limit further climate and energy regulation, and to consolidate its corporate interests 




Canada regarding the climate crisis, as explained by Carter (2018), who depicts widely ineffective 
policies for emission reduction through a three-party framework of institutional structure, interest 
group interplay, and selected ideologies: 
“Given this framework, we would expect far less effective carbon mitigation policy 
where 1) state institutions have been structured to foster fossil fuel extraction given 
longstanding economic dependence on this sector; 2) the fossil-fuel sector has wielded 
political power to resist policy changes that would constrain its extractive activities, 
whereas groups opposing this mode of development are weak or non-existent; and 3) 
fossil-fuel extraction has been predominantly conceptualized as an economic good – a 
necessary one, even – whereas the risks of extraction have been overlooked in public 
discourse.” (p.153) 
In turn, this argument would lead to suggest the existence of a powerful interest group linking 
private and public actors in a system of interdependencies, resulting in a hegemonic59 alignment 
of the corporate interests of fossil fuel companies with the ‘national interest’. The mention of such 
a hegemonic group is one of the most recurring themes across the ecological transition literature. 
For instance, several studies providing a critical analysis on economic growth will describe the 
often unquestioned assumption of the need for capitalist expansionism and relentless economic 
growth as the ‘growth paradigm’60, a “specific ensemble of societal, political discourses, theories, 
and statistical standards that jointly assert and justify the view that economic growth as 
 
59 The concept of hegemony is derived from the works of Antonio Gramsci, defined here by Evans (2003) who sees 
it as a combination of an “ideological vision of ‘what is everyone’s interests’ that is largely accepted as ‘common 
sense’ with effective ability to apply coercion when necessary to preserve the existing distribution of privilege and 
exclusion” (p.657). See Evans (2003, 2008) and Pillay (2018). 




conventionally defined is desirable, imperative, and essentially limitless” (Schmelzer, 2015, 
p.264), thus calling for an economic paradigm shift (Buch-Hansen, 2018; Carroll, 2020b; 
Fioramonti, 2017; Jackson, 2018; Mitchell, 2013; Schmelzer, 2015). This kind of engrained 
assumption is also strongly present in fossil capitalism literature, in which the collective efforts 
done by fossil fuel industry actors to undermine ecological regulation for the energy transition is 
seen as a “paradigmatic case” (Hughes, 2019, p.9). Meanwhile, Pillay (2018) points directly to 
capitalism and its deep integration – and dependence – of fossil fuel as the source of a transnational, 
hegemonic elite “united by their common interest in maintaining the essential features of the 
growth paradigm” (p.150). Additionally, Pineault (2018) and Carter (2018) use the concept of 
‘hegemonic complex’, where plummeting oil prices and widely opposed development projects 
have failed to challenge the continued growth of the fossil fuel industry. In turn, Pineault (2018) 
reviews the ‘capitalist inducement to burn fossil fuels’ through his analysis of the oil sands 
developments, notably given the contention surrounding ‘extreme energy’61 extraction:  
“Hydrocarbons are use-values central to the development of capitalist relations because 
they provide the energy needed by this mode of production. This is neither a necessary 
nor inevitable outcome, but once fossil fuels were integrated into capitalist production 
relations as use-values, once the forces of production and circulation have adapted to 
their existence, their expanded reproduction became dependent on this energy form. 
 
61 ‘Extreme energy’, or ‘unconventional oil’, refers to sources of fossil fuel that are more difficult to access and extract, 
resulting in lesser-quality fuel since more energy must be invested in its extraction. It also refers to the era in-between 
the ‘golden age’ of fossil fuel extraction characterizing the 20th century, of abundant and easily accessible sources, 
and the fully-renewable future. This ‘extreme era’ is notably characterized by an increased reliance on these more 
carbon-intensive sources of energy, which in turn further accelerates the effects of the climate crisis. See Pineault 




Given this contingent historical trajectory, extreme oil became an “inevitable” outcome 
of advanced capitalist development as it took place in the twentieth century.” (p.137) 
Similarly, the concept of ‘oil complex’ is used to explain an arrangement between government and 
oil and gas industry, which concentrates political power in a handful of corporations and 
associations, enabling them to structure the state’s political economy to create an environment in 
their favour, while marginalizing populations and ecological systems (Haluza-Delay & Carter, 
2016). This arrangement would further exacerbate a ‘carbon lock-in’ of a state’s economy and 
political institutions (Carroll & Daub, 2018; Gliedt & Larson, 2018). 
In all, these various – yet highly similar – mentions of the dominating extractive capitalist order 
outline the cause of the ‘business as usual’ mentality explained in the previous section, and 
emphasize the need to challenge the dominant actors generating this mentality. Notably, 
“neoliberal capitalism’s structure and institutions have perfected the art of sustaining the status 
quo and the leadership of hegemonic powers, not only through their control of the policy process 
but, more importantly, in presenting themselves as knowledge-bearers and experts of the economy, 
poverty, climate change and society” (Guerrerro, 2018, p.42-43). Additionally, under this 
Gramscian approach, civil society is also viewed as an arena where hegemonic powers can be 
contested regarding economic and social life (Bebbington, 2008; Howell & Pearce, 2002). This is 
particularly important given the high level of activity of fossil fuel industry actors in civil society, 
as attempts to influence the public opinion towards a favourable stance regarding oil and gas 
development (Carroll & Huijzer, 2018; Carter, 2018; Graham, 2019; Hughes, 2019; Neubauer, 




As such, it seems apparent that the transition towards a low-carbon economy, required to tackle 
the climate crisis, would require a deeper transformation of capitalist political economies and 
industrial systems (Carroll & Daub, 2018; Carroll, 2020b; Fioramonti, 2017; Haluza-Delay & 
Carter, 2016; Jackson, 2017; Pineault, 2018; Vasey, 2014). Particularly, this transformation is 
likely to require more meaningful solutions than the current technological fixes that proponents of 
the fossil fuel industry advocate for, such as carbon capture and storage (CCS). Indeed, Carroll 
(2020b, p.11) explains that this ‘obstructing’ through advocating “technological and market-based 
fixes [buys] time for continuing to ramp-up carbon extraction while creating new profit-making 
opportunities”. This seems to encapsulate the current Liberal federal government’s approach to the 
climate crisis, where, in 2016, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau approved two pipeline projects only 
nine days after creating the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change. As 
such, “the inability of nation-states to exercise their sovereignty in the face of international 
corporate and political pressures to grant investment concessions (for extractive activities or other 
‘mega-projects’) further discredits the possibility for radical social change from within” (Barkin 
& Sánchez, 2019, p.9). In other words, it seems unlikely that the transformational change needed 
would stem from within the political sphere under this state/non-state actor arrangement. 
To conclude, the current situation can be summarized through a few key points. First, the sharp 
increase of oil production for economic growth in Canada, accompanied by international trade 
agreements, have ‘locked’ the country in a form of neostaples trap. In turn, this creates a strong 
dichotomy for the federal government between further economic development and respecting 
international climate obligations, notably the reduction of GHG emissions under the Paris 
Agreement. Second, the highly decentralized political system of the country’s federal structure 




responsibility over climate and energy policy within their respective jurisdictions. Third, while 
these factors have greatly empowered the Canadian oil industry within national politics, their 
effects have been further exacerbated by decades of governmental privatization and market 
deregulation under a neoliberal political ideology since the 1980s. These factors are further 
emphasized by Doern & Gattinger: 
“…the regulatory governance of energy in Canada has been transformed [into a] 
complex, dense, and opaque system of multiple sectoral and horizontal regulators 
regulating the activities of a large number of diverse energy companies. In this sense, 
contemporary energy regulation constitutes a power switch from a relatively centralized 
and jurisdictionally insulated governance arrangement to a far more decentralized 
governance structure, in which power, in the form of information, financial and other 
resources, and statutory jurisdiction, is distributed among multiple public, private, and 
civic players.” (2003, p.201) 
The depiction of several ‘players’ having significant power within the energy governance structure 
represents the large space for interest groups in Canadian politics to influence policy decisions. 
More specifically, “in all of the Canadian provinces, representative democracy and traditional 
executive power arrangements promote hierarchal governing structures. These governing 
arrangements are, however, being challenged by multilevel policy networks in which power is 
distributed” (Atkinson et al., 2013, p.151). As such, these networks appear to play a significant 
role in Canadian federal and provincial politics (Compston, 2009a; Craft & Howlett, 2013; 
Howlett, 2002; Montpetit, 2002, 2005; Rayner et al., 2013; Williams & McNutt, 2013). They are 
therefore of particular importance in understanding policy outcomes in specific national or 




factor supporting the emergence of policy networks across the country’s multi-level governance 
arrangement (Montpetit, 2002; Tronconi, 2018). For instance, Montpetit (2002, p.2) argues that 
“federal arrangements multiply policy networks, influence the distribution of policy capacities 
among network actors, and – not least – contribute to the shaping of policy preferences. The 
imprint of federalism on policy networks is more important in Canada but is observable in both 
countries [Canada and the United States]”. Simply put, policy networks “are significant as they 
provide an understanding of collective processes through which policy briefs, policy preferences, 
policy discourses and policy decisions are constructed” (Montpetit, 2005, p.362). Thus, from the 
various factors of inaction reviewed in this chapter, it seems critical to study the Canadian oil and 
gas industry within a policy network approach to better understand its ties with Canadian 







4. Policy Network Theory and its Application in the Canadian Fossil Fuel Industry Domain 
From the literature reviewed in the previous chapter, it appears that political influence wielded by 
non-state actors from the oil and gas industry, regrouped into ‘policy networks’, would be an 
important source of the political inaction regarding the climate crisis. This chapter then delves 
further into the policy network approach used to understand the dynamic between state and non-
state actors within Canadian politics, more specifically in the context of the climate crisis. Prior to 
this, however, the first section introduces the main characteristics of policy networks within PN 
literature. Subsequently, the second section locates the current study within the policy network 
discourse by critically reviewing recent studies using a policy network approach to outline the 
links between key non-state actors, notably from the oil and gas industry, as a possible cause for 
the political inaction in tackling the climate crisis in Canada. There are nonetheless notable 
limitations to these studies, which lead to this study’s analytical gap, described in the third section. 
4.1. Policy Network Theory 
The concept of policy network emerged in political science in the 1970s, under assumptions that 
policymaking processes were influenced by interdependencies, informal relationships, and 
arrangements between interest groups, political institutions, and other actors involved, in order to 
reach specific policy outcomes (Compston, 2009a; Howlett, 2002; Thatcher, 1998). This mode of 
thinking differed heavily from the particular focus on methodological individualism that was at 
this point prominent in political science (Victor, Montgomery, & Lubell, 2017), as the network 
approach argued that the important unit of study is not simply an individual or a group, but 
particularly the relationships between such individuals and groups. Moreover, network analysis 
cuts through the enduring ‘micro- vs. macro-level’ debate regarding the proper scope of analysis 




2009; Victor et al., 2017). Indeed, a network analysis can be characterized as “a meso‐level concept 
that links the micro level of analysis, dealing with the role of interests and government in particular 
policy decisions, and the macro level of analysis, which is concerned with broader questions about 
the distribution of power in modern society” (Marsh & Rhodes, referenced in Rhodes, 2009, p.3). 
This is linked with the emphasis on a multilevel analysis, since different network structures and 
types of relations can widely differ across policy domains or levels of political organization (Adam 
& Kriesi 2019; Atkinson & Coleman, 1989; Braunstein, 2015; Wilder, 2019). Thus, a meso-level 
analysis is quite important in the context of network analysis.  
Early network analysis studied specific relational configurations of key policy actors – also known 
as policy subsystems – and the state. This approach was used in the United States to develop the 
concept of the ‘iron triangle’, meant to represent the three-way relationship between federal 
interest groups, congressional committees, and governmental agencies (Adam & Kriesi, 2019; 
Bevir, 2020; Howlett, 2002; Rhodes, 2009). This kind of subsystem was described to have 
‘captured’ extensive legislative and regulatory power, thereby generating strong concerns over the 
democratic integrity within policymaking processes, as this closed and rigid group advanced their 
self-interests above the general public’s in terms of policy choices and outcomes (Carroll, 1984; 
Hessing et al., 2005; Howlett, 2002). However, the application of the iron triangle in other political 
settings was highly limited, leading to an important transition in the network literature. The 
subsequent network approach took on various ‘types’ of networks, ranging from rigid and stable 
‘policy communities’ to more flexible and open-ended types of interest groups known as ‘issue 
networks’ (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). The former was characterized by a narrow, hierarchical, and 
interdependent group of actors with strong consensus over values, ideologies, and policy 




latter was in direct contrast, represented by a looser, more diverse type of network – and thus more 
prone to internal conflict (Bevir, 2020; Howlett, 2002; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Rhodes, 2009; 
Thatcher, 1998). Issue networks were described as less politically powerful as policy communities. 
They were more informal and non-hierarchical, and constituted of a higher number of actors, thus 
limiting the level of consensus within the network, through the presence of a wider set of views 
and perspectives over policy decisions (Börzel, 1998; Hessing et al., 2005; Rhodes, 2009; 
Thatcher, 1998).  
Overall, Compston (2009b, p.9) explains that the “most prominent dimension of variation in 
[policy network] literature is described as continuum between small, closed, consensual policy 
communities and larger, looser, more conflictual issue networks”. In other words, these two types 
of networks represent both extremes of the spectrum, enabling researchers to define studied 
networks within this spectrum based on the degree of integration and cohesion of network actors 
(Börzel, 1998; Compston, 2009b; Rhodes, 2009). As such, their combination “encouraged 
disaggregation (of policymaking, the state and interest groups), insisting that the interactions of 
actors be examined in detail. They offered distinct, identifiable categories of state-interest group 
relations whose defining characteristics could be applied in studies” (Thatcher, 1998, p.392). 
However, early network studies faced substantial limitations and criticism. Notably, it was argued 
that these approaches lacked explanatory power, were under-developed, and included in their 
analysis a set of factors influencing policy processes too narrow to be used for adequate policy 
analysis (Carroll, 1984; Thatcher, 1998). Indeed, it was unclear whether network characteristics 
were preconceived or more naturally – or randomly – generated, leading to question the actual 
impact of such networks onto the political sphere (Bond & Harrigan, 2014). Moreover, the varying 




definitions and specific use of the approach.  Consequently, the strong contention surrounding 
early PN research, notably over the practicality and efficiency of policy network analysis, led to 
major improvements of the field over time. Although there is still no universal definition of the 
concept of policy network, Börzel (1998) notes certain features that appear as commonly agreed 
on within contemporary network literature, notably that networks are characterized by non-
hierarchical, interdependent, and relatively stable relationships between actors, all sharing 
common policy interests and choices, and exchange resources to achieve these shared interests. 
Alternatively, the purpose of a policy network analysis is particularly well-defined by Braunstein: 
“A PN [policy network] analysis offers a way to map the organisations involved in policy 
making, and it allows the relating of this map to policy outcomes. This facilitates the 
exploration of the domestic politics behind different policy outcomes within countries 
and across countries. Policy network theories maintain that policy outcomes, and thus 
institutional choices, emerge from the structure of state-society relations. The structures 
of these relations shape the interactions among actors, thereby influencing consultation, 
negotiation, and bargaining in formal and informal institutional arrangements. This 
makes it an excellent framework for investigating policy processes that are characterised 
by the involvement of peak organisations and that lead to policy choices that do not 
follow formal political institutional logic or reflect the underlying economic power of 
interest groups.” (2015, p.54) 
From the early policy network literature, two main analytical approaches emerged: typological and 
interorganizational (Börzel, 1998; Braunstein, 2015; Thatcher, 1998; Rhodes, 2009; Wilder, 
2019). First, the network typology approach focuses on the configuration of state-society relations 




having an impact on policy content and outcomes (Atkinson & Coleman, 1989; Börzel, 1998; 
Dunn & Perl, 1994; Thatcher, 1998). In this case, ‘policy network’ becomes a generic term, thereby 
using a given typology based on specific variables of state-society arrangement to determine a 
specific form of network. In turn, the type of policy network present in a specific policy domain 
may then affect the policy process or its outcomes. Over time, this focus on state-society 
configurations has led to the development of multiple typologies using varying numbers of 
dimensions or terminology to define policy networks62, using a varying number of dimensions and 
variables for determining state-society relations, thus either extending or limiting the number of 
different types of policy networks possible. 
For instance, of particular interest is Atkinson & Coleman’s (1989) network typology, using three 
variables – degree of mobilization of business interests; state autonomy; and state concentration – 
to develop seven distinct types of sectoral policy networks (see Table 4.1). Here, state 
concentration and autonomy correspond to the “degree to which ultimate decision-making power 
is concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of officials [and] the degree to which 
these are able to act autonomously” (p.51), which is then compared to the extent to which the 
“business community in a particular sector [is] mobilized to assume a role in the making and 
implementing of policy” (p.53). 












Low State-Directed Pressure Pluralism Pressure Pluralism Parentela Pluralism 
High Concertation Clientele Pluralism Corporatism 
Industry-Dominant 
Pressure Pluralism 
Source: Atkinson & Coleman, 1989 
 
62 Main typologies that enjoyed particular attention are Atkinson & Coleman (1989), Marsh & Rhodes (1992), Jordan 




At one end of the typology is the state-directed structure, in which poorly mobilized business 
interests have limited influence over decision-making, against a highly autonomous and 
concentrated state organization. Meanwhile, the opposite end describes a situation of industry-
dominant pressure pluralist PNs, in which policymaking is severely influenced by a highly 
mobilized business sector, and where state organization has little authority due to low degrees of 
autonomy and concentration of institutions (Atkinson & Coleman, 1989; Braunstein, 2015). 
Across this spectrum, the authors depict different types of networks; concertation, corporatism, 
and various forms of pluralism – pressure, parentela, and clientele pluralism – for a total of five 
different networks between the two extremes already outlined. 
However, the typological approach faces some analytical limitations. Thatcher (1998) points to 
conflicting definitions and subsequent ambiguity across the different typologies, a certain 
difficulty in obtaining empirical evidence regarding some of the variables used in typologies, 
thereby making them quite unwieldy for further analysis. In all, “the utility of network typologies 
is open to question in situations in which there is rapid change (both institutions and actors), a lack 
of clear sectoral/subsectoral boundaries, complexity of decision-making and a potentially large 
number of actors drawn from different levels of policy formation” (Thatcher, 1998, p.398). 
The second approach considers policy networks and their interactions with state institutions as a 
form of governance. The increasing dependence of governments on non-state actors across various 
policy domains resulted in greater negotiation and coordination between state and business 
interests, notably due to the growing dominance of non-state actors in policymaking63 (Thatcher, 
1998). In this sense, interorganizational relationships become highly important for understanding 
 
63 Especially in the case where a privatization and financialization of previous government institutions occurred under 




contemporary policymaking processes (Börzel, 1998; Rhodes, 2009; Thatcher, 1998; Victor et al., 
2017). In this case, the majority of interorganizational network studies analyze the links between 
actors and groups through quantitative data about these specific links, with the results depicting 
intricate map diagrams of the network, also known as ‘social network analysis’ (SNA) (Victor et 
al., 2017; Ward, Stovel, & Sacks, 2011). A main benefit of this approach is that it provides 
empirical evidence of the blurring of the boundaries between state and non-state actors, as the 
resulting network maps specifically inter- and intraorganizational relationships across political 
institutions, industry companies and associations, as well as civil society organizations (CSOs) 
(Adam & Kriesi, 2019; Heaney & Strickland, 2017; Knoke & Kostiuchenko, 2017; Rhodes, 2009; 
Thatcher, 1998; Ward et al., 2011). Consequently, it is often argued that the interorganizational 
approach holds more explanatory power, methodological rigour, and legitimacy than the 
typological approach, notably due to its use of quantitative data and the visualization of network 
structures through SNA maps, particularly in comparison to the broad and generalized conceptions 
of state-society structures within network typologies. 
Nonetheless, this approach also faces certain limitations. The extent of the validity and accuracy 
of the configuration of a certain mapped network developed through quantitative analysis remains 
challenged. Indeed, the extent of a network and its relevant relationships may be too large to be 
easily studied. Network researchers must often apply ‘boundaries’ to their networks – for instance, 
either through a network analysis within a specific sample of actors, or the use of exclusive data 
to limit the breadth of the network (Bond & Harrigan, 2014; Thatcher, 1998; Ward et al., 2011). 
Consequently, the depicted network may differ from the actual network configuration. 
Furthermore, this type of analysis is only possible with ‘visible’ relationships – through industry 




validity regarding the studied network. Particularly, Thatcher (1998, p.402) explains that “only 
visible decisions and actors are taken into account, often together with the actors’ own view of 
power relations; as a result, many of the criticism of standard pluralism apply, notably that the role 
of non-decisions in setting agendas is ignored, whilst non-participants in decisions may enjoy great 
power thanks to, for instance, systemic power and the mobilization of bias”. Finally, this approach 
also tends to focus too heavily on the relationships between actors, thus sometimes neglecting the 
effect of the characteristics of specific actors within the network (Adam & Kriesi, 2019). 
Furthermore, while both approaches face distinct limitations, these critiques represent concerns 
over the study of networks as a whole. One of the main arguments against policy networks – and 
of great relevance here – is whether their analytical framework provides significant explanatory 
power, or if it is merely a descriptive tool. Indeed, despite improved methodological rigour since 
early PN research, the purpose of network analysis remains unclear, aside from some potential for 
descriptive assessment – in which Dowding (1995, 2001) is a prominent figure representing these 
concerns (Börzel, 1998; Braunstein, 2015, Knoke & Kostiuchenko, 2017; Monpetit, 2005; 
Thatcher, 1998). For instance, in relation to the criticism that policy networks lack explanatory 
power, Börzel (1998, p.266) explains that “the general inability of the interest intermediation 
school [i.e., typological approach] to formulate hypotheses which systematically link the nature of 
a PN with the character and outcome of the policy process seems to confirm the judgment that PNs 
are not more and not less than a useful toolbox for analysing public policy”. In turn, this line of 
criticism has direct effects over the legitimacy of the causal mechanisms between policy network 
structures and policy processes and outcomes. In other words, the understanding of how policy 
networks may affect policy outcomes remains unclear – and is one of the most understudied 




Rhodes, 2009; Thatcher, 1998). As such, Compston (2009b, pp.35-36) contents that “the issue for 
policy network theory as a theory of policy change, therefore, is to provide a logically coherent 
and empirically plausible account of what causes changes in the pre-existing policy preferences of 
relevant public actors and/or in the nature of resource exchange over public policy”. Another 
notable criticism is of an apparent neglect of important contextual, environmental, and 
socioeconomic factors within network analysis, which may greatly affect the PN’s structure, the 
policy process, or the relationships between actors (Braunstein, 2015; Thatcher, 1998). 
However, despite considerable criticism found across network literature and the attributed 
methodological limitations of PN studies, this type of analysis is still considered to provide 
important contributions to contemporary public policy research. Particularly, the ‘hollowing out’ 
of welfare states, along with the privatization of public services and an increasing reliance on 
market forces, make PN research much more important, given the significant increase of the degree 
of political power of non-state actors following these trends (Knoke & Kostiuchenko, 2017). 
Indeed, “policy is not made in the electoral arena or in the gladiatorial confrontation of Parliament, 
but in the netherworld of committees, civil servants, professions, and interest groups” (Marsh & 
Rhodes, referenced in Knoke, 2018, p.540). Furthermore, there have been significant contributions 
in the study of causal mechanisms between network structure and policy outcomes in recent years, 
which was a main point of contention regarding the applicability of the PN approach. For instance, 
Braunstein’s (2015) work shows that the impact of policy networks on policy processes and 
outcomes can be linked through the components of a PN – defined by the state-society structure 
and configuration of relevant institutions for a specific domain –by determining which actors are 




In turn, Braunstein’s model points to an alternative beyond the typological and interorganizational 
approaches – which Thatcher (1998) initially described as the ‘diversified’ approach. This third 
form of PN research still considers the formal institutional structures that can impact policy 
networks, but it also integrates the previously omitted factors mentioned earlier, and extends the 
framework of analysis to improve the causal relation between network structure and policy 
outcomes. The diversified approach can then be considered a form of integration of the typological 
approach, in which defining state-society configuration remains relevant64, with the focus of the 
interorganizational approach on empirical evidence and measurable data. In turn, this combination 
of both approaches seems to have the most analytical potential, as it appears to minimize the 
respective flaws associated to initial approaches (Adam & Kriesi, 2019; Börzel, 1998; Braunstein, 
2015; Thatcher, 1998). In addition, Thatcher outlines the combination of other frameworks and 
theories within the diversified network framework, such as theories of power and the use of 
 
64 For instance, Braunstein (2015) uses the typology developed by Atkinson & Coleman (1989) and applies it to his 
own research context in a multilevel and domain-specific approach. 




historical institutionalism. Further research also supports this integration, which can allow a better 
understanding of power distribution within the network and the state, along with how the studied 
network emerged and changes and adapts over time: 
“As policy change is a function of exogenous and endogenous factors […], only a 
simultaneous analysis of both types of factors can show whether and how policy 
networks can resist, alter, or accept environmental stimuli and thus serve as a core 
variable for understanding policy outcomes. Only when the understanding of how 
external factors and internal network dynamics influence policies and their changes is 
improved may we be able to specify which types of policy networks increase the 
legitimacy and efficiency of policy making.” (Adam & Kriesi, 2019, pp.148-149) 
As such, Adam & Kriesi (2019, p.130) explain that “external factors such as institutions, ideas, 
values, strategies, and technologies are now also taken into account as independent determinants 
of network structures”. This concept was adapted into a model linking various factors affecting 
PN structure, in influencing policy outcome – shown in Figure 4.2. In turn, this model represents 
this study’s analytical ecclecticism approach. Notably, the review of multilevel factors in the 
previous chapter favour the creation of large and politically powerful networks – therefore further 
supporting the importance of studying climate policy inaction through a PN approach.  
Source: Adam & Kriesi, 2019   





Policy network analysis represents a particularly effective approach for understanding the extent 
to which policy processes and outcomes can be affected by politics and non-state actors. It is also 
considered to be very useful to study the politics surrounding the global climate crisis. For instance, 
“the policy network approach allows the empirical observations to somewhat more closely 
approach the ‘wicked’ complexity of social and political causality, so very much evident in climate 
change problems” (Broadbent, 2017, p.2). This approach has been greatly enriched over multiple 
decades of research, and has been shown to have particular value in the study of state capacity in 
the context of a growing number of non-state actors with increasing political power. Finally, the 
contribution of a PN approach to public policy is categorized under three fundamental roles: 1) 
describing the network structure and the linkages between actors; 2) measuring the effects of 
different factors on actor exchange types (where the network is the dependent variable, and the 
focus of such research is on monitoring how a network changes and adapts over time), and; 3) 
studying the causal mechanisms between policy network and policy processes and outcomes (in 
which the network becomes the independent variable for this role) (Thatcher, 1998). Through these 
distinct roles, network research can provide a significant contribution to the field of public policy. 
From the assessment of the roles, strengths, and limitations of PN research, the next section 
critically reviews recent network studies within the Canadian context. 
4.2. Critical Review of Recent Canadian Oil & Gas Policy Network Studies  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, a number of recent studies have used a network approach within the 
Canadian fossil fuel industry domain, particularly as an effort to better understand the close 
relationship between this industry and Canadian politics. Five are of significant importance here. 





First, Graham (2019) analyzes financial reports of the ten biggest fossil fuel companies in Canada 
to determine whether these organizations have made important investments in renewable energy 
in order to determine the existence of a corporate transition strategy. Particularly, the study 
includes a social network analysis to outline intersectoral relations between the fossil fuel industry 
and the renewable energy industry. The findings provide evidence of particularly high social and 
political barriers to an energy transition, therefore questioning “whether capitalism can 
‘decarbonize’” (p.229). Indeed, the fossil fuel companies reviewed appear to have hardly invested 
in renewable energy technologies. In fact, these companies seem to have instead focused on a 
short-term strategy of delaying energy transitions and ‘business as usual’. Notably, Graham (2019) 
points to the investments of the largest Canadian fossil fuel companies in renewable sources of 
energy as quite marginal, even more so in comparison to these companies’ investments directed in 
the expansion of their non-renewable operations. However, despite these small figures of 
investments in renewables, Graham points to their aggrandizements by several of these companies, 
used in ‘greenwashing’ practices: 
“While fossil fuel corporations like Enbridge have made significant investments in 
renewables, the benefits of some green initiatives can be outweighed by misleading 
conclusions that these corporations are green saviors. Coupled with dubious yet 
increasingly common pronouncements that energy system transformation is now well 
underway, these relatively minor investments can justify inaction. In this way, their 
investments become a component of the “new denialism”.” (p.244) 
These findings lead Graham to challenge the current market-based approach of the energy 
transition in Canada, which is seen as critically insufficient in comparison with the increasing level 




regarding the fossil fuel policy network’s structure and the extent of its related actors – particularly 
within the financial sector. 
Carroll & Huijzer’s (2018) work specifically focuses on this point. Their study comprises of a 
SNA using share ownership data from a sample of the 200 largest Canadian oil-producing 
companies to map corporate ownership interrelations within these companies. This analysis 
reveals disproportionate concentration of the fossil fuel industry’s ownership and economic power 
around only a few private actors65, which “represents a massive centralization of economic power 
in the hands of private investors accountable only to themselves” (p.8). Moreover, the study 
outlines strong ties and the prominent role of Canada’s large banks66, along with five US-based 
asset management firms67, in the fossil fuel industry68. Carroll & Huijzer explain that these “major 
financial institutions participate in overlapping constellations of interest in a close symbiosis of 
fossil-fuel capital and financial capital. The interlinked stakes within the various firms give these 
financial institutions an obvious interest in the vitality of the entire sector and in resisting efforts 
to wind down fossil-fuel capital and to expand renewables” (pp.28-29). Moreover, there is further 
consolidation of interests of these financial institutions, notably due to the fact that each of these 
banks hold a certain ownership of each other. In all, the level of concentration of the fossil fuel 
industry is described by the authors as “nothing short of oligarchical” (p.29), urging for energy 
democratization and pressuring Canadian financial institutions and governments to divest from the 
 
65 Carroll & Huijzer emphasize the increasing concentration of the Canadian economy within a smaller core of large 
firms over the years; in 2015, only 0.156% of all Canadian firms accounted for nearly 60% of all corporate revenue. 
In the fossil fuel industry, the three largest oil producers (Enbridge, Suncor, and Imperial Oil) accounted for more than 
30% of total yearly revenue in 2015, the top 10 largest firms accounted to 60% of revenue, and the top 25 producers 
held 80% of the revenue. 
66 Royal Bank of Canada, Toronto-Dominion Bank, Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal and Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Commerce. 
67 Capital Group, Vanguard, Franklin Resources, Fidelity Management and Research, and Blackrock. 
68 Of noticeable interest is the Royal Bank of Canada, which has investments in 30 out of the top 50 fossil-fuel firms, 




oil industry. Thus, this study extends the fossil fuel network structure beyond the oil industry and 
into Canadian (and global) finance, through empirical evidence of the deep integration and 
consolidation of interests within various groups and actors through overlapping investments and 
strong interrelation of financial groups and institutions within this network. 
Indeed, Canadian banks and financial institutions play an important role in the fossil fuel industry. 
For instance, a recent study published by the Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives and the 
Corporate Mapping Project in late 2019 (Rowe et al., 2019) revealed that the Canadian Pension 
Plan was still heavily investing in the fossil fuel sector, which has been described as “both a moral 
failing and a financial risk” (p.21). Notably, the maturity and potential decline of the oil and gas 
industry is likely to lead to considerable stranded assets for investors. The report points to the shift 
in energy production towards renewable sources, resulting in a potentially decreasing demand for 
fossil fuels, which then seriously hinders the capacity of such investments to flourish in the long-
term – while already posing some risk today. Furthermore, the report argues that such strategy 
equals to investing “in companies whose financial worth depends on overshooting their carbon 
budget” (p.17), which goes against the global effort to remain below a 1.5oC temperature increase. 
As such, “banks, government pension and investment funds and other institutional investors can 
be held as much accountable for continued and escalating carbon emissions as producer 
companies” (Carroll & Huijzer, 2018, p.29). These findings also further reinforce the argument 
that Canada has fallen into a neostaples trap. Having a considerable portion of assets invested in 
the fossil fuel industry, the Canadian banking and financial sectors have become accomplices of 
the industry’s resistance towards ecological regulation and reduced carbon emissions, as these 
institutions attempt to protect their investments (Carroll & Huijzer, 2018; Carter, 2018; Neubauer, 




Another approach for network mapping is through the analysis of overlapping professional 
positions – network actors simultaneously holding top decision-making positions – across different 
organizations (Bond & Harrigan, 2014; Brownlee, 2020). Notably, “interlocking positions and 
persons are important for the cohesion of two main institutions: politics and economy. […] 
Interlocking directorates treat positions as a structural feature of importance for investigation” 
(Knoke & Kostiuchenko, 2017, p.4). This approach is found across the important works of 
sociologist William K. Carroll, specifically directed towards the network and ties between 
Canadian oil industry actors and other spheres of Canadian society (Carroll, 2020a; Carroll et al., 
2018; Gray & Carroll, 2018; Carroll, Graham, & Yunker, 2018). For instance, one of his recent 
works (Carroll et al., 2018) outlines the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) in aligning the 
corporate interests of this network with the ‘national interest’ through a SNA of interlocking 
directorships and board memberships between fossil fuel industry corporations and key CSOs. 
Through a sample of 238 large Canadian fossil fuel companies and 112 civil organizations 
(regrouping industry associations, business advocacy groups, think tanks, academic institutions, 
and research institutes), the study outlines deep, intricate relationships between a number of fossil 
fuel corporations and CSOs. In turn, these interrelated actors are engaged in a ‘second-stage 
denialism’ strategy, characterized as proposing “policies that appear as credible responses to the 
scientific consensus but do not harm big carbon – the three most typical being greater efficiency 
in carbon extraction and consumption, new technology, and incremental change inadequate to the 
scale of urgency of the problem” (Carroll et al., 2018, p.428). This strategy is performed by the 
blurring of the boundaries between market and civil society organizations through the 
aforementioned interlocking directorships, along with significant fossil-fuel industry funding 




public-service institutions’ opinions with business interests69. Based on this, “the traffic in 
interlocking reveals an elite network in which directors of carbon-capital corporations participate 
in governance of key knowledge-producing organizations” (Carroll et al., 2018, p.434). Moreover, 
the study adds: 
“Corporate power reaches into civil and political society with generally debilitating 
implications for democracy. At the center of a robust democracy is an ongoing public 
conversation in which everyone with a stake in an issue gets a say. As it reaches into the 
public sphere, concentrated corporate power distorts the communication, privileging the 
interests and perspectives of those who own and control capital.” (p.426) 
This is similar to another study on the effects of the corporatization of Canadian universities (Gray 
& Carroll, 2018), which also reviewed interlocking directorates to map strong ties between certain 
oil companies and associations with academic institutions – notably the universities of Alberta and 
Saskatchewan. Furthermore, the study points to a report from the Canadian Association of 
University Teachers, in which the “industry representation on academic governance boards and 
corporate research funding has been found to influence the direction and scope of research 
undertaken within the academy, at the expense of academic freedom and integrity (Gray & Carroll, 
2018, p.494). These studies reveal extensive relationships between the oil industry and Canadian 
civil society organizations. 
Overall, the evidence provided by these studies point to a network with seemingly unprecedented 
characteristics in Canada’s political history. This extraordinary situation is thus one of the main 
 
69 On that matter, Carroll, Graham, & Yunker (2018) emphasize the consequences of the growing ‘corporatization’ of 
public-service and academic institutions in Canada over the last few decades, resulting in the adoption of commercial 




factors motivating additional research in order to understand this network and its effects onto 
Canadian politics. Carroll`s findings emphasize the hegemonic structure of this group, as “the 
varied practices and forms of knowledge comprising such an organizational ecology offer the 
strategic advantage of diversity” (Carroll et al., 2018, p.447). While the high number and diversity 
of actors may point to a pluralist set of different views, it is argued that the strong interrelation and 
interlocking of key fossil fuel actors allow for this network to wield substantial influence over the 
ideas and knowledge being produced at various levels, ultimately making corporate interests 
synonymous to ‘common sense’ or ‘public interest’. These elements are particularly important to 
the ‘denialism 2.0’ introduced earlier, in which are promoted “policies and practices, convivial to 
profitable corporate revenue streams, which appear to be credible responses to the scientific 
consensus – as in the promise to phase out coal production by 2030 (while ramping up 
infrastructure and carbon extraction overall)” (p.447). 
Another valuable area of study is in the lobbying practices of the oil and gas industry in Canadian 
politics (Graham et al., 2019). Lobbying is defined by the Federal Lobbying Act as 
“communicating, with public office holders, for payment with regard to: the making, developing 
or amending of federal legislative proposals, bills of resolutions, policies or programs; the 
awarding of federal grants, contributions or other financial benefits; and the awarding of a federal 
government contract” (Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying in Canada, referenced in Graham 
et al., 2019, p.15). Moreover, it is a practice that has been used by various interest groups to 
influence policymakers and political officials over specific legislation and policy choices, from 
personal or business interests to civil rights issues, which can lead to improved policy process and 
outcomes aligned with the public interest (Graham et al., 2019; Victor, 2019). However, concerns 




following growing research on the subject that pointed to an apparent overrepresentation of 
corporate actors and associations into the lobbying industry (Goldberg et al., 2019; Graham et al., 
2019; Victor, 2019). 
Consequently, Graham et al. (2019) build on previous research on oil industry lobbying at the 
federal level through an analysis of data from the Canadian Registry of Lobbyists70. From this, a 
sample of 239 fossil fuel companies and 21 industry associations is used to make a social network 
analysis, with the results mapping a highly concentrated network linking 32 oil companies and 14 
industry associations71. The report reveals that the fossil fuel industry is far more active in lobbying 
activity in comparison with other major Canadian industries – namely the forestry, automotive, 
and renewable energy industries. Moreover, the fossil fuel industry’s lobbying is mostly directed 
on environmental issues, in which its lobbying efforts were more than five times greater than 
opposing environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) within the studied time period 
(Graham et al., 2019).  
From these findings, the authors emphasize a lack of democratic accountability within lobbying 
activities, notably given that the bulk of an industry`s lobbying activities is concentrated within a 
specific group of industry actors. Moreover, the study also denotes a form of ‘continuity-in-
change’, as the transition from the Harper to the Trudeau administration in 2015 appears to have 
had very little effect on the oil industry’s lobbying behaviour, besides an increased focus on key 
 
70 The authors mention the work of Cayley-Daoust & Girard (2012), which examined the oil industry’s lobbying 
practice from 2008 to 2012. The current report thus continued the approach of the previous authors, reviewing 
lobbying practices between 2011 and 2018. This time period also allows for a measure of whether the change in federal 
administration in 2015 effected lobbying practices by the fossil fuel industry. 
71 According to Graham et al. (2019), the most active lobbyists were the Mining Association of Canada (MAC) and 




agencies like Natural Resources Canada and Environment Canada. Thus, such practice can further 
exacerbate the erosion of democratic policy processes within public policymaking:  
“The diminished role of members of Parliament as a focal governmental target under 
Trudeau, and the growing significance of senior public servants and mid-level staff 
within the former state agencies, indicate a strategy of targeting key decision-makers and 
state actors that remained after the change of government. This points to a “deep state”, 
a form of co-government, far outlasting election cycles whereby key state institutions 
and actors within them develop long-term relationships with leading corporations and 
private interests that contribute to strategy elaboration, policy formulation and 
implementation.” (Graham et al., 2019, p.50) 
However, while this study sheds light on the lobbying practices of the oil industry into the federal 
government, it is not possible to directly link lobbying efforts with specific policy outcomes. 
Furthermore, the limited information that can be found in the Canadian Registry of Lobbyists 
restricts the ability to further study lobbying activities. In other words, the findings of Graham et 
al. (2019), like previous similar ones, may only reveal important lobbying activities and outline 
key relationships between certain state officials and non-state actors. 
Finally, the last study reviewed here extends the analysis of the ties between the fossil fuel industry 
and Canadian CSOs (Neubauer, 2018). Notably, Neubauer outlines such ties as ‘discourse 
coalitions’ (p.250), in which actors from different fields and sectors provide coherence and 
legitimacy in arguments for the continued development of the fossil fuel industry. Indeed, “because 
oil and gas comprise a relatively small share of Canadian GDP, employment, and export earnings, 




expansion requires constant public legitimation” (Neubauer, 2018, p.251). To represent the 
hegemonic aspect of this ‘oil development status quo’, Neubauer adapts Gramsci’s concept of 
historic bloc72 into the ‘Canadian petrobloc’: “a decentralized yet interlocked constellation of state, 
civil society, and corporate actors jointly dedicated to tar sands expansion” (p.249).  
This petrobloc is represented by a SNA of interlocking boards of directors and key staff of relevant 
private and public organizations with cabinet members of former Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 
followed by a discourse analysis of the identified actors’ communications. The study shows 
important connections between civil society organizations and government actors, notably in 
framing opponents to the oil industry and its expansion in Canada (in the forms of pipeline projects 
or oil sands development) as anti-Canadian, ‘foreign-funded radicals’73. Moreover, the study also 
outlines ways in which the ‘petrobloc’ changed and adapted through the change in government 
following the 2015 federal election: 
“The petrobloc concept is not as ephemeral as this change in government would 
seemingly imply. While the heavy-handed actions of the Harper government had 
alienated many voters from the petrobloc’s export market diversification strategies, the 
Liberals have in some ways emerged as industry’s new best friend. Despite the 2014 oil 
price crash, the Liberals have continued along the path of their predecessors, publicly 
advocating for pipeline capacity to tidewater to secure Canada’s national economic 
interest. Despite rejecting Gateway, they have approved several contentious bitumen 
 
72 The original historic bloc is defined as “the constellation of dominant institutions, social groups, and ideas around 
which an economic system and political system are organized” (Gramsci, 1996, p.263). 
73 This expression was notably used by former Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver, referring to various First 
Nations, ENGOs and other opposing groups during the Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline project. The close 




transport and export market diversification projects, including the Kinder Morgan Trans 
Mountain extension in British Columbia.” (Neubauer, 2018, pp.260-261) 
The studies reviewed above point to growing evidence and clarity over the existence of an 
extensive policy network spanning across oil and gas companies and industry associations74, 
financial institutions, national economic elites, civil society organizations (notably some neoliberal 
and conservative think tanks, foundations and advocacy groups funded, directly or indirectly, by 
fossil fuel industry actors), as well as some government officials and political parties (notably the 
Conservative Party of Canada, but also extending in recent years to the federal Liberal Party). 
While these studies suggest that this network enjoys considerable political influence on climate 
and energy policy decisions, it has nonetheless been contested by different activist groups on those 
issues. However, these PN studies also face some limitations that need to be addressed. In turn, 
their identification shows the analytical gap of this study. This process is presented in the following 
section. 
3.3. Limitations of Oil & Gas Policy Network Studies and Analytical Gap 
The network studies reviewed above provide a distinct picture of the structure of the oil and gas 
PN, spanning across CSOs, financial institutions, political actors, and fossil fuel industry 
companies and associations, while providing some explanatory evidence over how this network 
emerged, and how it is able to change and adapt over time – and elections. However, while these 
 
74 The oil and gas industry is particularly consolidated through large associations, notably the Canadian Association 
of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), the Mining Association of Canada (MAC), or the Canadian Energy Pipeline 
Association (CEPA). These associations are some of the industry’s largest lobbyists, and enable a certain coordination 
of multiple companies in the advocacy of specific policy or the dissemination of information favorably to the industry. 




studies are highly useful in understanding the structure and extent of this network within Canadian 
politics, they still face a number of limitations regarding policy network analysis.  
First, the majority of the studies discussed above have analyzed ties between political actors and 
institutions at the national level. However, it was established in the previous chapter that a 
subnational level framework is particularly important in the context of a highly decentralized 
federal system, such as in Canada, where provincial governments have significant power within 
their own jurisdictions. Second, aside from Neubauer’s (2018) discourse analysis, the studies 
outlined above have focused primarily on determining the structure of the oil and gas policy 
network. However, the need to research and understand the content of the network and its 
implications onto politics is heavily emphasized within policy network literature (Heaney & 
Strickland, 2017; Victor et al., 2017). Finally, and of most importance here, each of these studies 
fit within the interorganizational approach defined by Thatcher (1998), characterized by extensive 
use of quantitative methods – notably through SNAs – to provide analytical rigour and objectivity 
within policy network research. However, this approach also faces a number of criticisms, as seen 
earlier in this chapter. Notably, the interorganizational approach contains inherent flaws due to the 
necessary research boundaries applied in mapping a network – which may result in a network with 
differences to the actual one. Moreover, network data and the connections between actors must 
still be interpreted, in which case some relationships or indicators may be over- or undervalued by 
the researcher. This is explained by Thatcher: 
“Measures for activity may not reflect the distribution of power, the frequency of 
information does not necessarily show the importance of such exchanges whilst being on 
the periphery of an information or exchange network may not mean a lack of influence 




and providing quantification are no substitute for specifying causal relationships, and 
indeed depend on hypotheses concerning such relationships.” (1998, p.403) 
In other words, while the recent network analyses introduced in this section depict quite vividly 
(especially when put together) the existence and significance of the oil and gas policy network 
through their interorganizational approach, it remains unclear how this network directly affects 
policy processes and outcomes, notably in terms of increased oil production, deregulation of the 
fossil fuel industry, or in limiting policy change for stronger environmental regulation that supports 
climate crisis adaptation and mitigation. Therefore, the lack of research on causal mechanisms 
between this policy network’s structure and relevant policy outcomes represents the analytical gap 
of this research project.  
All the tools needed to conduct this study have now been identified. The previous chapter situated 
and justified the value of adopting a policy network approach within Canadian politics – notably 
in the context of the climate crisis. Subsequently, this chapter delved further into the policy 
network literature, thus allowing a critical review of the recent PN studies on the Canadian fossil 
fuel network. It then outlined this study’s analytical gap, which the second chapter presented the 






This chapter presents the findings of the study, conducted using Howlett’s model of network and 
policy change and semi-structured interviews of key individuals related to Canadian climate and 
energy policy. The first two sections present each component of Howlett’s model; beginning with 
the evolution of network membership for both the provincial and federal case in the first section, 
then followed by policy change in the second. Subsequently, the analysis conducted revealed some 
limitations to Howlett’s model, which are discussed in the third section. The fourth section 
combines every component of the model introduced in the previous sections in order to outline the 
network configurations for both cases. Finally, the fifth section presents the thematic analysis from 
the primary data collected during the semi-structured interviews, along with a discussion of key 
themes brought up by several interview participants. 
The findings outline limited inclusion of various actors in the province of Alberta for most of the 
observed period, with oil and gas industry actors overrepresented in climate and industry 
development policy processes in comparison to other groups of actors. Combined with limited 
policy change over time, these components point to the Alberta provincial subsystem as a closed 
network. Meanwhile, a sharp increase in both the number and diversity of actors involved in 
federal policy processes, along with slightly more significant policy change, suggests that the 
federal subsystem has gone from a closed to a contested network. 
5.1. Network Membership Change 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, policy network membership variation for Alberta was determined by 
observing the inclusion and exclusion of actors within key institutional bodies (such as standing 




their subsystem membership, are presented in the table below (Table 5.1). The table also looks at 
the effect of the main contributions of each institutional body on policy, as previous studies on 
public participation in policymaking in Alberta have shown that a greater inclusion of different 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































From this table, the changes in interest group involvement in climate and energy policy in Alberta 
can be regrouped in four different eras. The first one, which ends around the mid-2000s, 
demonstrates a rather highly exclusive policy process regarding fossil fuel development. This 
period is mostly characterized by the work performed by the National Task Force on Oil Sands 
Strategies, given its lasting impact on oil sands development in Alberta, and its exclusion of key 
stakeholders aside from corporate actors. In addition, Lemphers (2020, p.123) explains that 
“consultation with industry is clearly necessary when enacting industrial policy reform. However, 
in this case, there was arguably an imbalance with broader societal needs as no voices beyond 
industry and government were included in the [National Task Force on Oil Sands Strategies] 
governance or consultations”. Hoberg & Phillips (2011, p.511), who conducted extensive research 
on public participation in Alberta, characterized this period as “a clear case of a closed, bipartite 
policy subsystem historically dominated by two groups of actors: government and industry”, where 
non-governmental and non-industry actors (such as environmental groups or First Nations 
organizations) were systematically excluded.  
There are multiple accounts of poor consultation processes from both federal and provincial 
governments prior to the late 2000s, which were even acknowledged by the government of Alberta 
(Government of Alberta, 2007a). However, growing pressure over environmental concerns from 
ENGOs and the public in the mid-2000s led to an expansion of the policy network, with a series 
of multi-stakeholder consultations related to oil sands development: the Oil Sands Consultation 
Multi-Stakeholder Committee (MSC), which focused on the long-term development of the oil 
sands; the Oil Sands Ministerial Strategy Committee, mandated with a developing a short-term 
plan of action for the government; and the Cumulative Environmental Management Association 




Alberta. These consultations included a broader range of actors, including environmental and 
Indigenous groups. 
Indeed, it is possible to denote in the table above a shift in consultation processes starting around 
the end of the 2000s, where there is an increase of both overall stakeholders attempting to get 
involved in oil & gas and climate policy. However, the true diversity and ‘opening’ of policy 
consultation was still questioned (Paskey, Steward, & Williams, 2013). For instance, multiple First 
Nations and environmental groups had resigned from CEMA at different times following their 
criticism of industry representatives holding most of the decision-making power (Carter et al., 
2017; Paskey et al., 2013). In addition, a notable case of limited inclusion is the 2013 Pembina 
Institute v Alberta court ruling75, in which Justice Marceau pointed to deliberate attempts by the 
Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resources Development (ESRD)76 to limit standing to 
environmental organizations opposing further oil sands development. Notably, he also expressed 
strongly worded concerns in the fairness of the hearing process. Of particular importance in this 
case was the existence of a 2009 internal briefing note from the director of the ESRD to the Deputy 
Minister of Alberta Environment, undisclosed to the public, which attempted to prevent the 
Pembina Institute and the Oil Sands Environmental Coalition (OSEC)77 from further participating 
in oil sands consultations given their opposing views to industry development, which represented 
“a formula of rejection of future submissions of Statements of Concerns from Pembina and 
OSEC”78, as voiced by Justice Marceau. 
 
75 Pembina Institute v Alberta (Environment and Sustainable Resources Development), 2013 ABQB 567. 
76 The ESRD was then merged with the ERCB in 2012, under REDA, to form the AER. 
77 The Coalition was constituted at the time of the Pembina Institute, the Fort McMurray Environmental Association 
(FMEA), the Alberta Wilderness Association, and Toxics Watch Society of Alberta. 




Similarly, during that time, the creation of the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) under the 
Responsible Energy Development Act (REDA) led to significant concerns regarding the 
accountability and transparency of the new regulator, and particularly towards public engagement 
in oil and gas developments (Davidson, Edou, & Robinson, 2018). This issue was also reported by 
an interview participant, commenting: 
 “…if you read the [REDA] on paper, it appears that the Alberta Energy Regulator is to 
regulate the oil and gas industry in the public interest. But in effect, what the Alberta 
Energy Regulator does is regulate the public in industry’s interest… they really regulate 
the public, to protect the industry.” (P01) 
Having a more inclusive policy process is important. As such, the opening of a previously closed 
policy process was seen as rather promising. However, several accounts also question the true 
impact of this inclusion at the time. More specifically, the broader representation within these 
consultations was largely only symbolic, given that the consultations’ concluding reports79 resulted 
in either no change in policy direction, or were consequently never implemented by the 
government (Hoberg & Phillips, 2011). In all, Hoberg & Phillips explain that:  
“…participation in consultation bodies was expanded to incorporate new actors but 
without significant change in the location of authority or the distribution of power. The 
multi-stakeholder consultations were established simply to recommend actions to the 
provincial cabinet, where authority has effectively remained. […] While multi-
 
79 The MSC led to the “Responsible Actions: A Plan for Alberta’s Oil Sands” Strategic Plan, the Ministerial Strategy 
Committee released the “Investing in our Future: Responding to the Rapid Growth of Oil Sands” report, also known 




stakeholderism has definitely increased in the oil sands subsystem, relatively little policy 
change has occurred thus far.” (p.524) 
Indeed, even in the limited instances where environmental, community, and Indigenous groups 
were in fact represented within a consultation process, there have been various accounts of these 
groups facing tokenism from government – the practice of including more diverse groups more for 
the appearance of having an inclusive process rather than giving theme actual decision-making 
power. For instance, the Alberta Land Stewardship Act (ALSA) requires that regional plans be 
developed through public consultations. However, the integrity of these consultations has been 
criticized for limiting the scope of the topics addressed: 
“There was indeed broad public consultation in developing the LARP [Lower Athabasca 
Regional Plan, under ALSA]. However, the Government of Alberta restricted the 
conversation to three future development scenarios – a current state scenario that 
maintained new production plus some new developments, and two additional scenarios 
with higher levels of oil sands production. Discussion of reducing oil sands production 
was precluded.” (Davidson et al., 2018, p.306) 
As such, during this period, Carter (2020, p.114) explains that “Alberta implemented a new form 
of public consultation that gave the illusion of improving regulation through public participation, 
while serving to control the message and public expectations in the interests of continued 
extraction”. Similarly, one interview participant, who has been involved in some of these public 
consultations in Alberta, shared similar views from personal experience. The interviewee 
especially suggested reforms to improve representation within such consultations, so that “…you 




person, or another time when there was 50 or 60 industry CEOs and I’m the only one dissenting. 
That’s not a very democratic policy process in my experience” (P07). 
Moreover, there have been other instances of oil & gas companies or associations circumventing 
the multi-stakeholder group’s decisions or recommendations following their publication. This was 
also reported by one interviewee involved in the methane reduction oversight committee, a multi-
stakeholder group set up by the AER and Alberta Energy for methane regulations in 2017: 
“…after a nine-month process […] we didn’t reach perfect consensus, but we got to a 
place where people generally agreed on what the regulations look like. And then, the 
following November, we got a notice from AER saying “well, the industry is not happy 
with the modeling that was done as part of those discussions. So, we’re going to relook 
at it”. […] You know, to be fair on that one, they actually kind of held the ground on the 
regulations that did finally come up […] but again, it was just, you know, industry 
bypassing multi-stakeholder processes… and I’ll just point out that those multi-
stakeholder processes […] were all under NDP. There just aren’t those multi-
stakeholder… that step’s now been out. Now, it’s just industry.” (P01) 
As the interviewee explains, the third period is characterized by significant change in the 
participation process, which began to emerge in 2015 following the election of the NDP under 
Rachel Notley. Accounts of the Alberta Climate Change Advisory Panel and the Oil Sands 
Advisory Group generally denote a period of multi-stakeholderism – at least in a more meaningful 
way than in previous efforts. This shift also had a significant effect onto industry groups, where, 




the day, on the political side” (P04).  Another interviewee, a director of an industry association in 
Alberta, also shared this view: 
“…when the NDP was in power […] we couldn’t get a meeting. Like, they wouldn’t 
even say no, they would just ignore you. And so, the tables were kind of turned there. 
Which is probably not a bad thing. […] So, it was super challenging for an industry that 
had access, good access, for a long time. I’m not suggesting we had that much influence, 
but we had access. Back then [under the NDP], we didn’t even have access.” (P10) 
However, this pluralist approach to policy consultations did not last. The election of the United 
Conservative Party (UCP) under Jason Kenney in 201980 has had important repercussions to the 
general degree to which certain actors would be welcome – further expressed with the TIER 
roundtables, which were conducted exclusively with corporate actors from the oil & gas industry 
(Lothian, 2019; Riley, 2019). This government change represents the fourth period in the table, 
noted with a decrease in the degree of inclusion of policy consultation processes. “As [Premier] 
Kenney demonstrated […] Alberta is incredibly insulated to populist pressure, or democratic 
pressure” (P07). Consequently, while there has been a sharp increase in various actors involved in 
climate and energy policy processes in Alberta between 1999 and 2019, the analysis of the effects 
of network inclusion undertaken here shows that there has been, overall, limited change to the 
policy subsystem membership in Alberta.  
 
80 A representation of the stark change between the NDP and UCP is the launch of the Public Inquiry on Anti-Energy 




For the federal subsystem, network membership change was determined through Howlett’s model, 
using policy briefs submitted to relevant legislative committees. The following table (Table 5.2) 
presents the source of each of the policy briefs by organization type.  









Share of Total 
Briefs (%) 
NGOs & civil organizations 2 13.3% 38 23.2% 
Individuals 0 - 27 16.5% 
Industry associations 9 60.0% 23 14.0% 
Corporate actors 2 13.3% 20 12.2% 
Government 1 6.7% 19 11.6% 
Academic/think tanks 1 6.7% 16 9.8% 
First Nations 0 - 14 8.5% 
Unions & workers’ associations 0 - 6 3.7% 
Political parties 0 - 1 0.6% 
Total 15 100%* 164 100%* 
   *: Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.  
While the total number of actors involved in the policy process (by submitting policy briefs) is 
initially quite low, it is worth noting that the majority of the actors involved within the policy 
process are corporate actors and industry associations. This points to the general theme of a policy 
process with exclusive industry representation, even aside from this specific policy within the 
NRGO Committee. For instance, in his 2014 Fall report, the Commissioner of the Environment 
and Sustainable Development of Canada signaled concerns about the degree of exclusion 
regarding oil and gas regulations. Notably, “although detailed regulatory proposals [for oil and 
gas] have been available internally for over a year, the federal government has consulted on them 
only privately, mainly using a small working group of one province and selected industry 
representatives” (Commissioner of the Environment, 2014, s.1.13). 
Table 5.3 shows the extent of the variation of the federal subsystem between 1997 and 2019 based 














Federal Subsystem 15 164 +993% 4 26.67% 
Of the 15 initial actors who initially submitted policy briefs in 1997, four had also submitted policy 
briefs in 2019. Together, these two tables directly outline a sharp increase of actors involved in 
energy and climate policy decisions at the federal level. This element was also emphasized by 
another interview participant, doing research on policy networks in Canada, in which “in terms of 
networks, they [the newly-elected Liberal government in 2015] started opening them up, it was a 
different cast of characters that were in Ottawa” (P07). 
Aside from this increase in different actors, interview participants also pointed to a decrease in the 
alignment between oil and gas industry actors over time. The high levels of cohesion and capacity 
for mobilization have been a key component of oil and gas PN studies, which can lead to an 
overgeneralization of the industry as a single, homogeneous entity. One participant, a senior 
director from an energy organization, emphasized that misconception: 
“…oil and gas [industry] has such a diversity in membership. Like, you have one-man 
shops, you have 10-men companies who are looking at flipping their company in 12-18 
months and make a profit, you have midsize companies who have a little longer view, 
and then you have [larger companies] who want to be around for a century. […] You also 
have vertical integration differences. So, you have those that just produce, those that kind 
of move it, those that refine it, and those that sell it. You have such different fundamental 
interests, from an economic standpoint, that it’s almost unimaginable for all those 




There was nonetheless greater cohesion in the past, as seen with EPIC or the National Task Force. 
However, increasing pressures onto the industry, largely related to the climate crisis and the need 
to reduce GHG emissions, began causing a divergence of perspectives across industry actors: 
“There was much more alignment in the ‘90s, and early 2000s in oil and gas, in general, 
globally. […] And then, as we moved through the Kyoto Protocol, […] you saw people 
with longer perspectives […] view it as an opportunity. […] And you had other 
companies either working covertly or overtly, still trying to undermine climate science.” 
(P08) 
Consequently, this diversity of interests within the oil and gas industry is worth acknowledging. 
Some of the most forward-thinking energy companies have indeed taken strong initiatives 
regarding the climate, which deserve to be commended81.  However, although some companies 
are seen as “sustainability leaders”, they are still moving too slowly. Indeed, while a research 
participant pointed to the fact that climate “expectations of the world have changed dramatically, 
relatively quickly”, the interviewee also emphasized that industry leaders, for the most part “are 
not generally moving fast enough…” (P08). Moreover: 
“Some [oil and gas companies] are moving faster than others. Particularly European 
international majors are moving faster. [Canadian leading companies] are moving at an 
 
81 Studies monitoring sustainability efforts of oil and gas companies often name Shell, Total, and Repsol as leaders, 
notably for their integration of sustainability measures in corporate performance, and doubling down on emissions 
intensity and absolute GHG emissions. See Good (2020) and Parafiniuk & Smith (2019). However, these initiatives 
by these ‘leaders’ are drastically overshadowed by the negative stance of some of the greatest sustainability laggards 
in the oil and gas industry – particularly Koch Industries, ExxonMobil, Chevron, which Parafiniuk & Smith describe 
as being “a serious threat to the planet. They create a ripple effect; other companies use the same strategies to either 




‘okay’ speed, but could go faster. And then there’s some other companies stuck in ‘90s, 
unfortunately.” (P08) 
Thus, the existence of forward-thinking companies supporting political efforts to reduce emissions, 
and their positive contributions, do not outweigh the consequences of large groups of industry 
actors that have failed to follow suit, especially as the Alberta provincial government has 
systematically supported further development of the industry. As explained by another industry 
actor, “…there was lots of money coming in [Alberta resource industries], and lots of projects 
were being built, and then the world around us changed, and we didn’t necessarily change as 
quickly as we should have” (P10).  
This component is further exemplified by other actors that continue to resist energy transition 
efforts. Particularly, such actors are reported to enjoy considerable political access and influence, 
especially in Alberta: 
“…without question, you typically have right-of-center governments […] in Alberta with 
close ties between not just the oil and gas industry, but those parts of it that are in denial 
about climate change, and the global energy transition that is underway. As opposed to 
the progressive companies who know that a transition is happening, and they’re preparing 
for it, investing in it, I would say, […] have weak influence on the current provincial 
government.” (P04) 
In other words, it is important to acknowledge the diversity of actors within the oil and gas industry 
itself. There is a tendency to refer to the oil and gas policy network and the industry 
interchangeably, which generates the misconception of seeing the industry as one homogenous 




which is observed within both the provincial and federal subsystems. This aspect of the PN is 
important for the final analysis of both subsystems, presented in the following sections. 
5.2. Policy Change 
The categorization of policy change for both subsystems for the observed period is summarized in 
Table 5.4. A more detailed description of each policy change is included in the appendix section. 











Provincial 0 2 5 17 24 
Federal 1* 3 5 9 18 
Total 1 5 10 26 42 
*: See Appendix 2. 
As the table shows, policy change in Alberta within the observed period is mainly depicted by 
continuance – represented by a strong majority of the policies analyzed as incremental changes to 
instrument components. Important legislation was enacted between 1999 and 2015, such as the 
Climate Change and Emissions Management Act (CCEMA) in 200382, ALSA in 2009, or REDA 
in 2012. However, they mostly further entrenched the province into its policy goal of economic 
development through fossil fuel exploitation, while providing limited effect on environmental 
protection or emissions reduction. For instance, when asked about the pieces of legislation within 
that time period (1999 to 2015), an environmental lawyer, with nearly two decades of experience 
in Alberta legislation, qualified these acts and their respective regulations as “more of the same” 
and “the continuation of the energy development status quo” (P01): 
“If you read on the surface, […] the Land Stewardship Act [develops] overarching 
regional land use plans that will consider and manage cumulative impacts. And the 
 




government will be bound to only make decisions that are consistent with those plans. 
But if you read the details of the plans, and also into the Act, you see suddenly that the 
only part of the plans that are enforceable are what are called the regulatory details of the 
plans, which had very limited application and has a lot of discretionary language. […] 
Responsible Energy Development Act is a meaningless revision… it was a change on 
paper. […] The Alberta Energy Regulator is established under REDA and is just a 
continuation of the previous regulator…” (P01) 
Of particular interest is also the enactment of the Specified Gas Emitters Regulation (SGER) in 
2007, which is essentially the first form of carbon pricing system in Canada (Government of 
Alberta, 2007a). One interviewee, from an energy company in Alberta, recalls the SGER, at the 
time, as: 
 “…one of the most advanced policies in the world. Now, the price was relatively low, 
at $15 a ton, and the target was 12% [of emissions reduction]. But it put a consistent price 
on carbon across such a large swath of industry that, other than the EU emissions trading 
system, which was then just being developed, there wasn’t really anything close to that.” 
(P08)  
While this initiative was applauded as a progressive shift from the conservative provincial 
government, it has also been framed by several as more of a political move by Alberta to reaffirm 
and consolidate its constitutional power to regulate its economy within its jurisdiction prior to the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the federal government (Blue et al., 2018; Leach, 2012). A 
governmental official in Alberta explained that “it [SGER] was put through very quickly to kind 




of federal intrusion into that space if there was a vacuum” (P03). In addition, the effectiveness of 
the SGER to reduce GHG emissions from the industry sector has been questioned. Indeed, one of 
the provincial government’s mistake was failing to “really progress that policy in a material way. 
So, they essentially left the base flat, the target flat forever” (P08). Other critics also pointed to the 
regulation’s intensity-based approach to emission reduction instead of putting an absolute limit on 
them, as well as its limited scope, targeting less than 45% of the province’s total emissions, as the 
main shortfalls of the policy (Blue et al., 2018; Bramley et al., 2011; Read, 2014)83.  
More significant policy change is observed after 2015, with the election of the NDP government, 
and notably with the enactment of the Climate Leadership Plan (CLP), implemented in 2016. This 
historical government change, ending a 44-year rule of the previous Conservative governments, 
was quite disruptive on several respects, which brought contention from multiple groups – as 
explained in the previous section by an industry interviewee. At the same time, ENGOs and other 
civil society groups also criticized the government’s initiatives regarding the climate crisis for 
falling short of stringent enough measures. This was also explained by one environmental lawyer: 
“…the NDP was supportive of industry, no doubt, but also was willing to regulate and 
was willing to take some actions. […] You know, oil & gas is big business in Alberta 
and they [NDP], as much as anybody else, didn’t want to kill that. But they at least made 
some reasonable steps in the direction, through the Climate Leadership Plan, setting the 
100-megaton limit, setting the methane reduction target, you know, all good stuff. Still 
 
83 For a more positive view of the SGER, see Leach (2012, p.898), who states that “the SGER provides equivalent or 
weaker incentives to undertake emissions reductions than would a carbon tax, but that these are not as weak as is often 




would never have got us anywhere near where we will need to be by 2030 or 2050. But 
they were steps in the right direction.” (P01) 
Thus, despite mixed accounts regarding the NDP’s energy and climate initiatives during their short 
time in government, this period represents nonetheless a significant shift from the previous 
Conservative governments. However, several of the NDP’s policies had very limited effects – 
along with a very short existence. The election of Jason Kenney’s UCP in 2019 saw the repeal of 
several NDP climate initiatives, notably the CLP. Following this change in government, Alberta 
has seen a renewed interest in its oil and gas industry as the main factor of economic growth for 
the province. For instance, several participants voiced strong concerns with the resistance to 
change by the current government of Alberta: 
“[Policy changes, moving away from the oil & gas industry] aren’t going to be happening 
under the current government… and would they happen under an NDP government, 
which is the most likely alternative? I don’t know. It certainly didn’t happen under the 
Notley government. […] Alberta’s policymakers and some of the people are increasingly 
out of touch […] but the rest of the world is changing…” (P07) 
“…many of [the UCP’s policies] seem to be for short-term economic gain, but it may 
just be short-term political gain, and not really thinking about even a 5- or 10-year 
horizon, let alone longer implications for the prosperity of our province in relation to 
income of individuals, economics of the province, the implications of […] how climate 




 “[Premier Kenney] is a good advocate for the energy industry. I mean, he is. But 
sometimes, it’s a bit too much… you’ve got to acknowledge these other pieces and show 
what you’re really doing on it. So, what are you really doing on energy transition?” (P10)  
In contrast, federal policy change is much more dispersed across the different types of change – 
although incremental change to instrument components also represents a majority. On one hand, 
there are positive policy changes that have occurred, such as the 2012 regulations enforcing a coal 
phase-out across the country84, and notably their amendments in 2018 which accelerated the phase-
out timeline from 2053 to 202985. On the other hand, there are several cases of environmental 
regulatory rollbacks, notably under the 2012 Jobs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity Act (also 
known as Bill C-38), which drastically changed the environmental legislation landscape of the 
country86. One interviewee, a former senior federal energy official, stated that right from the 
beginning of the federal environmental assessment and review process [EARP, established under 
Cabinet Directives of 1973 and 197787], there were calls to revise and strengthen the process.  
Critics in ENGOs favoured establishing the legalistic process under the U.S. Environmental 
legislation accomplished in the early 90s.  But given that environment is a ‘shared jurisdiction’ in 
Canada’s federation, duplication and overlap were bound to emerge. There was a growing chorus 
from Premiers, industry, and others for streamlining and removing policy duplication within the 
CEAA. However, the reforms under Harper “went too far” (P09). Moreover, the research 
participant pointed to Bill C-38 as a clear example of fossil fuel industry influence on federal 
 
84 Reduction of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal-Fired Generation of Electricity Regulations, SOR/2012-67. 
85 Regulations Amending the Reduction of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal-Fired Generation of Electricity 
Regulations, SOR/2018-263. 
86 The extent of the impact of this legislation was extensively covered by previous authors. See Doelle (2012) and 
Gibson, (2012), as well as the Appendix section. 




policy: “I think probably one of the most blatant examples of [industry] influence on policy was 
that of EPIC88, a body set up and funded by industry subscribers to push for an energy policy in 
general but within that initiative, streamline and reduce federal provincial duplication in 
environmental assessment. […] Basically, many of the changes to the Fisheries Act, Navigable 
Waters Act and NEB Act were promoted by EPIC” (P09). 
Consequently, the recent efforts to improve climate and energy policies by the current Liberal 
government have been questioned. For instance, several policy decisions taken by Prime Minister 
Trudeau’s government are seen as quite conflicting; from signing the Paris Agreement and 
launching the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, which has the 
potential of deeply reshaping Canada’s economy towards decarbonization, while also supporting 
increasing oil & gas development. An interviewee explained: 
“…the inability of the Liberals to deliver on their [climate policy] promises is partly a 
function of the Liberals and their capacity, and partly a function of just the legacy, the 
inertia of the state as well… I think for me, the Trans Mountain pipeline decisions was 
also pretty bubble-bursting […] which showed that there was a lot of lip service paid to 
these reforms. But, when push came to shove, they [Liberals] were able to protect the 
people that needed to be protected, to use the risk-bearing capacity of the state to maintain 
the status quo.” (P07) 
However, the allegedly dichotomous position of the federal government on climate and energy 
policy does not seem to be restricted to the current government. Indeed, federal energy and climate 
policy between 1999 and 2019 is framed as a series of changes in policy directions, which resulted 
 




in a period of high political uncertainty and limited change regarding the climate crisis. “The 
federal government has had a lot of false starts and a lot of challenges. […] I think it’s been a 
shame to see all the false starts that happened at the federal level, and even something that’s not 
very ambitious, if you can just get it in place, and start and then make it better. I think you’re a lot 
better off” (P03).  
This situation of limited policy action and ‘false starts’ can be seen as having lacked the initial 
requirements of policy stickiness in order to generate a path-dependent process toward effective 
climate change policy (Levin et al., 2012). This element was also mentioned by another participant, 
a former governmental environmental commissioner: 
“How could we take climate action that wouldn't be reversed by the next government? 
Because the flip flops are immensely destructive. Climate action, and a lot of 
environmental action requires investment in long-lived equipment and infrastructure that 
only pays off over a longer period of time than the normal election cycle. China doesn't 
have any problems with this, but for a parliamentary democracy, it's really hard.” (P05) 
Interestingly, this pattern is seen in both provincial and federal cases. In Alberta, several of the 
NDP climate initiatives lacked such policy entrenchment, as the UCP repealed important parts of 
the CLP less than four years later. Subsequently, this “back and forth” policy component highlights 
some limitations to Howlett’s model, which need to be further discussed. 
5.3. Research Contributions to Howlett’s Model 
During the analysis of both case studies, there were numerous instances of climate and energy 
policies – acts, regulations, governmental frameworks or reforms – that were either heavily 




impact on the fossil fuel industry. In turn, these “blocked” policies do not seem to fit in the 
typology of policy change used in Howlett’s model, which only considers actual changes in various 
policy components. However, it would be a mistake to disregard these elements altogether – the 
mere existence of an observable number of blocked policies has a direct effect onto the 
interpretation of the entire political process. Thus, from the four categories of policy change of the 
initial typology, it would be necessary to add a fifth one. From a historical institutionalist 
perspective, these blocked policies represent various forms of policy drift, “changes in the 
operation or effect of policies that occur without significant changes in those policies’ structure” 
(Hacker, 2004, p.246). Furthermore, Lemphers (2020) emphasizes that such policy drift occurs 
particularly once a certain group of powerful actors resists policy change, even in the face of 
substantial democratic pressure. Moreover, he adds that, “unlike positive feedback which spurs 
reactive change, policy drift stresses policy status quo. As the climate crisis deepens, more 
ambitious climate policy is needed that results in much faster rates of absolute emissions reduction. 
Yet, policy drift is omnipresent” (2020, p.277). 
This category would thereby compose of instances of policy retrenchment, causing discontinuity 
in regulatory trajectories (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). This is represented in the form of enacted 
legislation that has been either heavily modified to limit its effect or quickly repealed, legislation 
that has been enacted but failed to have any effect whatsoever on the policy domain (i.e., 
‘symbolic’ legislation), or that failed to be enacted, amended, or repealed, despite strong public or 
political support for it. Consequently, there are 8 notable instances of blocked policies in the 
context of Alberta, and 11 at the federal level. These instances are introduced in the table below 




Table 5.5: Blocked Policies by Subsystem, 1991-2019 
Year Blocked Policy Description 
- Province of Alberta - 
2002 Recommendations of the Tuer Commission 
2007-2011 Premier Stelmach oil & gas royalty system review 
2008-2010 AWC recommendations for Alberta’s new wetland policy 
2015-2016 NDP oil & gas royalty system review 
2016-2019 Reforms to the Alberta Environmental Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting Agency 
2016-2019 Enactment and repeal of the Climate Leadership Plan 
2018-2019 Blocked transition of the province’s electricity generation system 
2019 An Act to Repeal the Carbon Tax, SA 2019, c 1 
- Federal Government - 
1991-1995 First efforts of the federal government to introduce a carbon tax 
1994 National Action Plan on Climate Change 
2002-2011 Kyoto Protocol 
2006-2007 Bill C-30, Canada’s Clean Air Act 
2007 “Turning the Corner” action plan 
2009-2014 Copenhagen Accord 
2010 Bill C-311, Climate Change Accountability Act 
2013-2016 Second sustainable development strategy 
2014 Bill C-634, An Act to establish a Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights 
2015 First budget of the new Liberal federal government 
2016 
Implementation issues of several components of the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean 
Growth and Climate Change 
Admittedly, these examples of blocked policy change shown above are each caused by a whole 
range of factors and cannot be attributed to a specific one. A critical and historical analysis would 
be required for each of these blocked policies – which was beyond the scope of this research. 
However, they nonetheless represent an additional type of policy change that should be considered 
when studying the impact of PNs onto policy outcomes.  
There seems to be somewhat of an irony here. On one hand, both federal and provincial 
governments seem to lack political power to enact stringent climate and energy policy, as the 
consistent failures to reach any emissions reduction target for nearly three decades would suggest. 
On the hand, it is quite puzzling to see, in the meantime, oil industry-based targets being reached 
in record-breaking time. Oil sands production reached the target of 1 million barrels per day in 




target for the oil sands, expected to be reached in 25 years, was instead done in three89. Since then, 
the Alberta oil sands have attracted approximately more than $325 billion-worth of capital 
investments (Natural Resources Canada, 2020a). 
On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that there have been successful cases of governmental 
climate policies. For instance, one interviewee from the government of Alberta pointed to the 
current coal phase-out running ahead of schedule. Indeed, one government official in Alberta 
interviewed pointed to the province now expecting to remove any form of electricity production 
from coal by 2023, instead of the initial timeline ending coal use only in 2030 (P03). However, 
instances of blocked policies outnumber – by far – such successful cases. 
Consequently, the entries in this fifth section can reinforce the ‘closed’ subsystem structure, in 
which there are such levels of insulation and asymmetry between the network and the entire policy 
discourse community that even incremental changes fail to occur. The lack of policy change 
regarding environmental law and policy have already been outlined nearly two decades ago by 
Boyd (2003): 
 “Industry has blocked and weakened many important environmental law and policy 
initiatives. […] In effect, the government consistently puts the economic concerns of the 
private sector ahead of the need for the public health protection. […] Every time 
government proposes a new or improved environmental law or policy, those with a 
vested interest in maintaining the status quo raise economic objections.” (p.253)  
 
89 These objectives were part of the 1995 Final report of the National Task Force on Oil Sands Strategies which, as 
previously mentioned, included only oil industry leaders, governmental agencies such as NRCan, Finance Canada, 
and Alberta Energy, as well as other corporate actors like the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce. The report was 
also notorious for barely mentioning effects of such growth on GHG emissions or the environment. For a detailed 




For instance, Boyd points to the significant political influence wielded by the Business Council of 
Canada, which significantly weakened the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 1999. 
Moreover, Boyd denotes the ‘symbiotic relationship’ between resource industries and federal and 
provincial governments which has led either to policies largely favourable to such industries, or 
blocking further environmental regulation. An example of the latter is the early federal elections 
of 1997 and 2000 by former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, which removed numerous newly 
proposed environmental laws as Parliament was dissolved. 
5.4. Results of Subsystem Cases 
From the analysis of membership and policy change, the resulting subsystem change can be 
determined (see Table 5.6).  
Table 5.6: Resulting Network Structure Change, 1999-2019 
Subsystem Network Membership Change Dominant Policy Change Resulting Network Change 
Provincial Mostly limited Instrument components Closed  
Federal 
Decreased symmetry, High 
insulation 
Instrument components & 
policy instruments 
Closed to contested 
For the provincial subsystem, the alternative method used to determine membership change does 
not allow for measuring the degree of insulation and symmetry. However, by observing the 
inclusion and exclusion of different groups of actors across various institutional bodies, it is shown 
that membership change has been rather limited between 1999 and 2019 – although short periods 
of greater inclusion occurred during that time (especially from 2015 to 2019). Thus, the limited 
membership change, along with dominant incremental change of instrument components, would 
denote a closed network. Meanwhile, network membership change within the federal subsystem 
is much more pronounced, with a decreased symmetry due to the large increase of actors involved 
in the policy process. There remains a relatively high degree of insulation, as nearly a third of 




combined with a number of policy change, mostly in the form of instrument components and policy 
instruments. These elements, put together, would point towards an initially closed network 
becoming much more contested over time.  
5.5. Primary Data Thematic Analysis 
Following the study of the two cases, the interviews were further analyzed to determine recurring 
themes linked to climate energy action (or inaction) in Canada. These themes correspond to key 
variables and characteristics that appear to have an impact to the degree of policy action of the 
Canadian federal government. The themes and their relationships are presented below (see Figure 
5.1), followed by a general description of these themes and their relationships. Finally, some of 
the main themes brought forward by the interview participants are discussed in more depth.  





The thematic analysis shows strong similarities with previous PN research, notably Atkinson & 
Coleman’s (1989) network typology, which combined state structure with the degree of 
mobilization of business interests to determine the political ‘strength’ of a state90. Here as well, 
whether a state enacts and implements significant action to tackle the climate crisis is incumbent 
to the dynamic between the state’s strength and its relation to the extent of political power from 
non-state actors91. External components that are largely outside of the control of both the state and 
non-state actors (such as variations in oil prices, environmental impacts affecting the state, or 
shifting consumer demands of a population’s perceptions on the climate crisis, among many 
others) are added as a third important variable, which seems to act as a catalyst to the state/non-
state actor dynamic. 
Two components were identified as defining the degree of state strength: intra-state cohesion, 
which implies the alignment of the federal and provincial governments regarding climate and 
energy policy decisions (discussed further later); and the effectiveness of implemented policy in 
reaching climate objectives. The greater the discrepancy between current policies and the 
environmental targets, the more a state will have to muster political strength to enact policy change 
in order to meet its objectives. For the degree of power of non-state actors, two defining 
components were also identified. The first refers mainly to the level of organization of interest 
groups, represented by the network`s structure. The more organized and aligned various actors are, 
the more likely are they able to collectively put pressure on policy processes and outcomes. This 
degree of organization is thereby incumbent on which actors (from different industries or CSOs) 
 
90 Refer to the section in Chapter 4 discussing Atkinson & Coleman (1989). 
91 The term ‘non-state actors’ refers not just to the fossil fuel industry, but any market or civil society actors involved 




are included within such network, and the degrees of cohesion and diversity of a PN regarding 
specific policy decisions. Secondly, the network`s political power is also determined by the various 
tools and resources at its disposition to exert influence on policymaking. Interviewees referred to 
various means, including political lobbying, public communications strategies, industry access to 
state actors, and so on. Interestingly, some participants also described the concept of ‘regulatory 
capture’, in which the fossil fuel industry allegedly exerts such influence onto some governmental 
institutions that it would essentially ‘control’ some of them in order to maximize its private 
interests, with respect to industry development project approvals or environmental regulation. This 
controversial concept is further discussed later in this section. 
Within the dynamic between the second-order themes and their relations with respective first-order 
themes described here, some themes were particularly discussed by most participants: the 
importance of cohesion between the federal and provincial governments for state strength; the 
recent increase of political polarization and its relation to political conservative views; and industry 
political power, which includes the concept of ‘regulatory capture’. These themes are presented 
and discussed below. 
State Strength & Intra-State Cohesion 
State strength is crucial for the adoption and entrenchment of stringent climate policy. However, 
the Canadian federal government is not known to be ‘powerful’, largely due to the decentralized 
aspect of the Canadian Confederation, discussed earlier. As stated by a research participant: “the 
federal government has, in many cases, weak jurisdictional authority relative to the provinces. […] 
The success of [meeting international climate obligations] can be largely determined by the actions 




governments makes the former greatly reliant on the degree of cohesion and policy alignment 
within every Canadian governments – referred here as intra-state cohesion.  
The degree of intra-state cohesion in Canada has varied considerably over time. An example of 
high cohesion is the “Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change”, in which 
strong consensus across all provinces and territories occurred (Government of Canada, 2016). 
However, intra-state cohesion seems to have declined in recent years, notably between the federal 
government and Alberta, under Jason Kenney. One participant emphasized the uniqueness of the 
current situation, which does not seem to fit with the traditional views of diverging political parties 
in Canada: 
“Jason Kenney uses a level of rhetoric that we did not hear from, you know, Jim Prentice, 
in his short position, or from Stelmach or Redford. Now, there’s just a level of rhetoric 
that comes from Jason Kenney that is above and beyond what there was in previous… 
you know, if you want to go back as far as Lougheed, you can probably say we would 
have all been on the same page.” (P01) 
In turn, several participants saw this decreasing cohesion between Canadian governments on 
climate policy (as well as across a broad range of issues) as the result of increased political 
polarization in recent years, mainly stemming from conservative parties. 
Political Polarization & Conservatism 
A recurring theme across nearly every interview was the recent polarization of Canadian politics, 
although it has also been a common trend across numerous countries in recent years. The gravity 
of this issue is worth acknowledging here. Polarization has occurred at each end of the political 




current situation. The climate crisis seems to be an important factor for this polarization, especially 
the debate surrounding policy choices to tackle the issue, as different interest groups have been 
advocating for different – and often conflicting – sets of climate and energy policies to adopt. “As 
soon as you start putting lines in the sand that are not economically viable, you create tremendous 
polarization” (P08). 
However, while a few interview participants shared some criticisms over both sides, nearly every 
interviewee who mentioned political polarization pointed to right-wing rhetoric as an important, if 
not critical, source for it. Indeed, “you saw the polarization within conservative parties around 
carbon [pricing], where, starting in about the late 2000s, you saw the attack on carbon pricing as a 
fundamental principle of conservative policy.” (P08). This dynamic declined in the 2010s, for 
instance with Alberta Premier Jim Prentice, a conservative, who proposed a carbon tax in the 
province as well.  
However, the decline of oil prices in recent years, notably by 2014 and in 2020 following the 
COVID-19 pandemic, further exacerbated that perspective. The consequences of these price drops 
were particularly felt in Alberta, with considerable job losses and decreasing economic stability. 
This upheaval in the province’s welfare had dire consequences on some Albertans, in which some 
political actors saw it as an opportunity: 
“… people are mad, they’re scared, and they’ve got politicians, and particularly ones on 
the right side of the spectrum, that are telling them “the reason you’re unemployed is not 
because of macroeconomics, or the price of oil […]. The reason you’re unemployed is 
because of […] that pipeline activist, or that environmental NGO.” […] And that’s an 




about what’s happening in global energy markets, and how the best days are behind us 
now.” (P04) 
As such, climate and energy policy further became a point of contention. Indeed, “we’ve seen 
Jason Kenney come back and basically revert to kind of, I would say, conservative principles of 
attacking carbon [pricing]. And, since he was elected on a kind of platform of anger, he’s been 
attacking the federal government on climate” (P08), thus further eroding intra-state cohesion, a 
key component for state strength. In turn, another participant bemoaned the current situation across 
conservative governments in Canada:  
“We have an established pattern that when conservative governments are elected, they 
destroy laws, policies, institutions, staff, research, the entire range of public actions […]. 
That hasn’t always been true. […] But it’s become in some ways even worse now, that 
there doesn’t seem to be any environmental cause that today’s conservatives don’t 
damage. It wasn’t always like this.” (P05)  
It is unclear how polarization will affect Canadian politics in the future – which is beyond the 
scope of this research. However, the interrelations between the climate crisis, conservatism, and 
political polarization are important to outline and further study. 
Industry Political Control and ‘Regulatory Capture’ 
By and large, fossil fuel industry actors appear to have an extensive range of resources at their 
disposition for influencing political decisions regarding climate or energy policy. Previous studies 
have pointed to lobbying as a main source of influence from industry actors (Cayley-Daoust & 
Girard, 2012; Graham, 2019). However, there is very little evidence available to prove that specific 




interviewed denoted a reduced access or capacity to be listened to by political officials in recent 
years. However, lobbying does not represent the full extent of the fossil fuel industry’s means of 
influence. One participant denotes that, on top of political lobbying, oil and gas actors use a breadth 
of communications tools to frame narratives around key issues and policy debates: 
“Big companies have a lot of money and a lot of incentive, given the impact that policy 
and regulations have on their profitability, to go in and lobby hard, […] banding together, 
spending a lot of money, […] running newspaper ads, basically encouraging people to 
write op-eds [opinion editorials] and all that. And the government, then, […] usually 
capitulates.” (P04) 
The use of media platforms to frame policy debates and the dissemination of information also 
represents an important source of political influence for this industry policy network, as shown by 
previous studies described in Chapter 4. Moreover, one participant explained: 
“There is consensus building, and a building of analysis, a building of a repertoire of 
language in research […]. And there are key influencers along the way that end up 
developing these ideas and these forms of language and research, and it is able to pervade 
society. And this has, in fact, happened across successive provincial and federal 
elections, if you really dug into it. This has very clearly happened with particular social 
media groups, or particular think tanks that are connected into these broader elite political 




In turn, the discussion of this topic led some interview participants to describe the concept of 
‘industry-captured’ regulators92, notably regarding the AER and the NEB (now CER). This 
concept has also been used in previous studies in the context of Canadian environmental or 
industry regulation (MacLean, 2016, 2019; Wood et al., 2010). However, there seems to be some 
misconceptions with this concept. For instance, Carpenter & Moss (2014) explain that regulatory 
capture is often ‘misdiagnosed’ or ‘mistreated’. While multiple scandals of malpractice or conflict 
of interest in government institutions – of which both the AER and the former NEB have had their 
share – may represent possible examples of such ‘capture’, “plausibility, however, lies quite a 
distance from proof” (Carpenter & Moss, 2014, p.4). 
Further investigation during the interview process outlined a similar misconception of the concept 
of ‘regulatory capture’. This allowed to clarify the usage of the term by some participants regarding 
Canadian energy regulators: 
“… I’ve met some of the [AER] regulatory people within, you know, and I’ve dealt with 
them on things like the methane oversight committee and that, and there’s some really 
good people in that organization. They’re trying to do good stuff. But generally, it’s just 
not an effective regulatory of anything. Because they’re getting their direction from the 
government, and they won’t do much to target the industry.” (P01) 
“They [AER] are a regulator, they’re not a policymaker. So, the failings, where they exist 
– of lack of policy stringency – that’s government, that’s not AER’s problem. […] But 
 
92 The concept is defined here as “the result or process by which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or 
repeatedly directed away from the public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and 




in terms of the staff themselves, I think, you know, they’re not industry captured. They’re 
just as diligent as public servants as exists outside of the AER.” (P03) 
The case studies and interview process pointed to little evidence of an explicit form of regulatory 
capture or systemic corruption. Rather, the use of the concept here seems to refer instead to 
‘cultural capture’, a nonmaterialist form of capture in which the worldviews of state or regulatory 
actors are largely induced by industry members, and where “those regulators might make decisions 
because their conception of the public interest has been colonized by industry” (Kwak, 2014, 
p.79)93. Consequently, one participant specified that concept, notably in the context of Alberta’s 
current Premier, Jason Kenney, and his relentless focus on fossil fuel industry development: 
“I wouldn’t go to the level of corruption. I don’t think, you know, Jason Kenney is going 
home with millions of oil sands dollars in his pocket or anything like that. I think he’s a 
true believer […] this is the way that things should operate.” (P01) 
Indeed, the assumption that oil and gas development is unilaterally good for the economy, or that, 
at least, its benefits outweigh the environmental costs, is particularly dominant in Canada – 
especially in Alberta. Based on this, it is possible to see the interrelation between oil development, 
the specific paradigm of economic growth, and the climate crisis: 
“…the birth of the economy – a dematerialised conception of economic flows – was 
enabled by the arrival of oil, an energy source so cheap and so plentiful, from the 1930s, 
 
93 Interestingly, Kwak explains that social capture is rather inevitable, stemming from “the unavoidable byproduct of 
necessary interactions between human beings” (p.95). However, he emphasizes that the regulatory landscape may 
provide more room for such capture. “If the only problem we guard is material self-interest, we will have a regulatory 
process protected from bribery, but not from other influences wielded by motivated interest groups. We should not 
doubt that sophisticated interest groups are doing what they can to achieve cultural capture wherever possible, because 




that a system of general economic calculation could be devised that made no reference 
to questions of the exhaustion of non-renewable resources or the cost of energy. This 
made possible the idea of growth without limits.” (Mitchell, 2013, p.247) 
The emergence of the climate crisis thus comes to challenge the relationship between oil and the 
economy, especially as it imposes explicit ecological limits – which represents a fundamental 
disruption of the economic paradigm of constant, ‘limitless’ growth. Thus, the multiple points of 
friction outlined here – the issues surrounding government inaction as well as the polarization of 
Canadian politics – can be interpreted as the significant disruption stemming from the 
deconstruction of previous economic beliefs as part of a paradigmatic shift surrounding dictating 
economic principles (Buch-Hansen, 2018). However, this transition seems to be limited from 
industry groups using various means of influence to shape the worldviews of both state actors and 
the general public. 
In short, the political inaction of Canadian governments regarding the climate crisis is represented 
as a function of the degree of state strength in relation to the degree of strength of non-state actors. 
In this case, Canada’s strength and intra-state cohesion have remained largely weak for the past 
twenty years. Meanwhile, fossil fuel industry actors, regrouped in a cohesive network both at the 
provincial and federal level, appear to have wielded significant influence for specific policy 






“Moving beyond fossil fuels is more akin to quitting a sect than breaking an addiction.” 
– Pulitzer-winning author Greg Grandin  
This chapter represents the analysis of the findings presented in the previous chapter. The first 
section combines the findings of both cases and the interviews to return to the initial research 
question and hypotheses, and concludes with a discussion on the implications of the study’s 
findings. Subsequently, the second section describes the main research contributions. The third 
section outlines the limitations to this study, while pointing to areas for further research. Finally, 
the fourth section presents the study’s concluding remarks. 
6.1. Implications of Findings 
The case studies’ findings of the previous chapter point to the provincial subsystem being a closed 
network, while the federal subsystem evolved from a closed to contested one. Consequently, these 
findings now allow to review the initial question of this research: To what extent do the policy 
changes applied by the federal and Alberta provincial governments onto the country’s fossil fuel 
industry between 1999 and 2019 reflect the interests of the Canadian oil and gas industry policy 
network? In addition, two hypotheses were developed: 1) networks would have limited actors and 
high insulation from the policy community, resulting in strong resistance from proposed policy 
change; and 2) policy change is limited to incremental change to policy instruments, in turn 
pointing to closed network structures. The findings presented above show a strong alignment 
between fossil fuel industry interests and policy outcomes. However, the analysis of the provincial 




period. The table below (Table 6.1) presents the results of each subsystem in comparison to the 
initial hypotheses, which are partially confirmed.  
Table 6.1: Subsystem Network Findings & Initial Research Hypotheses 
Subsystem Hypothesis #1 Hypothesis #2 
Provincial Partially confirmed Confirmed 
Federal Partially confirmed Rejected 
 
For the provincial subsystem, despite the fact that membership change was rather limited between 
the beginning and the end of the observed period, it is nonetheless punctuated by greater inclusion 
and diversity of actors involved in the policy process. Additionally, the current trend would suggest 
that this closed network may become increasingly contested over time, leading to more significant 
policy change. In turn, this theme was widely assessed by interview participants, pointing to a shift 
of the political landscape in Alberta. “While I think there’s a lot of sort of “buckling down and 
doing what you’ve always done” mentality in Alberta, […] I think the politics in Alberta is 
changing. […] I think the demographics of the province are changing significantly” (P07). 
However, this denotation of political shift was also seen as being mostly halted by the current UCP 
government – as explained earlier. It is for these reasons that the first hypothesis is seen as partially 
confirmed. Meanwhile, the high resistance towards policy change, leading to limited, incremental 
changes to instrument components, confirm the second hypothesis. 
In the context of the federal subsystem, the first hypothesis is also only partially confirmed. As 
explained above, this subsystem was initially a closed network, as predicted. However, the shift 
towards a contested network indicates a degree of network insulation from the discourse 
community that is lower than expected. Finally, this network shift rejects the second hypothesis. 
In turn, the broadening of the federal subsystem was also expressed by an industry participant: 




in the 90s, sure. But in this day and age, I don’t think that’s the case. I don’t think the power always 
rests with us. […] I think now it’s far more open” (P10). It was similarly explained by the vice 
president of another energy industry association in Canada who pointed to a record of limited 
ability to influence policy decisions in recent years: “[Are we] active as a lobbyist? Yes, absolutely. 
[…] but, you know, just because we engage with them on a regular basis [federal government 
officials] – I would point to the government’s policies of the last four or five years, […] where it 
would be evident that certainly the government hasn’t accepted the majority of [the association’s 
policy recommendations]” (P06). 
Consequently, these findings also further consolidate Howlett’s initial model in terms of causality 
mechanisms between network change and policy outcomes. Indeed, in both cases, membership 
change corresponded to the policy change expected as per the initial model. This further supports 
previous studies pointing to the explanatory value of adopting a policy network approach in the 
study of policy decisions. 
Furthermore, the findings also emphasize the importance of having an inclusive and diversified 
policy process. This component was particularly advanced by Blue et al. (2018, p.106); “when 
fossil fuel interests define the contours of climate policy, the pursuit of economic growth will 
continue to trump environmental protection. […] The role played by the fossil fuel industry in 
shaping climate policies is deeply problematic, particularly at a time when bold climate policy that 
will reduce GHG emissions is most urgently needed.” Similarly, the growing pressure to increase 
policy network inclusion could, inversely, require the exclusion of the fossil fuel industry in 
climate and energy policy processes. Indeed, the extent of the climate crisis outlines a deep 
contradiction between the measures deemed necessary to tackle this global emergency, and the 




“…at what point do we start excluding the fossil fuel industry from the policymaking 
table that’s designing policies that will hasten its end? So, at what point was the tobacco 
industry excluded from discussions around setting health guidelines for tobacco? I think 
those questions will need to start happening pretty quickly… but I don’t think we’re at 
that point as a society.” (P07) 
Admittedly, reconciling both economic imperatives and the climate crisis is no small feat – a 
challenge most countries have struggled with. Indeed, while the analysis here shows the poor 
ability of Canadian governments to tackle the climate crisis, their poor performance for the last 
twenty years also reflects that of the rest of the world. “I don’t think Canada’s been any different 
than other parts of the world. In a very general but similar way, all countries have struggled with 
[the climate crisis]” (P06), of which the interviewee pointed to the dichotomy between the urgent 
need to reduce GHG emissions, while still sustaining a world largely built around the use of fossil 
fuels for energy. Consequently, most industry-related interview participants emphasized the need 
for “environmental improvements, on the one hand, and the economy on the other hand. […] You 
can achieve both” (P06). 
Another also pointed to a “spectrum of energy opportunity” (P10), suggesting a transition that 
considers economic and environmental factors at the same time, which may have less dire 
consequences than drastic corrective measures. “To suggest that you’re going to, all of a sudden, 
go off one [source of energy] and go to the other, I think is naïve. And so, how do we support that, 
where you’re supporting an economy, […] but you’re also saying, “we recognize and acknowledge 
that the world around us is changing, here’s all the things that we are doing”?” (P10). While such 




6.2. Research Contributions 
This research has three main contributions. First, the study contributes to policy network research, 
by providing additional empirical evidence to extant PN literature on the importance and value of 
this approach in the analysis of policy decision-making. Second, the study also contributes to 
Canadian political economy literature, notably through its eclectic analytical framework of 
multiple factors affecting policy decisions, especially in the context of Canada’s efforts to tackle 
the climate crisis. Notably, the study provides further evidence regarding the political dynamics 
and some of the sources of inactions within the federal and Alberta provincial governments. 
Finally, the study contributes to the field of ecological political economy. 
This study joins other works advocating the explanatory use of PNs in the analysis of policy 
decision-making, by providing additional empirical evidence that further suggests that policy 
network structure does have a significant impact on policy processes and outcomes. There are 
nonetheless several challenges in doing this, as this study revealed some of the difficulties in 
observing direct causality between the existence of an oil and gas policy network and actual policy 
outcomes within the federal and Alberta provincial governments. The climate crisis is such a multi-
faceted issue, with so many variables, that one cannot conclude that the oil and gas network is 
directly the sole or main cause for political inaction from Canadian governments regarding the 
climate policy, notably with reaching previous and current GHG emissions reduction targets (such 
as the Kyoto Protocol or the Paris Agreement). However, the evidence provided through the 
analysis of these two case studies shows that the fossil fuel PN nonetheless wields substantial 
influence over Canadian governments. Therefore, targeting this power dynamic would be a priority 
in order to enact further climate and energy policy that would have the capacity to transition the 




These findings were determined notably through the application of Howlett’s model observing 
causal mechanisms between network dynamics and their effects on policy outcomes. 
Consequently, this study’s findings also support the use of Howlett’s model, notably by reinforcing 
the initial model through its application within an additional policy domain (i.e., the oil and gas 
industry). Furthermore, the research conducted also provides ways to enhance Howlett’s model, 
particularly by observing beyond policy change, and reviewing instances in which policy change 
has failed to occur – characterized as policy drift. Further research using this model could include 
in their analytical corpus rejected policies as a new way to investigate inaction in numerous fields. 
Secondly, it also contributes more specifically to recent works in the Canadian political economy, 
using a policy network approach to outline the close relationships between oil and gas industry 
actors and political actors. For instance, this research suggests that this PN approach has a valuable 
meaning both at the national and subnational level, by reviewing network ties within provinces 
themselves. The research also pointed to little evidence highlighting lobbying activities as having 
a direct effect on policy decisions, or to explain the relationship between the industry and 
governments. It is particularly difficult to outline such relationship – although further research on 
lobbying practices may help better understand their effects within Canadian politics. However, the 
study outlined a breadth of different means for political influence at the disposal of the oil and gas 
PN, notably regarding media relations and issue framing, as well as ‘cultural capture’. 
Finally, this research contributes to the contemporary field of ecological political economy, a 
subfield within the broader Canadian political economy. Notably, it further outlines ways in which 
extractive capitalism and the political influence of the oil & gas industry has entrenched policy 
decisions towards its own benefits. For instance, while the study refutes arguments of ‘industry 




concept of ‘cultural capture’ to explain the deeply ingrained belief that further oil and gas industry 
development is critical to the Canadian economy – and steadily outweighs social and 
environmental costs. Moreover, this study suggests that the combination of adopting a policy 
network approach within an ecological political economy lens could further enhance this field of 
research. 
6.3. Limitations and Further Research 
The scope and time constraints of a master’s thesis have put certain limits on this research project. 
There are then key limitations to acknowledge. In turn, some of these limitations may also point 
to areas to be addresses through further research. 
One of the study’s main limitations is its time period. While reviewing policy change over twenty 
years provided valuable information, going further back in time may be necessary to fully 
understand some of the policies enacted during the observed period. As such, more research using 
a different or broader timeline, for instance going back to the 1970s or even earlier, would allow a 
greater understanding of the evolution of fossil fuel PNs in the Canadian context, which may 
greatly contribute to outline critical energy development policy that led Canada onto a path-
dependent trajectory towards further oil and gas extraction and production. 
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic restricted traveling to Alberta, which limited the capacity 
to undertake an exhaustive policy network analysis of the fossil fuel PN in Alberta, in the likes of 
the previous studies that have done so at the federal level. Additionally, as this study emphasized 
the importance of conducting PN research at a subnational level, it focused largely on Alberta, 
despite the fact that other provinces extract and produce various fossil fuels. As such, further 




dynamics, for instance in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador, as well as British 
Columbia. 
For various reasons, this study was unable to include members of energy labour organizations or 
Indigenous groups during the interview process. However, this does not imply that their 
perspectives and the role they play in energy and climate policy decisions (from a local to a 
national level) are irrelevant – quite the contrary. As such, the multiple contributions from this 
study previously described may be enriched by further research that includes labour groups and 
Indigenous communities in its scope of analysis. 
Furthermore, the thematic analysis presented in the previous chapter represents a wealth of 
concepts and themes to study. Each of the themes outlined, as well as their interrelations and their 
implications on climate and energy policy (in)action, may be enriched with further research. For 
instance, a few interview participants described the link between climate policy inaction and 
increasing socioeconomic inequality in Canada. Indeed, never in the history of this country has the 
economic gap between different social groups been so large – and is still likely to continue to 
widen (Peters, 2020). In turn, while inequality and the climate crisis are two important problems 
in themselves, they are seldom studied in relation to each other. 
Another important area of research would be the impact of the climate crisis (and the subsequent 
need for low-carbon energy sources) onto political systems. Particularly, “a larger limit that oil 
represents for democracy is that the political machinery that emerged to govern the age of fossil 
fuels, partly as a product of those forms of energy, may be incapable of addressing the events that 
will end it” (Mitchell, 2013, p.7). Is climate inaction also caused by political institutions that, by 




is such change possible within a reasonable time frame, before reaching an environmental tipping 
point leading to ecological collapse? These questions may become critical as more states begin 
increasing their efforts to meet their 2030 sustainability targets.  
6.4. Concluding Remarks 
This study analyzed climate and energy policy change of the Canadian federal and Alberta 
provincial governments for over twenty years, using a policy network approach following 
Howlett’s model of determining causal mechanisms between PN structure (and its evolution over 
time) with policy outcomes. As such, this study is amongst the few that have observed the 
evolution of policy networks over time, let alone in the Canadian oil and gas industry policy 
domain. It also emphasized the need to put climate and energy policy outcomes within a historical 
context. The findings corroborate with other studies showing the alignment between the oil 
industry’s interest and policy decisions in Alberta, as well as with the federal government. For 
instance, Carter et al. (2017, p.63) show that “Canada’s transformation into a globally significant 
fossil fuel producer and exporter coincided with a transformation in federal governance and 
environmental policy in support of oil and gas activity during the Harper administration of 2006-
2015” – albeit this study shows that policies from other federal governments have contributed to 
this alignment. Similarly, Davidson et al. (2018, p.308) argue that “Alberta has historically paid 
homage to the fossil fuel industry and thus has prioritized development over environmental 
protection as a matter of course”. Finally, this study also joins others who have demonstrated that 
“the structure of policy networks has a clear impact on climate policy” in Canada (Lemphers, 2020, 
p.267). 
Indeed, the findings of this research point to an important alignment of interests between industry 




1990s. However, the study reveals nonetheless growing contestation over policy processes and 
outcomes within federal climate and energy processes (as well at the provincial level, but to a 
lesser degree). There are mainly two reasons for this growing contestation. First, there has been in 
recent years an increase in both population and diversity in the stakeholders involved in policy 
processes, notably as the effects of the climate crisis exert growing pressure on governments to 
tackle and mitigate it. Second, this increase in the number and diversity of actors is also combined 
with decreasing cohesion within the oil and gas industry, which may further hamper its capacity 
to mobilize and wield political influence over key climate and energy policy decisions. However, 
it still appears that oil and gas industry actors regrouped under a policy network with a vested 
interest in the continued future development of the industry remains highly closed and continues 
to wield disproportionate influence on Canada’s climate and energy politics – which may explain 
the limited actions undertaken by Canadian governments to tackle the climate crisis and reach a 
low-carbon society. This issue calls into question the integrity of the democratic function of 
Canadian political institutions, as well as their capacity to tackle such a complex and critical issue 
such as the climate crisis. 
Overall, the performance records of Canadian governments on tackling climate change have been 
critically unsatisfactory. This is caused largely from decades of limited policy initiatives, as well 
as general inaction on policies that were actually enacted, aside from expressed engagements and 
‘willingness to do something’ – even if that ‘something’ has rarely been specifically defined and 
combined with tangible actions. However, the usage of the term “maintenance of the oil 
development status quo” generates some misconceptions.  
While, on the surface, the last twenty years of policymaking may seem to be characterized 




situation than the term ‘status quo’ would imply. There has been more significant change in policy, 
perceptions, and political platforms since the beginning of the observed period. Some progress has 
been made in some areas, while others have regressed – and sometimes quite dramatically. By the 
same token, it is inadequate to neglect the increasing change within the fossil fuel industry, as 
some companies have been rather forward thinking, while others less so. Alas, while it is important 
to acknowledge these differences and the complexity of the cases studied here, the fact remains 
that progress towards reducing GHG emissions has been critically insufficient – as with a strong 
majority of other nations. 
However, recent news may provide a bit of optimism. The new Biden administration in the United 
States has been campaigning on strong promises of new environmental legislation and tackling the 
climate crisis head on – which is a drastic change in tone from the previous administration. As 
Canada’s main trading partner, new climate and energy policy in the U.S. is likely to influence 
Canada’s own climate approach – although there may be some friction along the way, as seen 
recently with the Keystone XL pipeline issue where the U.S. administration rejected the project 
despite the Canadian government’s support of it. 
In addition, the Canadian federal government released in December 2020 an updated climate plan, 
titled “A Healthy Environment and A Healthy Economy” (Environment and Climate Change 
Canada, 2020b). Of particular interest in this Plan is the federal government’s announcement to 
increase the national carbon tax to $170 per ton by 203094. By today’s standard, the resulting 
 
94 Currently at $30 per ton, the Plan proposes an increase of the carbon tax by yearly increments of $10 until it reaches 
$50 per ton by 2023. The tax would then increase by $15 every year, until it reaches $170 by 2030. See the Climate 




carbon price would be higher than any of the current carbon pricing systems across the world95 
(World Bank, 2019). Consequently, such initiatives could potentially put Canada as a contender 
to become a global leader in tackling the climate crisis96. 
It is undeniable, then, that the world is changing. That is not the question. Rather, the question now 
would be, is the world changing in time before an ecological tipping point is reached? The 
optimism expressed here is grounded in the fact that, despite the historical announcement of the 
federal government in December 2020, no implementation plan or legislation have yet been 
presented to actualize this progress. And, if the analysis of the last twenty years of climate and 
energy policy at the federal level done for this study has taught anything, it is that it would be naïve 
to put too much hope on announcements before seeing implementation. 
At the same time, this global change seems to be full of contradiction. For instance, the government 
of Alberta rescinded in spring of 2020 the 1976 Coal Development Policy, which protected large 
areas of the Rocky Mountains from coal mining. Particularly, the rescinding was done without any 
public consultation – while the fossil fuel industry was informed in advance of the public 
announcement (Croteau, 2021). The provincial and national public outrage that followed forced 
the government to reinstate the initial Policy in early 2021, until a new version will be introduced 
(Government of Alberta, 2021b; Ramsay & Croteau, 2021). Regardless, upon the announcement 
of the initial rescinding of the Policy, Robin Campbell, former Alberta minister of Environment 
and current president of the Coal Association of Canada, stated that “coal’s not going away, as 
 
95 As of 2019, the World Bank denotes 57 carbon pricing initiatives implemented or scheduled in the short term, spread 
across 46 countries. While the majority of these initiatives have a price below CAD$37 per ton, Sweden currently has 
the highest tax, at about CAD$155 per ton. See World Bank (2019). 
96 It is worth acknowledging, however, that the implementation of such a high carbon tax by 2030 will only have 
limited effects on the climate crisis at this point, given that global warming is already significant. In other words, 
while a $170 carbon tax would have proved highly effective decades ago, it is highly insufficient on its own today, 




much as people think it is” (Fletcher & Omstead, 2020)97. Similarly, during the 2021 Scotiabank 
CAPP Energy Symposium, CAPP president and CEO, Tim McMillan, stated that “our [fossil fuel] 
industry still has its best days ahead of it” (Healing, 2021). While most likely a call for optimism 
in the face of the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the industry, this statement remains in 
direct contrast with the reality of the climate crisis and the eventual decline of the fossil fuel 
industry. Another contradiction was also witnessed during the study’s interview process. While 
acknowledging the eventual decline of fossil fuel demand worldwide, one industry participant 
suggested that Canada should nonetheless seek to increase its market share of the decreasing global 
oil and gas industry – and even aim to be the country to sell the very last barrel of oil down the 
line.  
The next challenge, then, appears to be over the rate of change. In the first chapter, the term 
‘denialism 2.0’ was introduced to describe the current stance of the fossil fuel industry towards 
climate change, having moved from pure climate denial in the 1980s and 1990s to the illusion of 
progress. Are we about to witness the birth of ‘denialism 3.0’, in which the energy transition is 
carried over too long of a timeframe to prevent cataclysmic ecological disaster? Is this form of 
denialism going to be practiced by both industry and governments alike?98 These questions may 
prove fundamental in order to effectively prevent further climate policy inaction. The future of the 
next generations, as well as our own, depend on it.  
 
97 The contradiction is particularly strong given the province’s boasting of its phasing-out of coal for generating 
electricity. Granted, some of the coal projects in the Rocky Mountains are directed for exporting industrial coal, used, 
for instance, in steel production. Regardless, this policy decision remains widely inconsistent with calls to decrease 
overall coal use worldwide given the high rate of emission of this fossil fuel. 
98 Similarly, during the 2019 federal election leaders’ debate, NDP Leader Jagmeet Singh criticized both (former) 
Conservative Leader Andrew Sheer for his anti-carbon tax platform, as well as Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau 
for failing to take more action on the climate crisis since he was elected in 2015. Singh notably referred to them as 
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Appendix 1. Summary of Policy Change Data Sources – Alberta Provincial Subsystem 
Policy Goals 
Pre-1999: the economic development of the province is primarily done through the expansion of 
the oil industry, particularly oil sands projects. The province’s economic development focus was 
already directed towards increasing oil production under Premier Lougheed (1971-1985). 
However, this period also saw the enactment of Alberta’s landmark environmental legislations, 
leading to the province’s oil and gas industry regulatory framework as being one of the strictest in 
North America. Premier Klein (1992-2006) drastically changed the province’s policy goals 
through his neoliberal, pro-market approach, which led to a wave of deregulation and laissez-faire 
governance, along with an increased focus on oil industry expansion99. This resulted in Alberta’s 
oil boom, while simultaneously following a series of streamlining and policy drift of the industry’s 
regulations, notably affecting environmental regulations. 
Programme Specifications  
• 2016 – Energy Efficiency Alberta Act 
o Creates the new Crown corporation Energy Efficiency Alberta, which has the mandate 
to, among multiple objectives, raise awareness to energy consumers, develop programs 
for energy conservation and small-scale renewable energy generation100. 
• 2018 – Methane Emission Reduction Regulation, Alta Reg 244/2018 
 
99 This is often represented through the National Task Force on Oil Sands Strategies. 
100 It is worth mentioning that this Act was repealed in 2020 under the UCP’s Red Tape Reduction Implementation 
Act, despite accounts of significant returns in both energy conservation and reduced emissions for households and 
small businesses (Efficiency Canada, 2019). However, this Act is still considered here since it was repealed passed 




o Following the initial plans under the NDP’s CLP, the methane reduction regulation is 
enacted in 2018, aiming to reduce methane emissions by 45 per cent from 2014 levels 
by 2025. However, the regulation is scheduled to come into effect only on January 1st, 
2020 and, as of December 2020, is still under equivalency review with the federal 
methane reduction regulation. 
Policy Instrument Types 
• 2000 – Energy Resources Conservation Act (ERCA) 
o Mainly a renewal of the Act’s previous 1980 version, it brings forward the 
“consideration of the public interest” within the development of energy resources101. 
However, the interpretation of the ‘public interest’ for this Act and other related 
regulations implies that the development of the province’s energy resources is 
automatically in the public’s interest. 
• 2003 – Emissions Management and Climate Resilience Act (EMCRA), formerly known as 
the Climate Change and Emissions Management Act (CCEMA) 
o New legislation for the implementation of Alberta’s action plan on climate change, 
targeting emissions reduction through ‘energy intensity’, but with little impact on the 
fossil fuel industry’s absolute emissions output (emissions actually increased under this 
legislation). 
o The legislation is also meant to reaffirm Alberta’s jurisdictional power over its natural 
resources, enabling the contestation of future federal GHG regulation – as seen earlier. 
• 2009 – Alberta Land Stewardship Act (ALSA) 
 




o Abstract ‘super-legislation’, amending 27 provincial Acts. Legal instrument for the 
implementation of the Land-Use Framework (LUF), enacts significant changes to the 
province’s land-planning and development law. Criticized for leading to legislative 
slippage and providing extensive discretionary power to the province Cabinet and 
limiting public participation for energy projects and development of regional plans 
(notably with the rejection of policy recommendations from the CEMA and MSC). 
• 2011 – Mine Financial Security Program (MFSP) 
o Significant improvements of the previous land conservation and reclamation legislation 
regarding oil sands projects. 
• 2012 – Responsible Energy Development Act (REDA) 
o Following the recommendations of the Regulatory Enhancement Task Force, repeals 
and replaces the Energy Resources Conservation Act (ERCA). The Act is meant for the 
improvement of energy regulation for landowners, industry, and the environment, and 
streamlining of approval process for oil and gas projects. As seen earlier, this act 
reshapes the approval process of oil and gas industry projects, in a way that largely 
hinders public participation in these matters, while removing regulatory decision-
making from the AER to the provincial government. 
o Centralization of regulation for all energy projects within the AER, criticized as being 
a “one-stop shop” by merging the Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB) and 
the Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource Development (ESRD) into the 
AER102. Raises substantial concerns: reduced public participation to energy project 
 
102 The AER is seen as widely prioritizing industry development over its mandate of environmental protection. Refer 




hearings and process, limits procedural fairness, alleged reduced independence of 
regulator and further alignment with interests of the fossil fuel industry. 
Instrument Components 
• 2004 – Specified Gas Reporting Regulation (SGGR) 
o Requires Alberta oil and gas facilities emitting more than 100,000 tonnes of GHG per 
year to file annual emissions reports. 
• 2007 – Specified Gas Emitters Regulation (SGER) 
o Enforcement of SGRR for emissions reduction of large emitters. Despite being the first 
carbon pricing system in Canada, it is criticized for targeting less than 45% of the 
province’s emissions, having a carbon price level too low to generate a financial 
incentive for emissions reduction, and, under its intensity-based approach to emissions 
reduction, still allows for substantial increase in absolute GHG emissions. 
• 2008 – “Alberta’s 2008 Climate Change Strategy: Responsibility / Leadership / Action” 
o The Strategy includes three themes: energy efficiency and conservation; carbon capture 
and storage; and sustainable energy production. It calls for the intensity targets set in 
the 2002 plan to be reached by 2010; for GHG emissions to be stabilized by 2020; and 
for an absolute GHG emission reduction of 14% below 2005 levels by 2050 – with two 
thirds of this reduction relying on CCS projects. Overall, the plan is seen as too weak 
to constrain emissions, in fact allowing emissions from oilsands to continue to increase 
significantly. 
• 2009 – Surface Rights Amendment Act 
o Streamlining of the regulatory process, increase in efficiency, empowering of the 




• 2009 – Carbon Capture and Storage Funding Act 
o Creates an annual plan and budget for the development of carbon capture and storage 
projects in the province. 
• 2010 – Carbon Capture and Storage Statutes Amendment Act 
o Develops the province’s legislation for CCS technology implementation, as main 
approach for reduced GHG emissions. Criticized for being largely ineffective, with little 
to no emissions reduction so far.  
o The CCS approach represents largely the provincial government’s sustained effort to 
further develop the fossil fuel industry for economic growth. Even if CCS projects were 
to significantly offset GHG emissions (which they have yet to do), this approach to 
carbon emissions removes some of the imperative to decrease oil and gas production 
and consumption. 
• 2011 – Alberta Land Stewardship Amendment Act 
o Designed to further clarify some of the criticisms to the initial Act, but is argued to 
further add ambiguity onto the Act’s mandate and purpose. It also fails to address issues 
of discretionary power and limited public participation. 
• 2012 – Lower Athabasca Regional Plan (LARP) 
o Developed under the Land-Use Framework (LUF) and ALSA to provide objectives for 
land and water use, as well as cumulative effects assessments. However, the regional 
plan is mostly seen as a continuation of previous policies, and ensures the sustained 
growth of the oil sands in the region. 




o Establishes the Alberta Environmental Monitoring Evaluation and Reporting Agency, 
mandated with obtaining credible and relevant scientific data regarding the condition 
of the environment in Alberta. However, the Act is largely criticized for failing short of 
creating an independent agency, while giving government with the discretion to appoint 
the agency’s directors. Additionally, the 18 amendments proposed to correct the 
outlines flaws of the bill were all rejected by government. 
• 2013 – Alberta Wetland Policy 
o The new policy, under the Water Act, replaces the 1993 interim policy103. While the 
2013 version is an improvement of the previous policy, it represents mostly only 
incremental changes that have been criticized as falling short from a comprehensive 
wetland protection policy. 
• 2015 – Specified Gas Emitters Amendment Regulation 
o Amends the SGER to extend its duration until 2017. It also improves regulation for 
large emitters: stricter intensity-based emissions reduction requirements and increased 
per-tonne price for exceeding emissions, but fails to broaden the SGER’s limited scope 
for targeted emitters. 
• 2016 – Oil Sands Emissions Limit Act 
o Legislates an annual cap of 100 Mt on emissions from oil sands production. While such 
an absolute limit on emissions is a major change in fossil fuel industry regulation, the 
current limit still allows for a significant increase of oilsands development and 
emissions, while also including several exemptions for specific as well as discretionary 
 




oil sands projects. The Act also lacks substantial information regarding its 
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. 
• 2016 – Royalty Review Panel 
o The newly-elected NDP government launched a royalty review panel to reform the 
previous regime, still criticized for being too low. However, the review resulted in only 
minor adjustments to the existing royalty regime. 
• 2017 – Carbon Competitiveness Incentive Regulation (CCIR), Alta Reg 255/2017 
o Replaces the previous SGER as the new GHG reduction regulation and adds further 
regulation instruments for the provincial carbon pricing system. Although the CCIR is 
viewed as an improvement from the SGER, it is far from perfect – it notably has little 
effect on limiting the growth of the oil and gas industry. 
• 2018 – Energy Diversification Act 
o Authorizes the Minister of Energy to launch programs focused on the economic 
growth and energy diversification of the province, totalling $2 billion in investments 
in petrochemicals, petrochemical feedstocks and bitumen partial upgrading. 
• 2018 – Growth and Diversification Act 
o Amends the Investing in a Diversified Alberta Economy Act, Promoting Job Creation 
and Diversification Act, and the Alberta Corporate Tax Act, in support of the 
previously enacted Energy Diversification Act. 
• 2019 – Technology Innovation and Emissions Reduction Implementation Act 
o Renames the CCEMA into the EMCRA, adds the Technology Innovation and 
Emissions Reduction (TIER) regulation (Alta Reg 133/2019) to the EMCRA, which 




province. It was largely criticized for reducing pressure on large emitters and polluting 
industries, notably oil & gas, to reduce their emissions, and also for having been 





Appendix 2. Summary of Policy Change Data Sources – Federal Subsystem 
Policy Goals 
Pre-1999: Despite growing ambition of PM Chrétien’s liberal federal government (1993-2003) 
towards sustainable development and tackling climate change, notably following the objectives of 
the Kyoto Protocol, it admittedly had little action to show for. Instead, this period is more 
characterized by drastic budget cuts to Environment Canada (30% between 1988 and 1998), 
increased focus on free trade and pro-market policies leading to considerable energy commitments 
and fossil fuel industry expansion, and an overall lack of national climate or energy strategy, 
instead combined with increased devolvement of energy and environmental governance from the 
federal level to the provinces104. 
• *2015/2016 – Signature of the Paris Accord on Climate Change & Pan-Canadian 
Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change 
o Sets the objectives to cut emissions by 30 percent from 2005 levels by 2030. Following 
the signature of the Accord, the Pan-Canadian Framework, which represents Canada’s 
first true climate change plan, outlines specific actions that would sustain economic 
growth while reducing GHG emissions (new building codes, promoting electric 
vehicles, smart-grid technologies, reducing methane emissions, protecting natural 
carbon sinks, reducing emissions from government operations). The framework is then 
used as a benchmark for provinces and territories (where each can either adopt it or use 
their own plan as long as it is at least as stringent as the Framework). 
o If fully implemented, the Pan-Canadian Framework could represent a significant 
change in Canada’s overall policy goals regarding economic development and climate 
 




policy. However, the fact that Canada is currently unlikely to meet its 2030 INDCs 
under the Paris Agreement comes to question the extent of the federal government’s 
commitment to the Framework. It therefore remains to be seen if this will represent an 
actual change in policy goals. 
Programme Specifications 
• 2012 – Reduction of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal-Fired Generation of Electricity 
Regulations, SOR/2012-67 
o Coming into effect in 2015, this regulation enforces a performance standard of 420 
tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions per Gigawatt hour (t/GWh) onto new and end-of-
life facilities, in order to induce a coal phase-out across the country by 2053. 
• 2015 – Pipeline Safety Act 
o A major development in the regulation of pipelines in Canada, the Act amends the 
Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act and the National Energy Board Act, and enacts 
multiple new regulations. It expands liability limits for pipeline operators and oversight 
powers of the NEB over federally regulated pipelines and reinforces the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle. Operators also remain responsible for pipelines even when abandoned. 
• 2018 – Regulations Amending the Reduction of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal-Fired 
Generation of Electricity Regulations, SOR/2018-263 
o Amends the initial regulations enacted in 2012. The amended regulation now requires 
all coal-fired electricity generating units to comply with the performance standard. 
These changes would allow Canada to reach a complete coal phase-out by 2029, 24 





Instrument Types  
• 1999 – Canadian Environmental Protection Act 
o New and updated statute replacing the initial CEPA enacted in 1988. It strengthened 
several components of the law, notably regarding human health, environmental 
protection, and pollution prevention. While the CEPA is a very important and powerful 
law in the country, an internal review conducted by Environment and Climate Change 
Canada (ECCC) outlined several areas of improvement within the statute, especially 
with regards to GHG emissions reduction105. 
• 2009 – Budget Implementation Act, 2009 
o Significant deregulation of the NWPA legislation, significant reduction of waterways 
protected under the Act. Also provides broad discretion to the government to further 
exempt projects and waterways from the NWPA’s approval process. 
• 2012 – Jobs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity Act 
o Following the 2012 “Responsible Resource Development Plan”, this omnibus bill 
amends 69 laws, virtually all of the federal legislation for environmental governance, 
including the National Energy Board Act. Repeals the Kyoto Protocol Implementation 
Act, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 1995, and the National Roundtable 
on the Environment and the Economy Act. 
o Enacts the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, which removes the majority 
of the federal government involvement in EAs, severely limits public participation, and 
places regulation and assessment processes within government’s powers instead of 
previous independent panels. 
 




o It is also worth mentioning that, following the presentation of this omnibus bill, 871 
amendments were proposed by the opposition to the Conservative government – which 
refused them all106. 
• 2012 – Jobs and Growth Act 
o Amends the Navigable Waters Protection Act (NPWA) and renames it as the 
Navigation Protection Act (NPA). Significantly reduces the number and types of 
projects subject to NPA approval, while weakening the capacity to protect Canada’s 
waterways, while nearly all Canadian lakes and rivers are exempted from federal 
oversight. This allows for large industrial development and infrastructure project to 
disrupt waterways with little regard to navigable waters or environmental rights. 
• 2019 – An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, 
to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other 
Acts 
o Repeals the National Energy Board Act, which is replaced by the Canadian Energy 
Regulator Act (CERA). Also repeals the CEPA, 2012, replaced with the Impact 
Assessment Act. Replaces the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency with 
the Impact Assessment Agency of Canada. The new agency will assume an 
expanded role over impact assessments, considering ‘effects’ defined as changes to 
the environment, health, social or economic conditions. Redefines the CEPA, 
2012’s definition of ‘public interest’. 
 
106 The absurdly large quantity amendment was regrouped in 159 votes. On 13th of June 2012, the House of Commons 
held an ‘around-the-clock’ session, which lasted 22 hours, to deliberate on each of those votes. The Conservatives, 




o Introduces the Canadian Navigable Waters Act (CNWA). Reverses several changes 
of the 2012 amendments to the Navigable Protection Act. CNWA expands the 
scope of navigable waters, thus expanding regulation powers over wider number of 
waters. 
o While the replacement of the CEAA, 2012 is seen as an important improvement, 
the new IAA nonetheless falls short on several components of environmental 
protection. Additionally, the bill faced substantial controversy from the extensive 
lobbying from oil and gas industry actors and the subsequent 187 amendments 
proposed by the Senate Standing Committee on Energy, the Environment and 
Natural Resources to weaken the initial bill. 
Instrument Components 
• 2003 – An Act to amend the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
o Numerous changes which have provided positive improvements, but have failed to 
address the fundamental flaws of the EA process. 
• 2008 – Federal Sustainable Development Act 
o Provides the legal framework for a Federal Sustainable Development Strategy, renewed 
every 3 years, in order to increase sustainable development in Canada. While the 
enactment of the FSDA was seen largely as a positive step towards sustainability, the 
contents of the law have failed to provide clear ways to meet its objectives. This is 
represented by the first two Strategies (2010-2013, 2013-2016), which had very 




o The enactment of the FSDA was largely positive, although its effectiveness is largely 
incumbent to the impact of the consequential 3-year Sustainable Development Strategy 
frameworks. 
• 2009 – Budget Implementation Act, 2009 
o Amends the Navigable Waters Protection Act, removing ‘minor works’ projects and 
projects in ‘minor waters’ from requiring EAs. This has significant implications to the 
energy sector, notably regarding the construction of power lines, pipelines, and water 
intakes and dredging. Further reduces public participation from such projects. 
• 2009 – Environmental Enforcement Act 
o Amends numerous environmental laws (notably the CEPA) to strengthen their 
enforcement. Also enacts the Violations Administrative Monetary Penalties Act in the 
same effort. The improvements to enforcement of environmental laws were mostly 
welcomed, but also criticized for not being stringent enough for effective environmental 
enforcement and pollution prevention. 
• 2010 – Jobs and Economic Growth Act 
o Amends the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 1992 with significant changes: 
reduces capacity for legal challenge over EA process and decisions, decreases 
government transparency and public participation regarding EAs and projects submitted 
to the NEB – among others. 
• 2015 – Energy Safety and Security Act 
o Amends the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act, Canada Petroleum Resources Act, 
Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, and Canada-Nova Scotia 




pays” principles into law regarding oil spills, increases liability limit to $1 billion, and 
other measures to enhance the liability regime for oil and gas extraction and nuclear 
operations. 
• 2018 – Regulations Limiting Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Natural Gas-fired Generation 
of Electricity, SOR/2018-261 
o Regulations designed to support the conversion of coal-fired to natural gas-fired 
electricity generation facilities, as well as new natural gas-fired facilities, which, in 
combination with the amendments to the regulations for coal-fired facilities, are part of 
the efforts to accelerate the coal phase-out. However, the transfer from coal to natural 
gas makes Canada still reliant on a fossil fuel for a portion of its electricity. 
• 2019 – Canadian Energy Regulator Act 
o Replaces the National Energy Board (NEB). However, there is little change to the 
structure and level of power of the new Regulator. 
• 2019 – An Act to amend the Federal Sustainable Development Act 
o Amends the Federal Sustainable Development Act, mostly by increasing the 





Appendix 3. Summary of Blocked Policies – Alberta & Federal Governments 
Provincial level: 
• 2002 – The recommendations of the Financial Management (Tuer) Commission aimed to 
significantly change the role and increase the size of the Alberta Heritage Trust Savings, 
the province’s financial asset supposed to offset the depleted value of fossil fuel resources, 
were not adopted by the government. 
• 2005-2010 – Following a multi-stakeholder consultation process, the Alberta Water Council 
(AWC) submitted to the Minister of the Environment two reports107 presenting 
recommendations for the new provincial wetland policy. After two industry actors wrote 
non-consensus letters against these reports108, the AWC’s recommendations were ultimately 
not adopted by the government in the subsequent new wetland policy in 2013. 
• 2007-2011 – The newly-elected Premier Ed Stelmach launched a review of the province’s 
oil and gas royalty system in 2007, leading to a new system intended to increase royalty 
rates and government revenues109. However, by 2010, the provincial government rolled 
back the new royalty regime, essentially reverting to the previous one. 
• 2015-2016 – While the NDP’s royalty review led to minor adjustments that are considered 
as one of the changes in instrument components, it is worth noting that the NDP had 
initially intended much larger reforms of the royalty regime. This review thus represented 
an important political shift from the NDP – in greater support of the oil and gas industry.  
 
107 Part of the Wetland Policy Project Team. See Alberta Water Council (2008). 
108 The Alberta Chamber of Resources and CAPP. See Alberta Water Council (2008). 
109 See “Our Fair Share” Report (Government of Alberta, 2007b). Additionally, the Auditor General of Alberta also 
expressed concerns regarding the province’s royalty regime in his 2007 report. Particularly, aside from the royalties 
deemed too low, the Minister of Energy was also largely criticized for having failed to collect billions of dollars in 




• 2016-2019 – An Act to Ensure Independent Environmental Monitoring repeals the 
Protecting Alberta’s Environment Act, and s.15 of the Environmental Protection and 
Enhancement Act. This policy change returns the Alberta Environmental Monitoring, 
Evaluation and Reporting Agency under Alberta Environment and Parks. This Act was 
seen as positive change, ensuring that the Agency is fully independent in disseminating 
climate change scientific information. However, such changes were largely dissolved by 
the UCP government in 2019. The 2016 change is therefore not considered policy change. 
• 2016-2019 – The enactment of the Climate Leadership Implementation Act and its 
subordinate acts and regulations (notably a carbon tax covering 90% of the province’s 
emissions) would have represented a drastic change of policy goal in the environmental 
and economic direction taken by the government of Alberta. The results would have led to 
absolute limits on emissions on the fossil fuel industry, notably the oil sands, leading to the 
first initiative in decades to actually diversify the province’s energy mix and economic 
drivers for prosperity. However, it was repealed in 2019110 by the newly elected UCP. 
Given the limited effects of this Act on the province’s emissions due to its very short 
duration, it is not considered as part of policy change. 
• 2018-2019 – As part of the NDP’s coal phase-out plan, the government enacted An Act to 
Secure Alberta’s Electricity Future. The legislation was designed for the transition of 
Alberta’s electricity system from an energy-only to a capacity electricity market, which is 
deemed critical to encourage electricity producers to transition towards renewable energy 
sources. This change was intended to have significant impact on Alberta’s electricity 
generation, which is nearly entirely produced with fossil fuels, and is the largest emitting 
 




sector after the oil and gas industry111. However, the UCP government cancelled this 
transition of Alberta’s electricity market toward renewables112. Since it was repealed less 
than a year after its enactment, it is not considered as policy change. 
• 2019 – Along with the repeal of the Climate Leadership Act mentioned above, the first bill 
of the newly-elected UCP in Alberta repealed several other programs developed by the 
previous NDP government113. 
Federal level: 
• 1991 – 1995 – Various attempts by the federal government during this period to develop 
and implement a federal carbon tax. 
• 1994 – The multi-stakeholder Climate Change Task Group published its report with 88 
recommendations for the 1995 federal-provincial “National Action Plan on Climate 
Change”. While these recommendations have been criticized at the time, notably for being 
mostly voluntary-based and already representing mostly the industry’s position on climate 
change, the majority of these recommendations were also never adopted. 
• 2002 – 2011 – The debacle of Canada’s commitment with the Kyoto Protocol, which lasted 
more than a decade, can be discussed in great length. From its ratification in 2002, the 
subsequent “Climate Change Plan for Canada” hardly ever actualized. Then, the Kyoto 
Protocol Implementation Act was enacted in 2007 by a minority Conservative government, 
 
111 As part of its recommendations for a transition to a capacity market, the Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO) 
explained that “the current EOM [Energy-Only Market] will not ensure the investment in new generation that Alberta 
will need in the future. Therefore, the AESO has concluded that Alberta must adopt a different electricity structure to 
meet its objectives for the electricity system”. See Bellefontaine (2016). 
112 Electricity Statutes (Capacity Market Termination) Amendment Act, SA 2019. 





to which their actual commitments to the Protocol have been questioned114. Overall, the 
ambitious emissions reductions targets were never actualized into policy, and Canada, 
under Harper’s Conservative federal government, officially withdraw from Kyoto in 2011. 
• 2006-2007 – Bill C-30, Canada’s Clean Air Act, which intended to amend the CEPA, 1999 
to include greater climate change action, had a tumultuous existence. Its inception by the 
minority Harper government was seen as largely underwhelming, and was further 
strengthened after subsequent readings, only to be cancelled later in the year115.  
• 2007 – The Harper government released its climate plan, Turning the Corner: An Action 
Plan to Reduce Greenhouse Gases and Air Pollution, which notably included a cap-and-
trade emission program and a nationwide coal phase out. The plan was subsequently 
delayed, and later abandoned entirely in 2011, favouring instead sector-based 
environmental regulations. This second approach was also never realized.  
• 2009-2014 – In 2009, Canada signed the Copenhagen Accord, committing to lowering 
GHG emissions by 17 percent relative to 2005 levels by 2020116. However, in 2014, 
Environment Canada issued a report stating that the target will not be met, in fact expecting 
exceeding the emissions target by 116 megatonnes117. The emissions target, along with the 
Federal Sustainable Development Strategy (2010-2013) developed in concordance to 
provide a path to reach the emissions reductions, were never realized. Ironically, instead of 
representing the implementation of sustainable development principles at the federal level, 
 
114 According to Fluker (2015, pp.85-86), “the governing Conservatives had no intention of implementing measures 
under the legislation and, after a failed attempt by environmental groups in judicial review litigation to force the 
government’s hand on its Kyoto commitments, the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act was repealed.” See also 
Lemphers (2020). 
115 See Open Parliament (2007) and May (2007) for greater context of the Bill. 
116 See Environment Canada (2011). 




this period is largely framed as one of policy retrenchment from the Conservative federal 
government, notably through the two historical omnibus bills C-38 and C-45, which saw 
extensive deregulation of virtually every environmental legislation in the country. 
• 2010 – Bill C-311, Climate Change Accountability Act, sponsored by MP Bruce Hyer 
(NDP), was designed to ensure Canada’s climate obligations and further strengthen GHG 
reduction targets. After being passed by the House of Commons, the legislation was 
blocked by a Conservative-controlled senate118. 
• 2013-2016 – The second version of the Federal Sustainable Development Strategy had the 
opportunity to make amends for the previous strategy, but also failed to generate any 
substantial form of policy change regarding GHG emissions or oil and gas production. 
• 2014 – MP Linda Duncan (NDP) introduced as a private member’s bill An Act to establish 
a Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights (Bill C-634), essentially a much more powerful 
and stringent CEPA. It did not become law119. 
• 2015 – Controversy surrounded the newly-elected Liberal federal government’s first 
budget. Despite the election campaign promise of initiating a phase-out of fossil fuel 
subsidies, the budget instead not only cancelled this objective, but also locked the 
subsidies, representing approximately $3 billion per year, until 2025. 
• 2016 – Following the release of the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and 
Climate Change by the newly-elected Liberal federal government, the implementation of 
various parts of the framework (notably the Clean Fuel Standard, methane reductions, 
carbon pricing) was subject to significant delays and policy drift.  
 
118 See Open Parliament (2011). 




Appendix 4. List of Interview Participants 
The interviews are identified in this study using a randomized alphanumerical code. In order to 
ensure confidentiality, every interviewee had control over the degree of their respective 
anonymity, as well as for the title used to represent them. 
P01: Anonymous, environmental lawyer, Alberta 
P02: Anonymous, research manager, think tank in Alberta 
P03: Anonymous, senior official, government of Alberta 
P04: Ed Whittingham, clean energy consultant and former executive Director of the Pembina 
Institute 
P05: Dianne Saxe, environmental lawyer and former Environmental Commissioner 
P06: Anonymous, Vice president, energy industry association 
P07: Nathan Lemphers, Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Ottawa 
P08: Anonymous, senior Director, major energy company in Alberta 
P09: Robert Skinner, energy policy academic, formerly federal government energy department 
official, who established the department’s environmental office in 1974, former Director of policy 
at the International Energy Agency, Director of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies and oil & 
gas industry executive. 
P10: Anonymous, Director, primary sector industry association in Alberta 
